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In 2006, I was asked by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences 
president at the time, Frits van Oostrom, to serve as chairman of the Nether-
lands Board on Research Integrity (LOWI). Out of a desire to contribute to the 
general cause, I accepted. At first, the job wasn’t so demanding, but after a 
few high-profile cases of scientific fraud came to light, the workload became 
significantly heavier. My term ended on January 1, 2015, but the subject of 
“scientific integrity” has continued to fascinate me, and I’ve been exploring it 
in various ways ever since. 
I guess you can say I have been studying scientific integrity for a long time. 
I have read a great deal of scientific literature on the topic, and over the years, 
I’ve collected countless articles from newspapers and magazines about fraud 
cases all over the world. This study is a report of my findings.
This book has become an analysis of the norms and values behind integrity 
and honesty in science and of their development since the mid-1980s. Around 
1985, there was a shift in both the views on and the structure of scientific re-
search. In the Netherlands, this shift coincided with the introduction of the 
system of conditional funding for scientific research (between 1981 and 1985), 
the institutionalization of PhD research, and the establishment of a system for 
research institutes (from 1986). 
This study details the development of the new rules established in various co-
des of conduct for scientific practice and the way in which suspected violations 
are evaluated and addressed. From 2006 to 2015, I participated in the evaluation 
of a large number of suspected violations of scientific integrity submitted to the 
LOWI. Thus, I myself have contributed to the interpretation of the rules and 
codes of conduct. However, this study is a reflection of my own personal views 
and appraisals. In no way does it represent the official position of the LOWI or 
any other body. That said, I do regularly refer to the LOWI’s opinions, which 
are published in anonymized form on its website (https://www.lowi.nl/en/ 
Opinions?set_language=en).
The first reason for releasing a revised version of this study was the publi-
cation of a new Netherlands Code of Conduct for Research Integrity in 2018, which is 
discussed in Chapter 2. With this update, this study can offer a contribution 
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to future discussions on scientific integrity that may arise as a result of the 
2018 Code.
A second reason was the need for an English edition. There is a strong 
desire at Dutch universities to communicate the standards of scientific ethics 
and integrity to students at all levels, from Bachelor to PhD, and English is 
the international language of science. It was Maghiel van Crevel, professor of 
Chinese language and literature at Leiden University, who submitted an urgent 
request to publish the new version in English. I am therefore very grateful to 
Maghiel for insisting on this translation and spontaneously supporting it. He 
has done me a great service with his many comments to improve and clarify 
the text, for which this acknowledgment is simply not enough. I am grateful to 
Leiden University, in particular to the Graduate School of the Faculty of Huma-
nities, for their financial support for this publication. And I would particularly 
like to thank Anniek Meinders of Leiden University Press for her unfailing 
belief in and support for this publication in its original and revised form, in 
Dutch and in English.
I would also like to recognize the many people who, directly or indirectly, 
have helped me to form my opinions and standpoints on the sensitive subject 
of scientific integrity. First of all, my thanks and gratitude go to the LOWI mem-
bers, former members and staff, with whom I have had extremely interesting 
discussions about many aspects related to scientific integrity and the many 
ways in which it has been violated. 
Finally, I would like to recognize a number of people who have helped 
me write this study and its latest revision. First of all, I would like to thank 
the translator Kristen Gehrman for her excellent work and the very pleasant 
way in which we have untangled the many translation knots. I am also very 
grateful to Adriënne Baars-Schuyt, who provided professional and meticulous 
comments on my manuscripts, as she did for the first and second edition. 
Given the specific subjects addressed in this book, one of which was proper 
source-referencing, this was a crucial task. Finally, I’d like to thank my wife, 
Trees Schuyt-van Etten. In my first book, published in 1971, I thanked her for 
the “piano of her soul”. Now, after all of these years, I’d like to thank her for 
the time she has given me and for allowing me to devote so much of my time 
to the subject of scientific integrity.
Kees Schuyt




The subject of scientific integrity has generated a lot of attention in recent 
decades, both in the media—which is all too happy to report on the latest 
fraud or plagiarism scandal—and in the boardrooms of the scientific insti-
tutions that have to respond to it. In the meantime, scientific research has 
continued, but researchers have become more attuned to the fact that scien-
tific integrity is something they need to pay attention to in their laboratories 
and research institutes. Then came the question as to whether we should 
add courses in scientific ethics and integrity to university curricula, which 
are already full as it is. New courses for students and novice researchers have 
been established in recent years, creating a demand for teaching material 
on scientific integrity. But can integrity be learned? Or is it more a matter 
of gaining experience, following good examples and having outstanding 
scientific researchers as role models? This is one of the questions that will 
be addressed in this study.
This book is not designed to serve as a curriculum for prospective stu-
dents or novice researchers. Although I know there is a need for this, I do 
not feel called to address all the possible ethical cases, dilemmas and temp-
tations inherent to scientific research and explain how young researchers 
should respond to each one. Moreover, there are already plenty of good tex-
tbooks available on this topic (Macrima 2005; Comstock 2013; On Being a 
Scientist 2012). It is true that dilemmas can arise in the application of rules, 
especially when rules are not clearly formulated. However, I believe that the 
standards of scientific research are already clear enough: always present re-
search results truthfully and never copy the work of others without properly 
referencing the source. These basic standards are not that difficult. How to 
uphold these standards is something that one learns from experience and 
from the good example of teachers, supervisors and experienced researchers. 
These veterans in the field are responsible for passing on their experience and 
scientific attitude to their students, colleagues and successors.
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This study is also not intended as a policy paper, although I do believe that 
universities in the Netherlands need a more conscious policy on scientific 
integrity. Over the past few years, I have been surprised by the lack of interest 
the Dutch universities have shown for this subject, even though many scien-
tists and administrators consider it an important issue. Two studies that have 
served as shining examples are The Ethics of Science by David Resnik (1998) and 
The Great Betrayal: Fraud in Science by science historian Horace Freeland Judson 
(2004). Almost anything one would like to know about scientific integrity 
and responsible conduct for scientific research can be found in these two 
works; yet, as far as I could tell, neither of them have been widely consulted. 
Both books have served as an example for me in writing this book, and I have 
made extensive use of the authors’ knowledge, experience and insights. They 
are often quoted because, as Marcel Proust put it, “One must never miss an 
opportunity of quoting things by others, which are always more interesting 
than those one thinks up oneself ” (quoted by De Botton 2000: 49; Vanheste 
2012: 16). 
This book is primarily intended for the academic community. The centu-
ries-old concept of ‘community’ in academia is under pressure at universities 
from new terms derived from bureaucracy and economics. Traditionally, 
an academic community consists of scientists—who conduct research and 
teach—their students, Deans, research supervisors, librarians, library users, 
university administrators and treasurers. All of these individuals are faced 
with integrity issues from time to time and many have probably asked them-
selves what exactly integrity means and how it can be promoted within their 
community.
Integrity is based on the trust that exists among the members of an or-
ganization; it is this trust that makes an organization a community. If trust 
is lacking or at risk of being lost, honest behavior becomes more difficult 
to sustain. Eventually, the community is forced to reflect on its actions and 
formulate its own standards of honest behavior. This study aims to make a 
small contribution to this task by outlining and analyzing the developments 
in the field of scientific integrity over the past decades. I hope that readers 
will be able to decide for themselves how they wish to exhibit scientific in-
tegrity in science and research. Thus, this study is not a textbook but a kind 
of scientific essay from which one can draw inspiration for one’s own work. 
Introduction
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But what exactly is scientific integrity? And why should we care about it? 
What are the issues at stake? What do we know about the nature and extent of 
these issues, and what do they tell us about the overall health of the scientific 
field? In this book, I will explore the general concept of integrity, describe the 
social values behind it, and apply those values to science specifically (Chapter 
1). I will then formulate two basic standards of scientific integrity, against the 
background of the establishment of codes of conduct for scientific practice, 
including the most recent such code in the Netherlands (Chapter 2). There-
after I will focus on fraud and other forms of dishonest behavior in scientific 
research and, in doing so, address the difficult question of whether or not 
scientific integrity violations have increased (Chapter 3). Chapter 4 outlines 
how suspected scientific integrity violations are handled in the Netherlands. 
In Chapters 5 and 6, I delve into more specific topics, such as the definition 
of plagiarism and self-plagiarism (Chapter 5) and the important distinction 
between sloppy science and dishonest research (Chapter 6). Finally, in Chap-
ter 7, I examine the university system of self-regulation and consider how we 
can pass down the scientific spirit—of which integrity is a crucial part—to 
the next generation of researchers. 
My personal assessment of the self-regulatory system for addressing scien-
tific integrity complaints in Dutch universities is not entirely positive. In my 
opinion, the Netherlands Code of Conduct for Scientific Practice of 2004/2012/2014 
and the Netherlands Code of Conduct for Research Integrity of 2018 leave too many 
questions about what exactly is and is not “against the rules” of scientific 
practice unanswered, which has resulted in all kinds of vague, unnecessary 
complaints about suspected integrity violations. 
If this book contributes to a deeper awareness of the importance of scien-





Scientific integrity:  
an exploration of an elusive concept
1.1 DISCREDITED BY FRAUD
The growing interest in scientific integrity is a testament to a broader cultural 
trend: honesty is no longer self-evident as a core value of professional activ-
ity. In the Netherlands, integrity has become an important issue in various 
sectors. Since 1992, the theme of professional integrity has been the subject 
of numerous scientific studies, including one on the integrity policy of the 
Dutch police (Lamboo, 2005; Huberts 2005). But this focus on professional 
integrity has not prevented serious integrity violations at all levels of the 
Dutch police force from occurring over the last decade. Political integrity 
became a problem as well. Politicians from various parties have been found 
guilty of dishonesty and had to leave their posts. The construction and real 
estate sectors have also had their share of fraud cases, bringing the issue 
of professional integrity further into focus (House of Representatives Acts 
2002-2003, 28244). Since the 2008 economic crisis, the issue of integrity and 
fraud in the financial and banking sectors has been on the political agenda. 
Apparently, some practitioners in these sectors are under the impression that 
fraud pays off. Scandals such as those involving Madoff (Stewart 2011), the 
Lehmann Brothers (McDonald and Robinson 2009) and other lucrative en-
terprises have prompted new measures against financial fraud in the United 
States. Major financial fraud and money laundering scandals at the Royal 
Bank of Scotland, the Rabobank of Europe and the ING bank of the Nether-
lands, have called the professional integrity of top-level European executives 
into question as well.
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In the Netherlands, we have seen serious cases of fraud in housing corpo-
rations, health care and special education funding. These cases have mostly 
involved the financial conduct and judgment of professional service provi-
ders. Social security fraud is another issue that has received a lot of attention 
in recent years, and the penalties have increased dramatically. The integrity 
of lawyers, public prosecutors, judges and notaries has been called into 
question following a number of notable cases in which rules of honor were 
violated. In the Catholic Church as well, we’ve seen long-concealed cases 
of sexual abuse come to light in recent decades, and a European chapter on 
sexual abuse in the church has been created as a result. Other cases of sexual 
abuse in the church have emerged in Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Germany and other countries as well. And let’s not forget all the scandals that 
have emerged in the world of professional sports, especially the numerous 
doping cases that have emerged in recent years. Anyone who wishes to com-
pare today’s scientific world to that of professional sports should know what 
such a comparison suggests: that winning is all that matters, by whatever 
means necessary. All of these cases raise questions about whether existing 
norms and deep-rooted values are still present in society and whether people 
still take them seriously.
In his Theory of Justice, philosopher John Rawls makes a general remark 
about the relationship between trust and integrity: “In times of social doubt 
and loss of faith in long-established values, there is a tendency to fall back on 
the virtues of integrity: truthfulness and sincerity, lucidity and commitment, 
or as some say, authenticity” (Rawls, 1971: 519-520). One might ask whether 
there will be a large-scale crisis of trust in social institutions in the first de-
cades of the twenty-first century. Of course, such a broad question cannot be 
answered in such a small study, but I do wonder.
It is therefore unsurprising that the interest in scientific integrity has 
increased. One case that attracted a great deal of attention in the US was the 
“Baltimore affair”, which involved suspected research fraud by an employee 
of Nobel Prize-winning biologist David Baltimore. From 1986 to 1996, this 
case had a direct and indirect impact on the professional lives of many scien-
tists and academics. Since the fraud was carried out with taxpayer money, 
members of the US Congress got involved. In 1989, the US government es-
tablished an Office of Scientific Integrity, which was renamed the National 
Office of Research Integrity in 1992. The Baltimore affair would eventually 
become the subject of several extensive reports by the National Academy of 
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Sciences and numerous individual studies (Kevles 1998; Freeland Judson 
2004: 191-243). 
Scientific integrity concerns all areas of science, not just research fun-
ded by the government. Following a much-discussed plagiarism case in the 
Netherlands (the Diekstra affair, 1996-1998), three Dutch organizations, the 
Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), the Association of 
Universities in the Netherlands (VSNU), and the Netherlands Organization 
for Scientific Research (NWO) joined forces in 2001 to address the issue of 
scientific integrity. In May 2003, the Netherlands Board on Research Integrity 
(LOWI) was established, and a code of conduct for scientific researchers was 
drawn up. This code, known as the Netherlands Code of Conduct for Scientific Prac-
tice, was first published in 2004 and went into effect on January 1, 2005 (with 
revisions in 2012 and 2014; hereafter, for convenience it will mostly be referred 
to as the “2004/2012/2014 Code”). In other countries, such as Norway, Den-
mark and England, a similar trend has been observed: a high-profile scientific 
fraud occurs and then governments and universities are compelled to take 
action. But is this all too little too late? And what is scientific integrity anyway?
1.2 INTEGRITY AS A STANDARD LINKED TO ONE’S POSITION
Scientific integrity falls under the umbrella of scientific ethics. In addition to 
integrity and honesty, scientific ethics includes issues such as the treatment 
of animals, the handling of subjects and patients, the permissibility of cer-
tain research methods (e.g. in the case of cloning and stem cell research), 
and the propriety of client relationships. Of these various aspects of scientific 
ethics, this study will focus primarily on the role of integrity. Client relation-
ships are only mentioned in the context of commissioned research.
On the whole, I consider integrity to be a social value that is linked to one’s 
role in society. Each profession has its own standards of conduct, which may 
vary according to the social context in which its practitioners operate. The 
definition of misconduct is linked to this context. For example:
 – Officials may not accept money or favors for certain services 
or to help sway decisions. They may not use their position to 
distribute favors or offer jobs to friends, relatives or business 
partners outside of the standard regulations.
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 – Doctors have a universal duty to help anyone in mortal danger, 
regardless of his or her nationality or of enmity; they are also 
bound by standards of professional confidentiality.
 – Lawyers are also bound by standards of professional confi-
dentiality and have a duty to maintain both professional and 
financial independence from their clients; thus, any funds 
entrusted to their care must be kept strictly separate from their 
own affairs.
 – Judges must remain impartial at all times. They may not, as 
Judge Azdak in Bertolt Brecht’s classic play The Caucasian Chalk 
Circle, use the seat of justice to serve private interests (Brecht 
1955; 2003: 90) or accept gifts from grateful citizens. 
 – Priests must uphold the values of their office. If they have 
taken an oath of celibacy, they are banned from all forms of 
sexual contact. This code of conduct is only applicable in the 
context of their faith, as there would be no reason to impose 
celibacy on the general public.
 – Journalists have a duty to truthfully report what they see, hear, 
or otherwise gather as newsworthy facts; this can result in 
specific problems for spin doctors and embedded journalists 
aiming to convey a specific message.
 – The business community has developed its own standards for 
handling bribes and established rules to prevent conflicts of 
interest and insider trading, but the use of lies and deceit in 
ordinary sales and purchases is less strictly regulated. When 
it comes to selling used cars or other items, for example, the 
caveat emptor is that all sales are at the buyer’s own risk, no 
matter how naïve he or she may be.
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All of these examples illustrate how integrity is linked to specific standards, 
which are derived from the institution’s core values. These values tend to vary 
from one social sector to another; this is to be expected in an open society 
where people have different tasks and roles. Thus, it goes without saying that 
values in academia differ from those in other sectors of society. However, 
this can create tension, particularly when leaders from other sectors—for 
example, politicians—with different values and interests interfere with sci-
entific research or try to impose their values on it. In this study, integrity 
is narrowly understood as the maintenance of standards linked to specific 
social positions, and not as, for example, compliance with general legal 
obligations that already apply to all citizens, regardless of where they live or 
work.
In society, there is nothing wrong with inventing a story and calling it a 
work of fiction. In science, however, inventing research data constitutes a 
major violation of the standards of responsible scientific behavior. Thus, in 
literature, fabulation is a norm; whereas in science, it is a violation of a norm. 
A classic example of this (which will be discussed later) is the case of Cyril 
Burt, a British psychologist who was found guilty of fabricating research data 
from 1952 to 1962. Of course, this is not to say that scientists are not allowed 
to use the power of their imagination to formulate new hypotheses, but they 
have to make sure their fantasies are not presented as facts.
There are plenty of instances where it is perfectly acceptable to copy other 
people’s words. For example, it’s not unusual to retell someone else’s joke 
without mentioning the source. In journalism, press releases are often copied 
word-for-word without reference to the source. And in the church, old ser-
mons from predecessors are sometimes reused. Government ministers will 
often adopt texts written by civil servants in their entirety and publish them 
under their own names at the end of their term in office; this is a generally 
accepted practice. And in the judiciary, copying judgments written by colle-
agues is far from forbidden. In fact, many judges prefer to copy the words 
of others because a departure from widely accepted formulations can raise 
questions. These are all cases in which the literal copying of others’ texts is 
not regarded as a problem. In science, however, copying is not permitted, at 
least not without properly acknowledging the source. 
Scientific Integrity
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1.3  INTEGRITY AS A STANDARD FOR ONE’S OWN BEHAVIOR
Although there has been plenty of talk about integrity, there are only a few 
studies that delve into what the concept actually means and where it comes 
from. The Latin word integer was initially used in a quantitative sense to mean 
‘whole’ (i.e. whole numbers), ‘undamaged’, ‘untouched’, ‘unharmed’ and 
‘complete down to the last detail’. But according to the classicist Cornelis 
Verhoeven, around the time of Cicero it took on a qualitative meaning of 
‘honest’, ‘inaccessible to corruption’ and ‘incorruptible’ (Verhoeven 2002: 
208). Around the same time, the poet Horace used the words integer vitae in 
one of his famous Odes (1, 22), which would be translated by Piet Schrijvers 
as “whose way of life is free from evil deeds” (Horace, tr. Schrijvers 2003: 232 
and 233). In Cicero’s De Officiis, the term integer is used as well, this time in the 
sense of “living in accordance with nature” (Cicero, Book III: 3: 13). Cicero 
notes that honest people are called to govern the masses and to protect the 
weak from injustice. He refers to Socrates, who said that the most direct way 
to a good reputation is to “be the person we wish to be” (Book II: 12: 41-43; 
translation Higginbotham 1967: 113-114; Beebe 1995: 7-16). The essence of 
integrity lies in the intrinsic motivation to follow virtue, not in the desire 
to use it as an instrument of self-interest (Book III: 33: 18; Higginbotham, 
1967: 182). In this sense, the concept of integrity is still present in moral 
philosophy today.
In his description of integrity, the Anglo-American philosopher Bernard 
Williams emphasizes the responsibility one feels for one’s own behavior, 
regardless of its usefulness or benefit and regardless of the behavior of others 
or the demands that others make of you:
“a consideration involving the idea, as we might first and very 
simply put it, that each of us is specially responsible for what 
he does, rather than for what other people do. This is an idea 
closely connected with the value of integrity” (Williams 1973; 
10th edition, 1993: 99). 
In other words, integrity is about commitment—the commitment that one 
makes to one’s own chosen values. These values provide a moral identity to 
which one’s behavior can be attuned, and the commitment to these values 
brings unity to one’s thoughts, desires and actions. In my opinion, Wil-
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liams’s general description of integrity can be applied to scientific integrity as 
well. Although certain aspects of his notion of integrity have been criticized 
(cf. Fleischacker 1992: 227-231; Markovits 2009), it includes two aspects that 
are widely accepted. First, integrity is part of a whole; it’s a plan or project that 
lasts a lifetime. Secondly, having integrity means that one does not carry out 
actions that are directly in conflict with one’s values. In other words, when 
people with integrity fail to adhere to their own values, they can’t bear to look 
at themselves in the mirror. Other writers note that integrity involves taking 
responsibility for one’s own actions and speaking and acting with conviction 
(Carter 1996).
The Oxford English Dictionary defines integrity as “the quality of being 
honest and morally upright” and as “the state of being whole or unified” 
(OED 2012). In other words, integrity is striving for honesty, sincerity and 
truthfulness, or freedom from moral corruption. “Scientists have intellectual 
integrity insofar as they strive to follow the highest standards of evidence and 
reasoning in their quest to obtain knowledge and avoid ignorance” (Resnik, 
1998: 84). Integrity leads to mutual trust. In her short introduction to Research 
Integrity and Responsible Conduct of Research, Ann Nichols-Casebolt refers to a 
definition provided by the Institute of Medicine in 2002: “Integrity in the 
conduct of research has been defined as an individual’s commitment to 
intellectual honesty and personal responsibility that embraces excellence, 
trustworthiness and lawfulness” (Nichols-Casebolt, 2012: 3-4; Institute of 
Medicine, 2002).
The fact that integrity as a social value has received so much more attenti-
on over the past decade isn’t all that surprising. I suspect that this isn’t only 
due to the rise in high-profile integrity violations, coupled with diminished 
trust in various social institutions (e.g. churches, banks, politics and go-
vernment, science), but also—and perhaps even more so—due to the effect 
that so many rapid changes have had on people’s personal identities. Grudin 
notes: “More than a virtue or group of virtues, integrity is an affirmation of 
self in a world where the defining outline of an individual often seems to be 
no more than a transparent and absorbent membrane between impersonal 
inner and outer forces” (Grudin, 1982: 48). According to Grudin, the charac-
teristics of integrity are trust in oneself, stability of character, and spiritual 
perseverance. These qualities do not manifest themselves in a single instance 
of behavior, but in a series of challenges that take on different forms (idem: 
47-48). The result is unity between one’s internal standards and external 
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behavior. People of integrity demonstrate a conscious consistency in their 
thoughts and actions, which persists over time. But just because someone 
has integrity does not mean that he or she is a superhero. Even honest people 
will be surprised, frustrated or confused from time to time. However, they are 
less likely to fall victim to morally compromising circumstances. A person 
of integrity is prepared for anything and always ready to act appropriately 
(Grudin, 1982: 51; 1990: 73-75).
When it comes to understanding the concept of scientific integrity, I find 
Williams’s description— ‘consciously choosing to take responsibility for 
one’s own behavior’— particularly useful because it implies that integrity 
is not bound by external pressures. It is also separate from the behavior 
and exhortations of others. This emphasis on autonomy is characteristic of 
most professions (doctors, lawyers, architects, etc.), but it also offers a good 
characterization of scientific research as a specific profession. Approximately 
5% of all university graduates go on to pursue a career in science and research 
(Chion Meza 2012). The integrity required for such a profession must be per-
sonally internalized as a standard for one’s own behavior: “This is how I want 
to behave; this is how I should behave; this is how I will behave.”
In some professions, this promise is actually verbalized at the start of 
one’s career in the form of a professional oath, for example the attorney’s 
oath or the Hippocratic oath (Houtzager 2004: 11-26). Would such an oath 
also be useful in the academic and scientific world? If so, when should it be 
taken? At the beginning of one’s university studies, at the onset of a research 
project or upon graduation? Obviously, people aren’t born with an internal 
standard of integrity. They are born with the ability to internalize cultural 
influences, which may later be reflected in their behavior. These cultural in-
fluences can lead to exemplary behavior among professional colleagues, who 
in turn can serve as sociological role models for others, particularly young 
people. Ultimately, they can internalize this behavior as well. This process of 
internalization, which goes beyond social control or the fear of punishment, 
is, in my view, crucial to the development of scholarly attitudes and scientific 
integrity. The scientific and academic community have an important role 
to play in this, namely in promoting the values of scholarship through role 
models (mentors, lecturers, promoters, research leaders) and passing them 
on to younger generations (see Chapter 7).
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1.4   SCIENTIFIC VALUES AND THE BASIC STANDARDS  
OF INTEGRITY 
Anyone who chooses to enter a scientific field is also choosing to accept the 
specific values inherent to science. There is a higher demand for honesty and 
transparency in science than in everyday life, where a little lie can sometimes 
be justified. But given that science is primarily concerned with developing 
its own truths, which can sometimes be diametrically opposed to social 
judgments or prejudices, it is important to consider the way in which scien-
tific truths are formulated. Science has developed its own values, which are 
generally associated with openness, honesty, scrupulousness, objectivity, an 
unbiased attitude, independence and a love of truth. Take the example set by 
two well-known sociologists, Max Weber and Robert K. Merton. Shortly after 
the First World War, Weber described the choice to enter the scientific field as 
one that should be approached with great care. The scientific profession ad-
heres to specific values; it is a profession with a special ethos, quite unlike any 
other choice of profession. Weber drew a sharp contrast between Wissenschaft 
als Beruf [science as a profession], which is characterized by the independent 
and constant search for knowledge and truth, and Politik als Beruf [politics as 
a profession], which involves the pursuit and exercise of power. In his view, 
knowledge and power are two social values that are fundamentally opposed 
(Weber, 1919; cf. Spinner 1985).
After the Second World War, R. K. Merton followed in the footsteps of his 
fellow sociologist. He gained recognition for his description of the five basic 
values of science (Merton, 1949; 1966: 550-561):
 – Communalism: Scientists have a duty to exchange ideas and 
disclose information. The cooperative assessment of know-
ledge is necessary to stimulate knowledge growth.
 – Universalism: Knowledge can be universally acquired and 
disseminated. It is not bound to any nationality, ethnicity, re-
ligion or political perspective (cf. the rejection of Einstein’s 
theory of relativity on ethnic grounds in Nazi Germany; the 
acceptance of Lysenko’s pseudoscientific theory of heredity 
on political grounds in the Soviet Union).
Scientific Integrity
22
 – Disinterestedness: Science is its own domain; it is not depen-
dent on other non-scientific or political interests.
 – Organized skepticism: We don’t know everything yet; our 
knowledge is not yet sufficiently precise. Scientific claims 
should be critically scrutinized before being accepted. 
 – Humility: in the face of the whole of reality, we only know the 
very beginnings of what exists. 
The question remains whether these values offer an overly idealistic vision of 
scientific practice and whether they need to be revised for our times. Never-
theless, one thing is certain: science adheres to specific values that have been 
developed and solidified over time and that do not necessarily coincide with 
those of other social institutions.
In science, skepticism is a tremendous asset. The moment it is lost or 
forgotten the integrity of science is at risk. The notorious fraud of the London 
psychologist Sir Cyril Burt offers lessons we can learn from. In the late-1950s, 
at the end of a successful career, Burt made a grave mistake. Driven by the 
ideological assumption that intelligence is hereditary, Burt fabricated rese-
arch results and published them along with two co-authors. In 1974, three 
years after Burt’s death, statistician Leon Kamin published a book detailing 
the many gaps in Burt’s research. He had discovered that three of Burt’s 
experiments had the same high correlation coefficient of 0.771, which was 
statistically improbable (Kamin 1974: 59). Kamin tried to contact the two 
co-authors but couldn’t find them. That’s when things really heated up. At 
first, the scientific community attacked Kamin for accusing Burt of fraud, 
but after a few years, a definitive conclusion was reached: Burt’s fraud was 
undeniable, the allegations against him were true, and his biographer could-
n’t find any trace of the two co-authors. In his review of Burt’s biography, 
Mackintosh states that the unacceptability of Burt’s data should have already 
been apparent: “It should have been clear to anyone in 1958 who had eyes. 
But it was only recognized after Kamin pointed out Burt’s totally inadequate 
reporting of his data and the improbable uniformity of his correlation coef-
ficients” (Mackintosh 1980: 174-175; quoted in Colman 1989: 32).
Why did Burt commit scientific fraud? Was it out of enthusiasm for his 
profession, honor, fanaticism for a political conviction? This is just one of 
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numerous cases of blatant scientific fraud. Fraud occurs in all scientific fields 
at all levels. Unfortunately, it is often detected too late, and oftentimes not by 
the scientific community itself but by the media. 
This brings me to the most basic standard of what constitutes a violation 
of scientific integrity, as formulated by LOWI in 2008:
“In the opinion of the LOWI, a violation of scientific integrity is any case 
where open publications and/or conduct violate the general obligation to 
truthfully present data from scientific research, including
(a)  any effort to falsify, manipulate, conceal, fabricate or present 
fictitious data as authentic during the course of scientific re-
search;
(b)  any case where data, literal passages of text and unique and 
original scientific ideas are taken from other sources, without 
correct or complete reference to the source, and are publis-
hed under the author’s own name” (LOWI opinions 2008-1;  
2013-2).
The first basic standard (a) refers to the invention or manipulation of research 
data, whereas the second basic standard (b) refers to plagiarism. While the 
first standard forbids a form of misrepresentation, the second prohibits the 
misappropriation of authorship (Freeland Judson 2004: 184-185). Together, 
these basic standards of science form three core rules of scientific integrity, 
or the avoidance of three core violations commonly known as FFP: “do not 
fabricate”, “do not falsify” and “do not plagiarize.” 
Although these rules are fundamental to scientific practice, they cannot 
be regarded as an absolute norm. Why not? There are numerous instances of 
violations that can only be assessed on the basis of concrete circumstances. 
Let’s consider, for example, the Sokal case. The physicist Alan Sokal wrote a 
completely fabricated article titled “Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward 
a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity” and submitted it to the 
journal Social Text, which published it (Sokal, 1996a). He then wrote another 
article describing the hoax and submitted it to another journal, Lingua Fran-
ca, questioning the critical standards of assessment employed by Social Text 
(Sokal 1996b). His article in Social Text was a parody of the jargon, rhetoric 
and postmodern reasoning styles common to cultural studies of science and 
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technology. Yes, he had fabricated research data. Did he violate scientific 
codes of intellectual honesty? Did he cross a line by transgressing establis-
hed boundaries? I don’t think so. The fact that the article was a parody was 
as plain as day—arguably, it was already evident in the title. According to 
Sokal, the experiment was not intended to cast a bad light on the journal’s 
editorial staff, but rather to protest against an overly subjective conception of 
science, knowledge and truth (see also: Sokal and Bricmont, 1998: 259-267 
and 268-280). In my opinion, the author successfully fulfilled his aim, and 
given the context and intentions, his case cannot be categorized as “fabri-
cated science.” 
The values of the scientific ethos, as described by Merton and later by 
Spinner (1985), are by no means fixed. They need to be reformulated for our 
times to reflect the insights that have been gained from a justified criticism 
of an overly inward-focused and complacent scientific practice. It is not a 
question of whether old values should make way for new ones, but of a rede-
finition of the scientific attitude that can unite scientists young and old, that 
connects old values with new science and present-day challenges. Today, an 
honest and responsible scientific practice calls for: 
 –  curiosity and skepticism
 –  an open mind and sufficient attention to the knowledge system
 –  tolerance and self-awareness of one’s own choices
 –  cooperation and competition (when this stimulates innovation)
 –  universalism and attention to local values
 –  independence of mind and willingness to cooperate
 –  maintaining a criticial attitude towards institutional authority 
and a lasting belief in the value of scientific knowledge
 –  awareness that nothing is certain and the recognition that 
some things can be known more confidently than others 
(Schuyt 2006: 233-241).
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1.5   SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY IN PRACTICE:  
AN INITIAL EXPLORATION 
Now that we’ve formulated the basic standards of integrity, I would like to 
conduct an initial exploration of general scientific practice, which is much 
more difficult to assess than isolated cases of scientific fraud. What does 
scientific integrity look like in practice? Unlike in the governmental, medical 
and real estate sectors, there has been relatively little research into fraud in 
science and academia. The question is whether research into dishonest be-
havior in scientific research is necessary or desirable. Opinions are divided on 
this matter, and it is difficult to determine whether the number of violations 
has actually increased. If one wants to answer the question from a purely 
quantitative perspective, the situation may not seem so dire (more on this in 
Chapter 3). In the United States, the Office of Research Integrity registered 
153 cases of fraud in biomedical and medical research over a period of thir-
teen years, from 1992 to 2005, out of a total of more than 100,000 subsidized 
studies (http://ori.dhhs.gov; Huberts 2005: 29). More recent studies have 
reported that 1-2% of all researchers surveyed admit to having fabricated and/
or falsified data (Fanelli 2009). The best conclusion that we can draw from 
this and other research is simply that we just don’t know how much fraud is 
taking place in the scientific world. Only a well-designed study could provide 
us with a reliable answer to this question.
From a qualitative point of view, however, there is evidence to suggest that 
violations of scientific integrity may be on the rise. Nowadays, we have more 
technology to manipulate texts, data and images than ever before. Authors 
are now able to pluck material from any of the hundreds of thousands of 
scientific articles published each year and publish it under their own name 
without anyone noticing. Moreover, it is possible that the growing competiti-
on for jobs, research grants and contracts has increased the amount of fraud 
taking place. Again, the only real conclusion that we can draw from this is 
that we simply do not yet know if such a causal relationship exists.
What kind of violations should we be concerned about? What might moti-
vate someone to abandon his or her commitment to scientific integrity? And 
how can we encourage students and researchers to internalize the standards 
of scientific integrity and apply them to their research? I will discuss these 
issues in detail in the following chapters. But first, allow me to begin with a 
brief introduction to the central questions at stake.
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Manipulation of research data: errors and mistakes
The fabrication of research data—which is fairly rare—is difficult to detect; 
but what is even more difficult to detect is the manipulation and falsification 
of data. Falsification can occur during all phases of data management, from 
collection to selection, registration, storing, analysis, interpretation and 
presentation. It is not always easy to distinguish intentional falsification 
(fraud) from accidental falsification (error), unless the falsification is system-
atic or evident in faulty statistical analysis and improbable results. Here, 
honesty plays a major role. The practices known as cooking, trimming and 
fudging should be avoided; however, all three commonly occur. Cooking 
refers to the omission of negative results in order to promote the expected 
results. This can be done by trimming, meaning tweaking statistical tests, 
or by fudging, meaning attempting to cast the results in a more favorable 
light (more on this in Chapter 3). It can be tempting to twist or embellish 
one’s own research by omitting or manipulating data, especially in a cultur-
al climate where embellishment, or “upgrading”, is often encouraged. In 
a criminological study, 60% of the students surveyed said that they had no 
qualms with “pimping” their curriculum vitae, even if it meant bending the 
truth (personal communication F. Bovenkerk).
According to David Resnik, these forms of scientific dishonesty must be 
distinguished from mistakes and sloppiness (Resnik, 1998: 56-58). Mistakes 
are part of the scientific process, and errors in measurement are inevitable. 
Errors in reasoning, calculation methods and evidence should be identified 
and corrected by peer reviewers and the scientific community. The same goes 
for typos that affect the accuracy of the data, for example the placement of a 
decimal point (e.g. 0.01 instead of 0.001). Even incorrect page references in 
footnotes, however sloppy and tedious they may be, are generally just mista-
kes; they are not violations of integrity. For theological reasons, Copernicus 
falsely assumed that God had created the world perfectly—and what is more 
perfect than celestial bodies moving in perfectly circular orbits? His theory 
proved to be incorrect, but his research met the standards of the scientific 
method, which means that by today’s standards it would be called “honest”, 
in spite of the faulty reasoning behind it. Mistakes and cases of minor care-
lessness do not constitute a violation of integrity. But according to the core 
rules of avoiding FFP, which certainly extend to the questionable research 
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practices of cooking, trimming and fudging, these mistakes could be regar-
ded as different forms and stages of data manipulation.
Adjusting research results: conflicts of interest 
Adjusting research results, changing texts for non-scientific reasons, 
omitting outcomes that are unfavorable to the parties involved or provid-
ing incorrect or incomplete reports are all examples of dishonest research 
practices. If any of this is done under pressure from clients, the scientific 
independence of the researcher is also at stake. In the 1950s, for example, 
the American tobacco industry started suppressing research that suggested 
a positive correlation between smoking and lung cancer. The industry even 
went so far as to commission research specifically intended to counter these 
claims (Oreskes and Conway, 2010: 136-168).
Researchers, at all levels of their careers, can succumb to external pres-
sure to adjust their research results. Perhaps they are concerned about the 
future of their funding or feel pressured by politics or political ideology; re-
gardless, the question remains as to what extent such adjustments can be to-
lerated. This question becomes even more urgent when scientific researchers 
share their clients’ interests. Researchers may hold management positions 
or shares in the companies that fund their research, resulting in a conflict of 
interest. They may also serve as scientific consultants to the companies or 
public institutions they work for. Potential conflicts of interest such as these 
need to be clearly stated in their report, so that readers will know to examine 
the results critically. Of course, not all commissioned research leads to the 
manipulation of results, but the risk has prompted two new basic standards 
of scientific integrity: known conflicts of interest between the researcher and 
his or her non-scientific interests must be avoided at all times, and any poten-
tial conflicts of interest must be mentioned in the final publication of the re-
search. The latter is intended to reduce the tension between the researcher’s 
own interests and those of his or her clients by making these interests public.
It is impossible to say how often such tensions between clients and re-
searchers arise, but one thing is certain: they do. In their aptly titled book, 
De Onwelkome Boodschap [The Unwelcome Message], Köbben and Tromp 
provide clear examples of how scientific freedom is under threat (1999); they 
maintain that this is largely due to the amount of funding from government 
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ministries and other political institutions. However, these kinds of clashes 
can be easily avoided by drawing up contracts beforehand that establish the 
researchers’ freedom to independently report and publish their results. No-
wadays, such contracts are fairly commonplace.
All of this suggests that there is a problem with the position of science 
and scientists in politics and society. The method regularly used by the NWO 
to allow co-funding ministries to have a major say in the development of 
research needs to be critically examined and vigilantly monitored. These 
ministries are often terrified of receiving even the slightest criticism of their 
governmental policies—but criticism is the very breath of science! Thus, it is 
important to make sure that the specific values and interests of the funding 
institution, particularly those with a political agenda, do not interfere with 
the scientific research at hand. In all cases, there should be enough space for 
the specific values of science: openness, honesty, scrupulousness, nuance, 
freedom, truthfulness—in short, integrity. 
Unconscious bias 
The third (and in my opinion, trickiest) threat to scientific integrity is uncon-
scious bias, often rooted in wishful thinking. Unconscious bias occurs when 
a researcher expects a certain outcome and keeps testing until that outcome is 
achieved. This does not necessarily mean that the results have been tampered 
with or deliberately manipulated, but insufficient skepticism and a less rigid 
approach to statistical testing can still lead to a one-sided representation of 
reality. For example, one group of biomedical researchers demonstrated how 
industry-funded research into the relationship between certain medication 
and thrombosis systematically indicated lower risks of thrombosis than 
the same type of research funded by public sources (Kemmeren et al. 2001: 
131-138). Where does unconscious bias end and manipulation begin? My 
intention here is not to promote a negative attitude towards privately funded 
research, but rather to underscore the researchers’ obligation to report po-
tential conflicts of interest and to encourage the scientific community to play 
a more active role in identifying breaches of scientific integrity.
Scientific integrity: an exploration of an elusive concept 
29
Power relations
One final threat to scientific integrity that I’d like to mention are the 
long-standing power relations in research centers. For example, profes-
sors may try to appropriate their students’ ideas and data into their own 
research or demand that their assistants include their professor’s name on 
publications, when in reality the assistants have done most of the research 
themselves. These practices are not uncommon, though again, we do not 
know when and how often they occur. Such power relations can lead to two 
serious violations of scientific integrity: the denial of authorship on the one 
hand, and the unwarranted attribution of authorship on the other. In the 
former case, an assistant researcher receives too little recognition for his or 
her work; in the latter case, the powerful professor or research leader receives 
more recognition than he or she is due. “Put my name on it” may seem like 
a simple request, but it is often a distortion of the person in power’s actual 
contribution and an attempt to see his or her name on as many publications 





The codification of behavioral standards  
for scientific research
2.1  MUDDYING THE WATERS OF SCIENCE: THE STAPEL AFFAIR
In early September 2011, the scientific community in the Netherlands was 
rattled by reports of a remarkable case of scientific fraud committed by so-
cial psychologist Diederik Stapel, a well-established and highly respected 
professor at Tilburg University. It turned out that Stapel had been inventing 
research data and fabricating his own experiment results for years. The fraud 
was discovered by a group of young PhD students, who, while repeating some 
of Stapel’s experiments, did not arrive at the same results. Pretty soon, they 
began to doubt his statistical calculations and outcomes as well—and with 
good reason. Their distrust eventually compelled them to bring the case to 
the attention of the Rector Magnificus, who soon confirmed that Stapel was 
guilty of very serious academic fraud.
After a few days, Stapel confessed and resigned as professor. A committee 
chaired by Professor Pim Levelt carried out a deeper investigation into all of 
Stapel’s scientific articles. It soon became clear that in previous years, when 
he worked at the University of Groningen, he had also manipulated and fa-
bricated data in a large number of his articles, many of which were written 
with co-authors. A total of 55 articles with Stapel’s name on them contained 
fraudulent information and ten dissertations carried out under his supervisi-
on were based on his fabricated and/or manipulated research data (Levelt et 
al. 2012). Stapel had knowingly put the careers of young scientific researchers 
in jeopardy. If you ask me, this is as reprehensible as the fraud itself, though 
this aspect of the case attracted far less public attention. Who knows how 
much damage his actions have had on the careers of others?
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What’s going on here? Is this an extreme case of scientific fraud, the kind 
that only occurs once a decade? Or is it indicative of certain structural flaws 
in scientific research and/or the culture within scientific organizations them-
selves? The Stapel affair certainly warrants further research, especially given 
the fact that similar violations of integrity have occurred in other sectors of 
society as well.
2.2  SOME EXAMPLES OF FRAUD 
The Stapel affair was not the first case of guile and deceit in science—and 
it wasn’t the last, as we will see below. There have been countless cases of 
scientific fraud throughout history, some of which are downright absurd. 
There was the case of William Summerlin, a dermatologist in New York 
who, in 1974, decided to treat his mice with a felt-tip pen to fake successful 
skin transplants. His fraud was discovered when his lab assistant gave the 
rodents a good bath (Grant, 2008: 32-33). Then there was Jan Hendrik Schön, 
a physicist once described as brilliant (Grant, 2008: 67-68), only to be found 
guilty of false measurements and other forms of deception in later years 
(Grant 2006; 2008; Broad and Wade 1983). Long before the Stapel affair, 
the Netherlands saw its fair share of crazy schemes as well, many of which 
passed for reliable science for years. Take, for example, the VU Amsterdam 
professor Anthonie Stolk, who, in the 1950s and 1960s, made up data on fish 
tumors and wrote numerous anthropological articles and reports on African 
populations that didn’t even exist (Van Kolfschooten 1993, 2012).
We can certainly learn from these extreme cases of fraud, but they don’t 
bring us much closer to answering the primary question: Are these isolated 
incidents or is there something wrong with modern scientific practice? What 
conditions promote poor research practices? Without further research, we 
simply cannot say, and by only looking at spectacular cases like the Stapel 
affair, we aren’t getting the full picture.
In some ways, we can compare these cases of fraud in academia to cases 
of abuse in the Catholic Church: both institutions are faced with a “nume-
rator—denominator problem”. How does the number of cases discovered 
compare to the total number of cases out there, including those that have 
gone undetected? In the Netherlands, in the early 2010s, the universities em-
ployed 17,000 researchers, each of whom was involved in one or more rese-
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arch projects (Rathenau Institute, Chiong Meza 2012). Of the 102 allegations 
of fraud or plagiarism reported by Dutch universities from 2005 to January 
2012, more than half turned out to be unfounded (Berkhout and Rosenberg, 
NRC January 14, 2012: 8-9). To me, this suggests that it is too soon to speak of 
a structural problem or a crisis of trust in science. Without further research, 
we know very little about the prevalence of scientific fraud and the extent to 
which it occurs. So, what do we know?
Since the Stapel affair, three issues have received more attention:
 – scientific dishonesty and misconduct (which extends beyond 
fraud to include plagiarism and issues surrounding co-author-
ship as well), 
 – scientific integrity
 – the importance of conducting sound scientific research (in 
other words, being a good scientist). 
These three issues are often confused, and it’s often the gray areas that attract 
the most attention. When does careless, sloppy research become so bad that 
the researcher’s integrity is called into question? That a scientist produces 
sloppy research does not necessarily mean that he or she lacks integrity. The 
scientific community is also responsible for distinguishing between good 
and bad research and making sure that the body of knowledge is not polluted 
by a few bad eggs. Allow me to provide a few well-known examples.
Pons and Fleischmann’s research into a technique for cold nuclear fusion 
in March 1989 was poorly designed. The results of their controversial article, 
which had been published without peer review, were contradicted within a 
few months of the publication. Scientists around the world tried to replicate 
their study, but none succeeded (Grant, 2008: 65-67). Pons and Fleischman 
may have been poor researchers, but they were not fraudsters. Another case, 
the “discovery” of the Piltdown Man in England in 1912-13—in which bone 
fragments were presented as the fossilized remains of a previously unknown 
early human (Wikipedia)—was an outright hoax, born of an overzealous 
sense of patriotism. Although it took forty years before the fraud could be 




Three other well-known cases require more discussion. In 1865, Czech 
priest Gregor Mendel, assisted by a fellow friar and an ambitious gardener, 
presented the results of his genetic experiments with peas, which eventually 
brought him international fame. However, it later turned out that some of 
these results may have been too good to be true. In 1931, the statistician-bio-
logist Sir Ronald A. Fischer (creator of the Fischer t-test) noted the impro-
bability of such beautiful regularity in successive generations of peas and 
presented his findings to the scientific community (Fischer, 1936 as cited by 
Klotz: 1992: 2272; see also Irving M. Klotz, 1992: 2271-2273). Later, Teddy 
Seidenfeld (Tudge 2002: 94-97) refined Fischer’s assertions somewhat, but 
no one ever questioned Mendel’s sincerity. His theory of genetics was and 
remains a fine example of scientific creativity (Broad and Wade 1983: 31-33; 
Grant, 2008: 30-31). Creativity in science can sometimes be at odds with 
prevailing opinions (Klotz, idem). In the 1840s, Hungarian researcher Ignaz 
Semmelweis was the first to discover the causes of postpartum infections 
and propose simple hygienic measures such as washing one’s hands after 
administering medical treatments. He was right about the spread of bacteria, 
but this was not recognized. His research was long regarded as questionable, 
largely due to suspicions raised by the director of the famous Vienna General 
Hospital (Hempel 1970: 12-17). 
In an article from 1913, physicist Robert A. Millikan omitted a significant 
number of negative measurement results from his analysis and publications. 
These omissions were only discovered upon scrutiny of his original lab jour-
nals after his death. In 1923, however, Millikan received the Nobel Prize for 
his measurement of the elementary electric charge—incidentally, without 
mentioning his collaborator, Fletcher, who had conceived and carried out 
the original research (Broad and Wade, 1983: 33-35; Johnson 2008: 155-156). 
Millikan omitted data to establish his theory, combining scientific creativity 
with selective reporting. All in all, these examples show the whole spectrum 
of scientific research at the very edges of scientific integrity: from blatant 
fraud that went undetected for forty years (the Piltdown Man) to highly in-
novative empirical and theoretical research that went unrecognized for years 
(Semmelweis) to poorly designed—but not fraudulent—experimental rese-
arch (Pons and Fleischman) to the use of scientific-theoretical imagination 
with some questionable research practices (Mendel, Millikan). 
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2.3  FOUR CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTIONS
These insightful examples from history not only illustrate how figures and 
research data have been tampered with in the past, they also underscore the 
importance of continuing to distinguish between the various issues at stake. 
There are four important conceptual distinctions to be made:
1. honest, bona fide research vs. fraudulent, mala fide research 
2. questionable research practices vs. poor research practices
3. scientific controversies vs. integrity issues
4. game rules vs. goal rules
 
Game rules determine how the game is played (in chess, for example, a pawn 
cannot be moved three steps forward), whereas goal rules are guidelines for 
how the game can best be played (start with your pawns in the middle rows; 
don’t play your Queen too soon—you can, but you’ll regret it later in the 
game). Failure to follow the game rules renders the game invalid. Failure 
to follow goal rules won’t help you win, but it’s not a violation of the game 
rules (Wittgenstein 1953: par. 33; 66; 197-206; Bird 1972: 110-116; Rhees 
2006: 167-168).
The same goes for science: a poorly designed study, such as the one car-
ried out by Pons and Fleischmann, may be foolish, but it is not necessarily 
a violation of the rules of integrity. In Wittgenstein’s terminology, science 
is bound by certain constitutive rules, and violations of these rules render 
scientific research invalid. The basic standards of science formulated in 
the previous chapter (e.g. honesty, no FFP) are constitutive rules—i.e., they 
are game rules. In the development of the game rules of science, two other 
fundamental violations of integrity have emerged: conflicts of interest and 
failing to declare personal interests. Both pose a threat to “open and honest 
science”. The same applies to denials of authorship and co-authorship, and 
conversely, to the unwarranted attribution of authorship and co-authorship. 
In the game of science, honesty matters above all else.
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Scientific fraud is not innocent. Misconduct breeds misunderstanding. 
One might think that fake experiments or fabricated data don’t hurt anyone, 
but this is not true. Think of the damage to Stapel’s students’ careers. They 
had to withdraw all their publications with Stapel’s name on them. Some of 
his PhD students even ended up leaving the scientific field altogether due 
to the resulting gap in their publication history. Not only was the scandal 
devastating to these young researchers, it also undermined people’s trust in 
scientific research and called the integrity of science into question.
Stapel fabricated data in social psychology, but things can be even worse. 
In the biomedical field, for example, patients often serve as subjects for scien-
tific research. The results of these studies can determine how new medicines 
are implemented and have a direct impact on the health of those involved. In 
2013, it was discovered that Joachim Boldt, a highly reputable anesthesiolo-
gist in Ludwigshafen, Germany, had published no less than ninety articles 
based on fabricated data, causing one of the greatest scandals in medical 
research of all time. What’s more, his fabricated data posed a serious risk to 
intensive-care patients at many hospitals because his so-called “findings” 
had served as a basis for special treatment methods. According to The British 
Medical Journal (March 19, 2013), it took a long time to separate Boldt’s lies 
from established truths and to reevaluate research that was previously rejec-
ted based on Boldt’s research.
All in all, dubious scientific behavior comes in many forms: from extre-
me cases of deliberate deceit to questionable research practices to the many 
examples of poor, sloppy research. All this research can be dangerous or 
harmless, depending on its application. And finally, research results are 
often disputed. Sometimes it’s the method that’s called into question; other 
times it’s the researcher’s integrity. This brings me to one of the most critical 
questions in scientific research: what constitutes a violation of the scientific 
code of conduct and what does not?
2.4  THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS IN SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE
When assessing suspected violations of integrity, it is important to keep the 
four conceptual distinctions described above in mind. Both the distinction 
between bona fide and mala fide research and that between good and bad 
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scientific research are highly relevant. Poor or careless research does not 
necessarily lead to false results, and there are certainly cases of poor research 
with no dishonest intentions. On the other hand, some fraudulent research 
can be so cleverly hidden that it goes undetected during the peer review pro-
cess. 
Mala fide research always involves deliberate fraud, which has to be 
proven. The best-known examples of this can be found in the aforementioned 
2004/2012/2014 Code and in other codes of conduct such as the European Code 
of Conduct for Research Integrity, also known as the ALLEA Code, adopted by the 
European Science Foundation for all research funded by the ESF (2010/2017; 
ALLEA stands for All European Academies). And then there are the interna-
tionally recognized FFP:
 – Fabrication: the fabrication or creation of data and the publi-
cation of self-constructed research data
 – Falsification: manipulating research data by, for example, 
changing measurement results and other results of research 
(e.g. survey results), changing or adjusting images, spectra, 
arrays, and/or deliberately withholding unwelcome or nega-
tive research data and results
 – Plagiarism: taking literal passages of text and original scienti-
fic ideas from other sources and publishing them under one’s 
own name without giving due credit to the original author and 
source.
These standards are deeply rooted in modern science. They have long func-
tioned as norms, even before the establishment of codes of conduct. Codes 
of conduct can be regarded as codifications of standards that have evolved 
and become widely accepted in the scientific field over time. The fabrication 
and falsification of data pollutes the body of knowledge, thereby undermin-
ing trust in science. Plagiarism, on the other hand, undermines the reward 
structure in science, though it may not necessarily affect the body of know-
ledge, assuming that the plagiarized texts have been properly transcribed 
(see KNAW opinion 2012: 13). However, these serious violations of scientific 
conduct must be distinguished, both theoretically and practically, from poor 
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and sloppy research work, especially when the research has been carried 
out with good intentions. Poor research can and should be corrected, but it 
does not necessarily mean that the researcher is a person of low integrity or 
that there has been a breach of the code of conduct. Questionable research 
practices remain a gray area, and cases of carelessness in research continue 
to raise questions (more on this in Chapter 6).
Here we can draw an important parallel with integrity issues in other 
sectors—take medicine, for example. A surgeon can make a mistake (i.e. 
malpractice, against which he or she is most likely insured), but that’s not the 
same thing as a surgeon who has been strongly advised to stop doing surge-
ries because he or she no longer has a steady hand. If this person chooses to 
continue working anyway, it would be a violation of integrity. In the business 
world, a director of a large corporation can make a bad management decisi-
on without violating any standards of integrity. Only when certain codes of 
conduct have been violated or crimes have been committed (such as forgery 
or unlawful payments) can the case be considered a violation of managerial 
integrity. The line between a judgment error and an integrity violation is 
not always clear, so further discussion of the subtle boundaries of integrity 
violations is needed.
Then there is the matter of scientific controversies, which should be kept 
separate from integrity violations. If one does not agree with another resear-
cher’s results, it may be tempting to say, “Those findings can’t be true—this 
must be a case of fraud.” These types of controversies have become quite 
common in recent debates on climate change, for example, and the strong 
convictions on both sides make it all too easy to accuse the other of disho-
nesty, to use integrity as a weapon. But let’s not forget that controversies are 
part of science. In fact, it is thanks to this constant discussion and debate that 
science is able to advance. Criticism is the breath of science.
Many countries, the Netherlands included, have been slow to codify the 
standards of scientific research, only taking action after a scandal has oc-
curred. In the United States, an intense debate arose in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s around the handling of the above-mentioned Baltimore affair, in 
which the very freedom of science was at stake (more on this in Chapter 3). 
In 1992, the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Academy of Sciences 
established a code of conduct based on the forms of misconduct revealed in 
previous years:
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“(1) Fabrication, falsification, plagiarism or other serious deviation 
from accepted practices in proposing, carrying out, or reporting 
results from activities funded by National Science Foundation; 
or (2) Retaliation of any kind against a person who reported or 
provided information about suspected or alleged misconduct 
and who has not acted in bad faith” (my emphasis; National 
Academy of Sciences, 1992; see also: Freeland Judson, 2004: 
172).
In its simplicity and brevity, this wording is a good reflection of the basic 
FFP standards, and it also stresses the importance of protecting those who 
report cases of suspected misconduct. A similar definition of misconduct 
was provided by the National Institute of Health (NIH), which, as part of the 
United States Public Health Service, annually provides federal grants for bio-
medical research and thus has a vested interest in ensuring that the projects 
it subsidizes are carried out in an indisputably correct manner. The NIH also 
mentioned FFP and “other practices that seriously deviate from those that are 
commonly accepted within the scientific community”. At one point, however, 
the NIH’s description of what constitutes a violation of integrity differed 
from that of the National Science Foundation (NSF), which “does not include 
honest error or honest differences in interpretations or judgments of data” 
(Freeland Judson, 2004: 172). In other words, scientific controversies and 
differences in interpretation are, according to the NSF, explicitly excluded 
from the notion of “scientific integrity”. The discussion did not elaborate on 
FFP or what constitutes an “honest error”, a matter which is certainly open to 
interpretation. Moreover, the notion of “honesty” can be quite problematic 
when it comes to assessing errors.
This public discussion in the US after the Baltimore affair focused prima-
rily on the “serious deviation from generally accepted research practices.” 
What did this mean? Members of the scientific community were quick to 
point out that plenty of innovative and creative research deviates from stan-
dard norms and practices. Could such research now fall under a strict defi-
nition of misconduct? Moreover, the wording was so vague that some feared 
it would create a great deal of uncertainty as to what was permissible and 
what wasn’t. Many saw it as a government-led attack on scientific freedom. 
Howard Schachman, a biochemist at UC Berkeley and well-known advocate 
for research ethics, laid out his objections in Science magazine:
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“Not only is this language vague but it invites over-expansive 
interpretation. Also, its inclusion could discourage unortho-
dox, highly innovative approaches that lead to major advances 
in science. Brilliant, creative, pioneering research often deviates 
from that commonly accepted within the scientific community” 
(Schachman 1993: 148-149).
Schachman even went so far as to cite examples from history, where such 
definitions facilitated government interference in science: for example Ein-
stein’s theory of relativity in Nazi Germany and Lysenko’s theory of heredity 
in the Soviet Union (Freeland Judson, 2004: 176), as mentioned in Chapter 1.
On the other hand, supporters of the broad NSF definition raised an 
equally essential point, namely that the use of the term “accepted practices” 
implied that the evaluation of standards and breaches of those standards 
would be left to the scientific community itself, not to a public body. In other 
words, scientists would continue to judge the research practices of their 
fellow scientists, so the independence and freedom of science would not 
come under threat (Goldman and Fisher, 1997). In his commentary on this 
heated debate, Freeland Judson (2004: 178-180) remarked that the notion of 
“accepted practices” is not unusual in other sectors. In codes of conduct for 
lawyers, notaries and engineers, one generally finds a clause referring to the 
professional standards of behavior that must be observed. In other words, 
a lawyer needs to act like a lawyer. What exactly the specific standards of 
behavior in a given profession do and do not entail is often the subject of 
disciplinary procedures.
Nevertheless, the broad definition did not survive the ongoing debate. In 
1999, following the work of several committees, the Ryan report recognized 
FFP as three categories of scientific misconduct, but all reference to deviati-
ons from common practices had disappeared. The notions of “honest error” 
and “honest differences of opinion” survived the national debate, which went 
all the way up to the White House. The NSF scientific code of conduct has sin-
ce been incorporated into US federal law, which means that in the US, com-
mitting one of the FFP crimes in government-subsidized research projects is 
a violation of the law, and the perpetrator may be subject to imprisonment. 
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2.5   A CASE STUDY: THE CODIFICATION OF NORMS IN  
THE NETHERLANDS
The creation of a national scientific code of conduct in the Netherlands was 
less of a struggle than it was in the United States. The Netherlands Code of Con-
duct for Scientific Practice was drawn up in 2004 by a VSNU committee led by the 
Rector of the University of Amsterdam at the time, Paul F. van der Heijden, 
and went into effect on January 1, 2005, under the auspices of the KNAW, 
VSNU and NWO. The Code applies to all employees at Dutch universities and 
to all researchers at KNAW and NWO research institutes. Unlike in the US, 
there has been virtually no public debate on the matter in the Netherlands. 
However, prior to the Code, there had been several notes and protocols that 
served as building blocks for rapid formulations, fueled by various integrity 
scandals at the time (Buck 1990-1994; Diekstra 1996-1998).
In October 1995, a memorandum on scientific misconduct was publis-
hed under the auspices of the KNAW, VSNU and NWO. This was the first 
attempt to define the habits and practices of scientific research and create 
a normative force—and hence, to codify scientific conduct. The Dutch term 
for scientific misconduct, wetenschappelijk wangedrag, was introduced with 
reference to the NIH’s publications in the US. However, the English term 
“misconduct” implies both improper professional conduct and mismanage-
ment, financial or otherwise. At the time, the Dutch notion of “misconduct” 
had not yet been defined, so the concept was rather vague. According to NIH 
publications, some form of misconduct had been found in one out of every 
2,000 NIH-subsidized studies. The Dutch memorandum concluded that 
although such misconduct seemed rare, no concrete data on the subject was 
available. The memorandum also emphasized the importance of education 
and training to prevent misconduct: “It is important that an awareness of 
standards be passed on, particularly with respect to reliable data processing 
and the application of statistical techniques, careful reporting, giving credit 
where credit is due, providing complete bibliographical references, correct 
quotations, etc.” (KNAW 1995). Research organizations need to take action 
on matters related to scientific misconduct and alert their members to its 
existence in order to minimize dubious and fraudulent behavior as much as 
possible. This memorandum already addresses the basic standards of scien-
tific integrity in a nutshell. 
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Following investigations into the alleged plagiarism of clinical psycho-
logy professor René Diekstra, the Faculty of Social Sciences at Leiden Uni-
versity adopted its own guidelines in 1998, titled Protocol: Ethics for Scienti-
fic Research and Guidelines for Dealing with (Alleged) Scientific Misconduct (Leiden 
1998). It is interesting to note the motivation behind this Protocol, which is 
described as follows:
“There are generally accepted ethical standards and rules of 
conduct for conducting research at Dutch universities, but they 
are rarely established in protocols. In most cases, it is informally 
clear when scientific misconduct has taken place. However, 
clear rules and guidelines for procedures for dealing with scien-
tific misconduct are generally lacking. This memorandum aims 
to fill in these gaps for both staff and students of the Faculty 
of Social Sciences, and to make explicit what has always been 
implicit regarding the ethics of scientific research” (Protocol, 
1998: 1; my emphasis).
The text then proceeds to lay out a set of well-formulated and unambiguous 
ethical rules for all stages of socio-scientific research, from study design 
to publication standards, with particular emphasis on handling subjects 
and participants in the research. The rules themselves are mainly derived 
from the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct of the American 
Psychological Association and from privacy regulations in the Netherlands, 
which had just been drawn up by an advisory committee of the Ministry of 
Education, Culture and Science (Privacy-wetgeving en het gebruik van persoons-
gegevens voor wetenschappelijke en statistische doeleinden, OCW, 1997). No clear 
distinction is made between general scientific ethics and the specific issue of 
scientific integrity. However, this Protocol defines scientific misconduct and 
the possible sanctions that may come as a result. Compared to the 2004 Code, 
drawn up six years later, the Protocol’s summary of the forms of misconduct 
is remarkably clear and concrete. Thirteen short and well-formulated speci-
fications of misconduct are given:
“causing physical and emotional harm to the participant, vio-
lating promises to keep data anonymous, falsifying data, selec-
tively and covertly rejecting undesirable results, entering ficti-
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tious data, deliberately misusing statistical methods to reach 
conclusions other than those justified by the data, deliberate 
misinterpretation of results and conclusions, plagiarism of 
results or (parts of ) publications of others, deliberate misre-
presentation of the results of others, acting unjustifiably as an 
author or co-author, carelessness in conducting or commissi-
oning research, trying to obtain subsidies through deception” 
(Protocol, 1998: 13-14).
At the end of the section on misconduct, there is a general formulation, sim-
ilar to the one that caused such a stir in the US:
“Misconduct also occurs when a member of the academic com-
munity has seriously violated the written and unwritten ethical 
standards for the practice of science. This shall be determined 
at the discretion of the Executive Board, after having heard the 
opinion of a committee of independent experts and that of the 
researcher concerned” (Protocol 1998: 14; my emphasis).
Simply put, this Protocol already identifies the essential forms of scientific 
misconduct (according to the game rules) and the principles for how to act 
in cases of alleged misconduct.
In 2001, the three national research organizations KNAW, VSNU and 
NWO turned their focus from “scientific misconduct” towards “scientific 
integrity”. Their 1995 memorandum on scientific misconduct was replaced 
by a memorandum on scientific integrity, titled the Notitie Wetenschappelijke 
Integriteit, over normen van wetenschappelijk onderzoek en een Landelijk Orgaan voor 
Wetenschappelijke Integriteit [Memorandum on Scientific Integrity: On Stan-
dards of Scientific Research and a Netherlands Board on Research Integrity] 
(KNAW, 2001). The purpose of this memorandum was “to promote scien-
tific research in accordance with generally accepted standards of scientific 
practice. Special attention shall be paid to how to handle breaches of these 
standards” (2001: 5). The memorandum is particularly focused on the ge-
neral standards of “professional scientific activity” common to all areas of 
science, not the specific “mores” of individual fields. The term “misconduct” 
has been replaced by “forms of infringement of scientific integrity”.
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The memorandum goes on to describe fifteen examples of infringement 
of scientific integrity, which are more or less the same as those mentioned in 
the Leiden protocol, but described in more detailed terms. One example was 
left out (causing physical and emotional damage to participants) and three 
new ones were added, namely “uncourteous treatment of colleagues and su-
bordinates in order to influence the results of research; omitting the names 
of co-authors who have made a substantial contribution to the research or 
adding those who have not made a substantial contribution to the research; 
unauthorized copying of test designs or software” (2005: 7).Thanks to its 
concrete description of inadmissible conduct in scientific research, this me-
morandum became a sort of constitution on scientific integrity, to be applied 
in all affiliated Dutch universities and research institutes.
In addition, these institutions were instructed to draw up their own regu-
lations and to establish bodies that could take responsible action in the event 
of alleged violations of integrity:
“The institution should establish a procedure that allows the 
complainant and the defendant to be heard. Anonymous com-
plaints cannot be processed; the institution should make sure 
that whistle-blowers are adequately protected. The procedure 
for handling complaints should thus be carried out with suffi-
cient speed, and confidentiality should be ensured in order to 
minimize reputational damage caused by rumors. While it is 
not unusual for differences of opinion to spark debate in the 
news media, they are not grounds for addressing a complaint 
about improper scientific behavior” (KNAW, 2001: 10). 
In integrity violation procedures, it is also important to appoint a Confiden-
tial Advisor. The role of the Confidential Advisor is to “make a clear and un-
ambiguous statement about the suspected violation of integrity and submit 
their advice to the Executive Board” (idem). This statement allows the special 
investigation committee to formulate an opinion on the matter. The Nether-
lands Board on Research Integrity (LOWI, mentioned above) was established 
in order to ensure that all Dutch institutions handle integrity violation cases 
equally. Both the complainant and the defendant may appeal to the LOWI, 
which will then check that the institution in question has handled the case in 
a fair, efficient and confidential manner. Where necessary, this national body 
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may re-examine the substance of the complaint with the assistance of two 
experts in the relevant scientific field. The LOWI then advises the institution’s 
Executive Board, which makes the final decision in the case and determines 
whether any legal measures should be taken. The LOWI was founded in 2003 
by the KNAW, VSNU and NWO, began operation on January 1, 2004, and has 
since worked independently of its founders. 
In the 2001 national memorandum on scientific integrity, reference was 
made to an informational brochure published by KNAW, titled Scientific rese-
arch: Dilemmas and Temptations (KNAW 2000), which was primarily intended 
to bring the subject of scientific integrity and misconduct to the attention of 
researchers at all stages of their careers. However, it wasn’t very effective. 
The brochure outlines various fictitious examples of potential misconduct 
and discusses whether or not researchers have crossed a line. However, as 
Köbben pointed out in his review of the brochure, there is more to be learned 
from real-life cases: “Not an unpleasant read, but a bit childish, with artificial 
examples. There is more to be learned from real cases from the field, from 
seasoned researchers who can draw on their own experience” (Persson 2001: 
17). The brochure was revised and republished in 2005 (KNAW 2005). The 
new version is greatly improved and provides a more thorough description 
of the dilemmas and temptations that researchers can face. However, even 
though the brochure can be used as an educational tool, let’s not assume that 
standards of conduct will automatically emerge from it. For this, we need a 
professional code of conduct.
2.6   THE NETHERLANDS CODE OF CONDUCT FOR SCIENTIFIC 
PRACTICE OF 2004/2012/2014
After the notorious Diekstra and Buck Affairs, interest in scientific integrity 
waned, only to re-intensify with the Stapel affair in 2011 and 2012. In the 
meantime, as a result of the 2001 memorandum, Dutch universities had 
set about establishing regulations, appointing Confidential Advisors and 
forming committees on scientific integrity (known as Commissie Wetensch-
appelijke Integriteit or CWI), some more quickly than others (the last univer-
sity to establish official regulations did so in 2010, and the last university 
to appoint a Confidential Advisor did so in 2012). From 2004 to 2011, the 
average number of complaints about scientific integrity at each university 
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can be counted on two hands (Berkhout and Rosenberg, NRC Handelsblad, 
January 14, 2012).
Meanwhile, as mentioned above, the 2004 Code went into effect on Janu-
ary 1, 2005. The Code contains a preamble and sections on the five main prin-
ciples of scientific research and education. Sections 4 and 5 of the preamble 
states: “The integrity of each scientific practitioner is an essential condition 
for maintaining stakeholders’ faith in science. Integrity is the cornerstone of 
good scientific practice. The Code contains principles that all scientific prac-
titioners affiliated with a university (teachers and researchers) should observe 
individually, among each other and towards society. The principles can be 
read as general notions of good scientific practice; they are not intended 
as supplementary judicial rules.” (2005: 3). So how are they intended then?
“The Code describes desirable conduct and is, in this regard, 
complementary to the regulations established by the universi-
ties and the Netherlands Board on Research Integrity (Landelijk 
Orgaan Wetenschappelijke Integriteit, LOWI) on how to deal 
with undesirable conduct. Therefore, this Code does not contain 
sanction rules or complaint procedures. The principles defined 
in this Code are detailed further in ‘best practices’. These best 
practices, which provide a certain set of norms for the conduct 
of teachers and researchers, reflect the national and internati-
onal understanding of good scientific teaching and research. 
Under particular circumstances, deviation may be justified.” 
(2005: 3-4; original emphasis).
Five principles are mentioned: scrupulousness, reliability, verifiability, 
impartiality, and independence. These principles are self-evident and undis-
puted. But while the Code expresses the specific values of science, it lacks 
a clear and unambiguous set of standards that characterizes other codes of 
conduct. The specific standards of scientific integrity are vaguely formulated 
and are therefore difficult to identify (see also Chapters 4 and 7).
 – Art. 1.1: Scrupulousness is expressed through precision and 
nuance in providing scientific instruction and conducting 
scientific research and the publishing of results thereof.
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 – Art. 1.3: Accurate source references serve to ensure that credit 
is awarded where credit is deserved. This also applies to infor-
mation gathered via the Internet.
 – Art 1.4: Authorship is acknowledged. Rules common to the 
scientific discipline are observed.
 – Art. 1.5: Scrupulousness is not restricted to the transfer of 
information, but also applies to relations among scientific 
practitioners and with students.
 – Art. 2.1: The selective omission of research results is reported 
and justified. The data has indeed been collected. The statis-
tical methods employed are pertinent to the acquired data.
 – (…..)
 – Art. 2.3: The system of peer review can only function on the 
assumption that intellectual property is recognized and res-
pected.
 – (…..)
 – Art. 2.5: In transferring information in education, a selec-
tive representation of available knowledge is either avoided 
or justified. A clear distinction is made between transferred 
knowledge and personal opinion or related speculation.
With a bit of effort, one can recognize traces of FFP. In regard to plagiarism, 
the text basically states that one should not try to pass someone else’s work 
off as one’s own. The Code makes clear that plagiarism is not allowed, but it 
does not explain what plagiarism actually is. Plagiarism of ideas is prohibited 
through references to source-referencing and to a necessary condition for 
the peer review system. With some effort, the obvious ban on the fabrication 
and falsification of research data can be inferred from the first elaboration 
of the notion of scrupulousness. When it comes to co-authorship, the text 
indicates the desired behavior of those involved, but it does not mention the 
issues of non-recognition or the unwarranted attribution of co-authorship. 
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If researchers simply want to know where they stand, they would be better 
off referring to the Leiden Protocol of 1998, which has now been forgotten, 
or the 2001 KNAW memorandum on scientific integrity, which is now also 
little known and underappreciated, as both of these documents provide more 
clarity. 
Also confusing about the 2004 Code is the fact that research and education 
seem to be lumped together, with the same principles of integrity for relati-
onships between scientists and relationships between teachers and students. 
However, teacher-student relationships are subject to their own rules and 
complaint procedures. What happens if disgruntled students start using the 
Code as a basis for filing integrity complaints against their teachers?
Scrupulousness is certainly an important principle when it comes to the 
interaction between scientists, but without further elaboration on what it 
means to not be scrupulous, in other words, to be unscrupulous, there remains 
a great deal of uncertainty on the matter. And according to the Code, does 
writing a critical review of a colleague’s article fall within the scope of uncour-
teous behavior towards one’s colleagues? Is it considered a violation of the rule 
that one must treat colleagues with care and thus a form of misconduct? Is it 
considered careless to decide not to respond to critical emails from colleagues, 
or to forget to respond? The Code needs to provide a clearer formulation of 
which behavior is absolutely prohibited and which behavior is undesirable 
but not necessarily a violation of integrity. This would help prevent many 
misunderstandings and unnecessary accusations of integrity violations. All 
in all, too many questions remain unanswered.
The Code was hastily revised in May 2012 following the Stapel affair and 
two provisions were added: one on the obligation to report one’s side activi-
ties and side positions, and the other on the obligation to promote compli-
ance with the Code within the organization itself. As a result of yet another 
affair (self-plagiarism by well-known Dutch economist Peter Nijkamp, as 
alleged by a journalist), the Code was once again amended in the autumn of 
2014, and a new provision on the reuse of one’s own texts was added (see 
Chapter 5 for more on this subject). Two amendments in two years, both di-
rectly following a major “affair”—that’s a few too many adjustments to call 
this a clear and stable code of conduct. 
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2.7   THE NETHERLANDS CODE OF CONDUCT FOR RESEARCH 
INTEGRITY OF 2018
It was not surprising that the KNAW, VSNU and NWO felt the need to revise 
the 2014 Code yet again. In 2016, they established a committee to this end. 
Following consultations with experts on scientific integrity issues (chair-
persons of CWIs and the like) and online focus groups, the committee drew 
up a new code of conduct, which was endorsed by the boards of the KNAW, 
VSNU and NWO and eventually went into effect on October 1, 2018 for all 
researchers affiliated with these organizations. The 2018 Code also applies 
to universities of applied sciences and other government-funded scientific 
organizations and research institutes, which have since adopted it as well.
The Preamble to the 2018 Code acknowledges that, given the many mi-
nor changes in previous years, “the need has arisen for a new text with clear 
standards and a clearer internal system that is in line with international 
developments and can be used for both fundamental and applied and practi-
ce-oriented research” (Netherlands Code of Conduct for Research Integrity 2018: 7). 
This latest addition of “applied and practice-oriented research” was primarily 
aimed at aligning the Code with the new Code van de Vereniging Hogescholen 
[Code of the Association of Universities of Applied Sciences] and “De samen-
werkende organisaties in toegepast onderzoek” [“The cooperating organizations in 
applied research”].
The 2018 Code clearly differs from its predecessor in a number of respects. 
First of all, in the title, the words “Scientific Practice” have been changed to 
“Research Integrity”. Secondly, the principles on which the Code is based 
have changed. The 2004 Code laid out five principles for the establishment 
of codes of conduct and best practices: scrupulousness, reliability, verifiabi-
lity, impartiality, and independence. The 2018 Code is based on five basic 
principles (values), but it is the first to mention “honesty” as a fundamental 
principle of good scientific practice. In my opinion, this is completely justi-
fied, as honesty is the hallmark of science: a true scientist does not deceive. 
The other four are scrupulousness, transparency, independence and respon-
sibility. These are excellent principles upon which to build a code of conduct, 
but general principles are a long way from concrete standards of behavior. 
Translating values into behavioral norms is no easy feat and major leaps are 
required to move from abstract principles to concrete standards of behavior.
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Based on these five principles, the 2018 Code derives no less than 61 “stan-
dards of good research practice” (p.7), which are systematically built upon 
throughout the various phases of a scientific research: design, implementa-
tion, reporting, assessment and peer review, as well as during the commu-
nication phase, when research results are presented to a wider audience or 
when researchers enter into public debate (p. 18).
In the Preamble, the Code’s three main functions are mentioned (p.7). 
The first is to offer researchers and students an “educational and norma-
tive” framework within which the standards of research can be internalized. 
The second is to provide the Executive Boards of scientific institutions and 
their committees for scientific integrity with “an evaluative framework for 
the assessment of scientific integrity”, and the third is to lay out a number 
of duties of care for scientific institutions. This third function is new and 
unique to the 2018 Code, making the Netherlands an international leader 
in this respect. The Code explicitly outlines the responsibilities that scienti-
fic institutions have for ensuring the scrupulousness of scientific practice. 
While this responsibility is not completely new (it is based on Article 5 of 
the Higher Education Act), the 2018 Code defines numerous specific duties, 
such as protecting research culture, training researchers, supervising rese-
arch, supporting data management, setting ethical standards and ensuring 
careful and fair procedures for dealing with scientific integrity complaints 
(pp. 20-21). So far, so good.
Interestingly, the 2018 Code aims to fulfill two purposes: to serve as a 
normative and educational framework for all researchers and students, and, 
at the same time, to provide an evaluative framework for the assessment of 
alleged violations of scientific integrity. But can these two functions really 
go hand in hand?
The Code’s normative and evaluative framework involves a description of 
good, if not ‘the best’, research practices, accompanied by vaguely formu-
lated standards and educational advice, with phrases like “be precise and 
accurate”, “be open about the role of external stakeholders and potential 
conflicts of interest”, “use scientific methods”, “be clear”, “be honest” and 
“be transparent”, and “make sure that sources are verifiable”, “do justice to 
all research results obtained”, etc. (p. 16-18). This are good tips for carrying 
out proper research, but without further elaboration, the Code assumes that 
all researchers have a shared understanding of what accuracy, precision, 
clarity, transparency and honesty entail.
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The key question here is: do researchers know when they fail to meet 
these standards and run the risk of displaying “a lack of integrity” (p. 24) 
and being called before the Board? In other words, do the 61 standards laid 
out in the Code provide researchers with a clear understanding of what they 
are not allowed to do and certainty about the appropriateness of their own 
behavior? The Code explicitly states that all 61 standards must be respected, 
and failure to comply with any of these standards may result in an integrity 
violation of varying degrees of seriousness. This leads me to my next questi-
on: can these 61 standards also serve as an evaluative framework for violations 
of scientific integrity?
The answer is yes and no. Upon close inspection, the 2018 Code does 
address the three deadly sins of scientific integrity, FFP. While most national 
and international integrity codes are structured by level of seriousness, with 
the most serious violations mentioned first, followed by less serious viola-
tions and examples of reprehensible behavior and carelessness, the 2018 
Code is structured according to the logical flow of the research process. For 
example, here are some of the rules mentioned during the execution and 
reporting phases: 
“19.  Do not fabricate data or research results and do not report 
fabricated material as if it were fact.”
“21.  Do not remove or change results without explicit and pro-
per justification. Do not add fabricated data during the data 
analysis.” (p.17)
Although these formulations lack precision (what exactly is “data”?) and 
seem narrowly focused on a particular type of quantitative research, they 
clearly denounce the fabrication and falsification of data, the FF in FFP. 
If you look closely at standards 34 and 40, there is a ban on plagiarism, the 
P in FFP, as well.
“34.  Present sources, data and arguments in a scrupulous way.”
“40.  When making use of other people’s ideas, procedures, re-




Although these standards regarding the treatment of sources are mentioned, 
we also need a clear standard for the assessment of plagiarism, such as, for 
example: “plagiarism is not, under any circumstances, permitted and shall 
be treated as a serious violation of scientific integrity”, followed by a clear 
definition of plagiarism and examples of various forms of violations (see 
Chapter 1; for more information on plagiarism, see Chapter 5).
However, the 2018 Code does highlight the seriousness of violations 
to the 61 standards. The Code’s Chapter 5, on matters of non-compliance, 
states: “The clearest examples of research misconduct are fabrication, falsi-
fication and plagiarism” (p. 23) and refers to the aforementioned standards 
19, 21, 34 and 40. But only violations of these standards are referred to as 
violations of integrity. And while the Code does offer an evaluative framework 
for CWIs and other decision-making bodies, it only applies to these four 
standards: four out of 61!
In reference to nineteen other standards, which are identified by their list 
number in Chapter 5.2, the Code states the following:
“In the event that the following standards are not met, the de-
termination of whether the case in question constitutes ‘rese-
arch misconduct’ or a less serious violation will depend on the  
outcome of an assessment using the criteria as mentioned in 
section 5.2C” (p.23).
Some examples from this group of nineteen standards include:
“8.    Be open about the role of external stakeholders and possible 
conflicts of interest.”
“22.  Ensure that sources are verifiable.”
“23.  Describe the data collected for and/or used in your research 
honestly, scrupulously and as transparently as possible.”
“36.  Be explicit about any relevant unreported data that has been 
collected in accordance with the research design and could 
support conclusions different from those reported.”
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“38.  Be explicit about uncertainties and contraindications, and do 
not draw unsubstantiated conclusions.”
“58.  Do not delay or hinder the work of other researchers in an 
inappropriate manner.”
These recommendations seem sensible enough, but they are too broadly for-
mulated and could give rise to countless controversies: When are conclusions 
“unsubstantiated”? When is unreported data “relevant”? 
Violations of the remaining 38 standards are classified as “questionable 
research practices” or “minor shortcomings” in Chapter 5. In the case of a 
minor shortcoming, “there will be no reason to impose measures or sanc-
tions” (p. 24). In my opinion, the notion of “questionable behavior” is, in 
itself, questionable. On the one hand, it evokes associations with “fraudu-
lent” and “inadmissible” behavior, but on the other, the standards it see-
mingly refers to are so vaguely formulated that it is difficult to determine 
what a violation of them would look like. For example, standard 43 states: 
“Avoid unnecessary references and do not make the bibliography unneces-
sarily long.” Which references are “unnecessary” and how long is too long? 
Standard 46, “Be honest and scrupulous as an assessor or peer reviewer and 
explain your assessment,” could also lead to complaints in cases where a 
reviewer has rejected a substandard article without sufficient explanation of 
his or her assessment. 
We already have enough integrity complaints to deal with as it is, inclu-
ding those which are aimed at tarnishing a fellow colleague’s reputation. My 
concern is that the vagueness of many of the 2018 Code’s standards will open 
the door for more unwarranted complaints.
A novice researcher who wants to know which behaviors are and are not 
permitted under the 2018 Code must first pick out the nineteen ‘unqualified’ 
standards in the list of 61 and then look up the no less than twelve assessment 
criteria in Chapter 5, some of which are so vaguely formulated that they can 
be interpreted in any number of ways. Take for example, criterion c: “the 
possible consequences for the validity of the research in question and for the 
prevailing scientific knowledge and scholarship; or d: “the potential effects 
on the trust in scientific and scholarly research and between researchers”; 
or e: “the potential impact on individuals, society and the environment”.
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Does the novice researcher really understand the consequences of viola-
ting one of these 61 standards? The answer to this question is no. The 2018 
Code creates uncertainty about what constitutes permissible and imper-
missible scientific behavior. Moreover, it also creates legal uncertainty for 
anyone who has been accused of violating one of these vague standards by an 
unfriendly colleague; and then there are the vaguely formulated “assessment 
criteria”. It is the duty of each institution’s Executive Board to protect their 
employees from these kinds of legal uncertainties, especially when it comes 
to the critical matter of scientific integrity.
This double vagueness has predictable consequences. The Code’s stan-
dards open the door for minor complaints about colleagues’ behavior, which 
can lead to insecurity, unrest, jealousy and harassment. Then there is the fact 
that decisions on these complaints are largely left up to the discretion of the 
Executive Board of the institution in question, due to the ambiguity of the 
Code’s assessment criteria. In such cases, the Board can wield its adminis-
trative power arbitrarily. The assessment criteria could be used to acquit an 
esteemed researcher of a serious violation of scientific integrity, assuming 
that this has not “damaged the trust in science” or not had “negative conse-
quences for individuals, society or the environment.” But the same assess-
ment criteria could also be used to punish another researcher for a relatively 
minor violation. I predict that, in the next ten years, we will see this arbitrari-
ness manifested not only in minor cases, but in major cases as well—and the 
latter could end up being dismissed with reference to the Code’s assessment 
criteria. For who is keeping an eye on the assessors?
In all, the 2018 Code is a considerable step backward from what had al-
ready been achieved. It’s as if we’ve gone back twenty years. The first steps 
towards a codification of standards of scientific integrity came in the 1990s, 
back when there was hardly any standardization and hardly anyone knew how 
to handle integrity violation scandals. As noted above, in 2001 the KNAW, 
VSNU and NWO drew up a memorandum on scientific integrity. Like its 
predecessors from the 1990s, this memorandum contains clearer standards 
for what is and is not permitted in scientific research than the 2018 Code. As 
noted in the Code’s Preamble, there is certainly a need for “clear standards”; 
but the assertion that this Code provides that clarity for is untenable.
Unlike the 2001 and 1995 KNAW memoranda, the 2018 Code confounds 
the goal rules and the game rules of scientific research. Its purpose was 
both to create a normative framework for the transfer of standards for good 
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science practice (goal rules) and to provide an evaluative framework for the 
assessment of serious breaches of scientific integrity (game rules). Instead, 
the Code blurs the distinction between the two, creating a situation that will 
soon be characterized by uncertainty and arbitrariness in what is grounds 
for complaint, how complaints should be handled, and what decisions on 
scientific integrity should be made. With regard to the codification of the 





Scientific fraud: lessons from history
3.1  A NEW PHENOMENON?
Many of history’s greatest financial fraudsters started out stealing small 
amounts. An accountant or administrator illegally transfers a small amount 
to his own bank account. When he discovers that no one has noticed, the 
temptation to do it again grows. Pretty soon he starts transferring larger 
amounts until his network of illegal transfers and accounts becomes so 
complex that he has to transfer even larger amounts just to cover it up. This 
downward spiral can occur in science as well—not with money, but with data.
Since the Stapel affair, there has been a great deal of speculation into the 
cause of the Tilburg professor’s peculiar behavior and extreme deceit. One 
cause could have been the growing pressure on academics to publish and 
perform. Stapel said himself that he was under tremendous pressure from 
the contemporary scientific system, which holds researchers to exceptionally 
high standards (Stapel 2012: 256-259). Abma indirectly agrees and associates 
the increase in scientific fraud with current science policy in the Netherlands, 
which, he believes, places far too much emphasis on measurable achieve-
ments, such as the number of publications (Abma 2013).
In my opinion, these explanations are too simple. For starters, I find the 
parallel with financial fraud more interesting and perhaps more scientifically 
fruitful. When Stapel first started filling out his own surveys and submitted 
an article based on the fabricated data to a scientific journal, he must have 
been nervous: Will I get caught? When nothing happened and he realized 
that no one had noticed, he continued (Schuyt 2014: 73-85). When a young 
criminal’s small robberies go undetected the first nine times, and he finally 
gets caught on the tenth, he gets off with a warning. When the next nine rob-
beries go undetected as well, he receives more positive reinforcement for his 
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negative behavior, which is not taken into account when he is finally caught 
and punished (Schuyt 2006: 163). 
This is, in my opinion, a better explanation for the causes of scientific 
fraud than the pressures of present-day university life. Yes, the pressure to 
perform has certainly increased within the university sector over the last 
thirty years. In the Netherlands, this trend began in the mid-1980s with the 
introduction of the system of conditional research funding and the arrival 
of university-appointed PhD students. Meanwhile, sensitivity to scientific 
fraud was on the rise, and more cases of fraud were attracting public atten-
tion. However, let’s not jump to the conclusion that these two trends were 
causally linked. Although it may seem that way, there may have been other, 
underlying, more fundamental factors at play. 
To gain a better understanding of what these factors might be, it may help 
to take a look at the history of scientific fraud. The same kinds of behavior—
fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism—certainly existed in the past, even 
before scientists were under pressure to publish. Scientific fraud is not a new 
phenomenon. Since the seventeenth century, modern science has been mar-
ked by competition to be the first to come up with a new idea or theory. From 
1711 to 1713, Newton and Leibniz battled over who was the first to invent 
calculus (Ackroyd 2006: 152-155). One hundred and fifty years later, Alfred 
Russel Wallace and Charles Darwin competed to be the first to formulate an 
evolutionary theory. The history of scientific fraud also provides plenty of 
examples of research data that were just “too good to be true”, from Men-
del to Nobel Prize-winner Millikan (Broad and Wade, 1983: 31-35; Tudge, 
2002: 94-97; see Chapter 2 above). Both Burt and Stapel got caught because 
of their improbable statistical data, but Stapel was not the first scientist in 
the Netherlands to be found guilty of fabrication. As mentioned in Chapter 
2, from 1950 to 1962, the physician and VU Amsterdam professor Anthonie 
Stolk wrote several articles on fish tumors, which were largely based on ficti-
tious data. He also published countless articles and books on the prehistoric 
lives of animals and non-existent tribes in Central Africa. Nevertheless, his 
work was widely accepted at first and published by scientific journals (Van 
Kolfschooten, 1996: 122-136; Van Kolfschooten, 2012: 156-166). Another 
VU Amsterdam professor, Mart Bax, was also found guilty of publishing 
fieldwork reports based on falsified data for years. He did this to “confirm” 
two of his own personal theories: one related to religious miracles and the 
other on religious-political violence (VU report, Baud et al. 2013). Eleven 
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articles, all originally published without the slightest suspicion of fraud in 
the Amsterdams Sociologisch Tijdschrift and the Sociologische Gids respectively, had 
to be withdrawn (editorial, Sociologie, 10.4, 2014: 3-4).
Given that there has not been sufficient research into the frequency and 
causes of scientific fraud, I will try, through descriptions of several well-
known cases of scientific fraud from the recent past (1980-2015), to shed 
some light on a phenomenon which, in my opinion, remains grossly un-
der-researched. For now, all I can offer are a few hypothetical ideas and a 
speculative typology of scientific fraudsters, but it’s a start.
3.2   WHAT PHENOMENON? A MORE PRECISE DEFINITION OF 
SCIENTIFIC FRAUD 
All we know about how often scientific fraud occurs is that we don’t know. 
Whether or not scientific fraud has increased in recent years, we cannot say. 
There is very little research into the nature and extent of scientific fraud. How-
ever, there have been guesses and estimates, as well as a number of studies 
that have asked researchers whether they or someone in their vicinity has 
ever committed fraud with questions like, “In the last three years, have you 
seen a colleague fabricate or manipulate data?” (Verbeke 2013: 25). It is well 
known that there are methodological problems with research into hidden 
behavior and the numerical estimates of crime that remains unknown to 
the authorities (often referred to as the “dark number”). The problem with 
self-reporting is that it requires a (self-)definition of the reprehensible behav-
ior in question and a specification of the time period in which this behavior 
took place. Furthermore, asking respondents whether they are aware of fraud 
in their own environments raises the issue of double counting. Respondents 
in the same environment may recall the same well-known cases. Moreover, it 
can be difficult to define what the boundaries of an environment actually are. 
For example, Verbeke’s research into forms of fraud and misconduct in bio-
medical research in Belgium concludes that, of the 315 medical researchers 
surveyed (response 12%), “one in twelve” physicians admit to having carried 
out some form of data manipulation themselves (i.e. “fabricating or manipu-
lating data”). But whether they have “fabricated” (1.3%) or “manipulated” 
(7.3%) makes a big difference. When asked about their colleagues’ behavior, 
respondents reported much higher figures: 47% reported that they had seen 
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their colleagues fabricate or manipulate data (Verbeke, 2013: 25). What did 
the respondents perceive as “manipulating”? When it comes to research 
based on self-reporting, one cannot be too precise.
A response about the nature and extent of scientific fraud is thus closely 
linked to the definitions of fraud used by the researchers and the respondents 
respectively. What is meant by scientific fraud? This question is difficult to 
answer in a normative sense, and answers provided by individual respon-
dents in survey form cannot necessarily be trusted.
The international scientific community agrees on three obvious forms 
of misconduct in science: fabrication, falsification and plagiarism (FFP). 
However, these three major violations of scientific standards become more 
complicated when one also considers the many so-called questionable re-
search practices (QRPs). Some questionable research practices have been 
around for a long time, but they are still regularly applied and defended 
today. Charles Babbage (1791-1871), a British mathematician and one of the 
forefathers of computer science (cf. Nudds, 1969: 1-34), was already battling 
scientific standard violations in 1830. He identified four types of scientifically 
dishonest behavior (i.e. misconduct) that are still relevant today: hoaxing, 
forging, trimming, and cooking (Babbage, 1830; 1989). The first two items 
on the list, hoaxing and forging, are quite similar to the two main forms of 
misconduct recognized today, fabrication and falsification, whereas the other 
two, trimming and cooking, still occur in contemporary scientific practice 
as well. In 1830, Babbage described the two dishonest practices as follows:
Trimming: “consists of clipping off little bits here and there 
from those observations which differ most in excess of the 
mean, and in sticking them on to those which are too small”;
Cooking: “to give ordinary observations the appearance and 
character of those of the highest degree of accuracy. One of its 
numerous processes is to make multitudes of observations, 
and out of these to select those only which agree, or very nearly 
agree. If a hundred observations are made, the cook must be 
very unlucky if he cannot pick out fifteen or twenty which will 
do for serving up” (Charles Babbage, 1830; cited by Broad and 
Wade, 1983: 29-30). 
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Personally, I find the metaphor of the cook very appropriate. The cook only 
serves the recipes that he or she considers successful and leaves the rest 
behind in the kitchen of science—that’s where the fraud takes place. Bab-
bage’s elegant formulations reveal that academic dishonesty most certainly 
occurred in the science of his day. Unlike today, however, no action was taken 
against offenders. 
Scientific fraud is a violation of trust. Scientists, knowledge consumers 
and the general public all expect scientific results to be accurate and trust-
worthy; they trust that they have not been tampered with or manipulated. It is 
interesting to observe how various other sectors of society have experienced 
a loss of trust over the last decade as well. Although it may be difficult to de-
termine how often fraud occurs, its variety of forms across sectors may be an 
indication of a shift in today’s cultural standards. There is a tendency to com-
bat violations of integrity with increased supervision, but maybe we should 
reflect on what the common denominator among these violations may be. 
Criminological theory can shed light on the difference between “crimes 
of trust” and other crimes. The Norwegian criminologist Johannes Andenaes 
reported on the development of crime during the Second World War in Co-
penhagen in 1944. The Danish police—a hotbed of the Resistance—was dis-
banded by the Nazis during the last seven months of the war, greatly reducing 
the control over the behavior of ordinary citizens. In those seven months, 
robberies and theft increased tenfold. It didn’t matter that the thieves who 
were caught were punished much more severely—the chances of being cau-
ght were almost zero. What struck Andenaes the most, however, was the fact 
that cases of embezzlement and fraud did not increase during that time. This 
led him to the tentative conclusion that it is the nature of the social relati-
onship that largely determines the violation of particular standards and the 
threat of punishment. Breaches of trust (i.e. embezzlement and fraud) are 
apparently not influenced by the risk of punishment; there seem to be other 
factors at play (Andenaes 1952: 176-198, cf. Schuyt 1971: 146). The way that 
professional standards are internalized and transferred seems to have a gre-
ater impact on decision-making than supervision and (police) control, a fact 
which offers an interesting starting point for further research into breaches 
of trust in various sectors of society. Starting with science. 
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3.3  A FREQUENT PHENOMENON? 
Estimates of how often scientific fraud occurs depend on how scientific 
fraud is defined. According to Fanelli’s well-known meta-analysis of data 
from eighteen surveys, 1-2% of scientists are guilty of the two serious forms 
of fraud: fabrication and falsification (Fanelli 2009). This is in line with 
the estimate made by the European Science Foundation in its 2010 report 
Fostering Research Integrity in Europe. This report states that in a three- to five-
year period, one in a hundred researchers was guilty of serious misconduct 
(ESF 2010; Jump 2010: 20). Once the definition of fraud is broadened to 
include questionable research practices as well, self-reported data suggests 
that 3% to 30% of scientists are guilty of misconduct (Steneck 2001). Such 
a wide disparity leads one to question the reliability of these estimates. In 
2005, Martison, Anderson and De Vries estimated that 30% of the researchers 
interviewed were guilty of minor forms of misconduct compared to the 1-2% 
who confessed to more serious forms of scientific fraud (FFP). Many of these 
self-reporting studies were small in scale and limited to specific disciplines. 
One interesting example is a study among criminologists, who are certainly 
aware of the issue of “dark number” figures and often rely on self-reporting 
to gain insight into various types of legal violations. In a self-reported survey 
of 500 US criminologists, 2% reported having committed some form of pla-
giarism “at some point” and 1% during the past year (Robinson and Zaitzow, 
1999, quoted by De Haan 2011: 109).
One particularly elaborate study was carried out by Swazey, Anderson 
and Seashore Louis in the United States. They sent a carefully designed fif-
teen-question survey to 2,000 PhD students and 2,000 professors and scien-
tific staff members in four fields (chemistry, civil engineering, microbiology 
and sociology). The response rate was satisfactory, at 72% and 59% respec-
tively. Of the three main types of misconduct (FFP), plagiarism was reported 
to occur the most frequently, with an overall score of 8%, followed by 6% for 
falsification (with 13-15% among PhD students). The survey also included 
thorough definitions of “questionable research practices”, which resulted in 
a score of 22%. As expected, the results varied from one scientific field to the 
next: in sociology and civil engineering, scores were higher for plagiarism 
(18%), whereas in microbiology, falsification scored higher (12%). However, 
given that these statistics cannot be generalized, the value of this data should 
not be overestimated. The authors themselves were extremely cautious, sta-
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ting that the figures say more about the way in which faculties and disciplines 
influence the education and socialization of PhD students than about the fre-
quency of misconduct (Swazey et al., 1993: 542-553). Komter provides a clear 
overview of this and other similar studies in the US, looking at demographic 
factors, such as the perpetrator’s age, social status, personality traits and 
motives (Komter 2012). Systematic research into scientific fraud didn’t come 
to the Netherlands until 2016, and most of the results of this research have 
not yet been published, with a few exceptions. At the same time, however, 
speculation about the extent and nature of scientific fraud persists, and there 
is no shortage of theories about the causes behind it. One thing is certain, 
however: scientific fraud and misconduct are nothing new—they have been 
troubling the sciences for more than three centuries. 
3.4   DO PERFORMANCE PRESSURE AND DISHONESTY GO  
HAND IN HAND? 
A common explanation for contemporary scientific fraud is the growing 
performance pressure on university researchers, especially in the area of 
publications. The competition in some fields has become so fierce that some 
believe this to be the cause of new cases of fraud and plagiarism. There have 
been numerous comparisons of top-level science and top-level sport in recent 
years, and some say that academic misconduct is like using illegal substances 
to gain a competitive edge. Stapel, one of the most famous fraudsters, cited 
performance pressure as an explanation for his actions, both in his initial 
statements to the press and later in his own reflections on his case (Stapel 
2012). A month after his fabricated research data was discovered, he told De 
Volkskrant: “In modern science, the level of ambition is high and the compe-
tition for scarce resources is enormous. In recent years, this pressure has 
become too much for me. I was under pressure to score, to publish, to con-
stantly do better. I wanted too much, too fast” (De Volkskrant 31 October 2011). 
Later, in an interview in The New York Times that made him more internationally 
famous than he had ever been as a researcher, he made similar statements (28 
April 2013). In the book about his own “derailment”, published the day the 
Levelt report came out, he wrote: “Science is a battle of interests. Scientists 
will defend their interests, their research topic, their insights, their theories 
with sword and horse against other scientists no matter what. They’re all 
Scientific Integrity
64
competing to conduct as much research as possible for as little money as 
possible in the shortest possible amount of time, and they’ll stop at nothing to 
achieve this goal” (Stapel, 2012: 257-258, my emphasis).
The image of modern science presented here may appeal to some, but it 
is a gross generalization. It is undeniable that competition has increased, 
but the notion that scientists are willing to resort to any means necessary, 
even illegal ones, is not yet proven. It is a useful hypothesis, perhaps, but one 
which requires further investigation and testing.
First, we need to establish exactly what this pressure consists of and whe-
re it comes from. Is it from society? From the business world? From academic 
institutions striving to become the “best”? What is “the best” anyway? There 
has always been a drive to achieve in science, but nowadays there is also 
pressure to publish. Research positions have become scarce, especially for 
young researchers who want to continue in science after completing their 
dissertations, and in order to obtain a research grant or renew their contracts, 
they need to get their work published, preferably in leading journals. These 
criteria are observed by supervisors, professors and directors of research 
institutions and are often adopted by the university administrators who for-
mally approve appointments. In other words, the pressure is not from above, 
it’s from within. 
Editors of scientific journals play a key role in this assessment process 
because they determine which research results are worth being published. 
However, most editors and leading professors come from the same scienti-
fic circles as those who carry out assessments, distribute awards and make 
appointments. Many researchers, especially younger ones, experience this 
pressure as imposed by “the system”. The same criteria are also used to 
appoint candidates to tenured, senior-level positions, in this case not just by 
committees of professors but also by administrators. It is interesting to note 
that since the system of conditional funding was introduced in the Nether-
lands in 1985, the number of publications has been used as an indication of 
quality more often than before. Moreover, publications have come to weigh 
far more heavily than other important skills for university work, for example 
teaching skills and organizational skills. However, pressure on established 
scientists—such as professors with good, steady positions—is relatively rare 
in the Netherlands. No appointed professor with a tenured position has ever 
been dismissed in the Netherlands because he or she published too little, and 
publication requirements (two to three articles per year) are flexible. There 
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was nothing forcing Stapel to publish 25 articles a year, and he certainly 
didn’t need to do so to keep his position. 
That national science policies and the policies of individual universities 
have led to a shift in the assessment criteria for scientific research is unde-
niable (Abma 2013). It is also undeniable that this shift has created certain 
negative incentives for research. This is especially true in the socio-cultural 
fields of science, which are being held to the standards of the harder scien-
ces (Gutwirth and Christiaens 2014: 267-287). However, a critical analysis 
of the current scientific climate does not in any way suggest that, as a result 
of this situation, scientists are now more inclined to commit scientific mal-
practice. The influence of environmental factors on one’s freedom to choose 
one’s own course of action is more complex than most of the current critics 
assume. No one is forced into ambition or jealousy, and compared to other 
professions, scientists still have a great deal of freedom to carry out their 
research in the way they see fit.
In short, the pressure to perform has certainly increased, but the causal 
relationship between this pressure and scientific fraud has yet to be establis-
hed. For beginning researchers, cheating is extremely risky and could put 
their careers in jeopardy; for more established researchers who have already 
received a certain level of recognition, there are risks as well, and there is no 
reason to cheat unless they are unable to resist their own ambitions. Thus, 
Stapel’s claim that researchers are willing to resort to any means necessary, 
including illegal ones, to achieve their goal seems highly doubtful, assu-
ming their goal is to practice good, valuable science. Plus, given the strict 
requirements of scientific control—even if, in practice, they are not always 
watertight—there is most likely not a great deal of fraud taking place, and 
certainly no more than in the past. The most reliable meta-analyses from 
2001 and 2009 indicate that, based on self-reporting, 1-2% of researchers are 
guilty of serious forms of misconduct (Steneck 2001; Fanelli 2009, ESF 2010).
Another explanation for the perceived increase in fraud is more obvious: 
when two phenomena occur simultaneously, it is quite possible that they 
were both caused by a third phenomenon, which could be the underlying 
explanatory factor. In this case, that underlying factor could be the increase 
in the scale of universities. The intensification of competition over the last 
twenty to thirty years can be explained by the fact that, despite the sharp in-
crease in the number of graduates and qualified research staff, the financial 
resources for scientific research have remained more or less the same (in the 
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Netherlands, less than 2% of GNP goes to research and development). This 
explains why research funding and positions have become harder to come by. 
While scientists have always had to fight to achieve recognition, the battle has 
intensified in recent years due to the scarcity of resources and the number of 
positions available, and because the power of prestige can be seen to translate 
into funding and rank.
Despite the fact that the percentage of funding for scientific research has 
stagnated, or in some cases even slightly decreased, there has been tremen-
dous growth in the total number of researchers. It has even been claimed that 
80-90% of all scientific researchers who have ever existed are currently alive 
and working (Freeland Judson 2004: 407; Broad and Wade 1983: 53). In the 
US, the current number of researchers is estimated at approximately 200,000 
to 300,000, with an annual production of more than one million publicati-
ons; in 1960, there were around 50,000 researchers. Hence, if the percentage 
of fraudsters, estimated at 1% by previous research, has remained more or 
less the same, then the absolute number of questionable cases would have 
increased fourfold since 1960, from about 500 to about 2000. Something 
similar has taken place in the Netherlands. The number of students enrolled 
in universities rose from 40,000 in 1960 (Schuyt and Taverne 2000: 316) to 
205,000 in 2010. In 1960, the number of researchers at all Dutch universities 
was about 4,000 (Kersten 1996: 157; Van Berkel 2000: 336). Nowadays that 
population has risen to about 17,000, of whom approximately 6,000 are 
PhD students; especially in the biomedical, natural and technical sciences, 
a large proportion of research work is undertaken by PhD students (Chiong 
Meza 2012). If the average researcher carries out three studies in four years, 
and 1% of these researchers is guilty of fraud, that means that the number 
of potentially fraudulent researchers has quadrupled from forty to 170. As 
such, the fact that more cases are being reported as potentially fraudulent is 
not surprising and can be explained by the increase in the scale of scientific 
research. Since 1985, the number of young academics who only do research 
(most of whom are PhD students and postdocs) has increased dramatically. 
Before then, there was little pressure to publish or to obtain a PhD at Dutch 
universities.
Fabrication, falsification and plagiarism occurred in the past as well, 
even when there was little pressure to publish at all. Back then, researchers 
were motivated by the desire to be the first to come up with something. If 
fraud was observed, great lengths were taken to conceal it. From 1950 to 
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1980, there were certainly cases of FFP in the Netherlands, but according to 
the journalist Van Kolfschooten, the number of these cases in 1992 could be 
counted on two hands (Van Kolfschooten 1993; 1996: 4). Later on, however, 
he discovered more cases. One of the oldest recorded cases of modern pla-
giarism—in which a Netherlands-based researcher was the plagiarized, not 
the plagiarizer—concerned the writings of the Dutch economist Nicolaas 
Pierson (1839-1909, president of the Dutch Bank, minister of Finance, and 
professor of economics and statistics at the University of Amsterdam). In 
1866, he wrote an original study on “Italian economists of the 17th and 18th 
century”, which in 1872 was shamelessly published in its entirety in German 
in Strasbourg by Professor A. von Schwarzkopf without any reference to the 
original author (Verrijn Stuart, 1911: 44-45, with thanks to H. Trapman for 
drawing my attention to this unique case). This deceit was mentioned in 
newspapers (e.g. Het Handelsblad, 29 March 1873), but no action was taken 
at all. There are numerous instances of such cases throughout the first half 
of the twentieth century.
Since the first decade of the twenty-first century, more and more scientific 
publications (first) appear in digital form. This has created more opportu-
nities for quick, digital forms of plagiarism, which often go undetected. 
However, this does not provide a definite answer to the empirical question of 
whether plagiarism has in fact increased. As long as the scientific standards 
of “never plagiarize” and “always give credit where credit is due” are firmly 
anchored in scientific practice, the internet does not have to pose a threat to 
honest science.
Oftentimes, the motivation to plagiarize stems from a lack of time. Upon 
being caught, plagiarizers will sometimes claim that it was never their in-
tention to copy someone else’s work, but that they were running out of time. 
For example, a researcher who has to write a scientific report on a particular 
psychological disorder every week, on top of all the other work he or she has 
to do, may be tempted to copy from another source without properly citing 
it. Although this self-imposed “pressure to publish” may not justify the in-
tegrity violation, it does help explain the causal links between self-imposed 
pressure, systemic pressure, and certain forms of dishonesty.
There are, however, indications that the pressure to perform can lead to 
carelessness and other questionable practices. Publication pressure is also 
accompanied by time pressure: who will be the first to publish certain results 
in a small, restricted field of research? In some disciplines, only a few rese-
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arch centers in the world are devoted to a certain topic, and most researchers 
in the field know each other and are aware of one another’s current projects. 
Since most journals are not interested in publishing research that has already 
been released elsewhere, there is a constant race to get into the top journals. 
Whereas in the past, experiments could be repeated up to five times to verify 
the results, nowadays it is enough to conduct a single experiment, and if the 
results are favorable, to submit them for publication as quickly as possible 
(KNAW 2012: 23). Such haste is rarely a good thing, especially in science. 
Not only does it increase the chances of errors and negligence, it also reduces 
the rigor of the peer review process, particularly given that peer reviewers 
may also be in a hurry to see the work published so that they too can profit 
from it. In most cases, those guilty of questionable research practices do not 
intend to commit fraud, but they may have still undermined the reliability of 
scientific knowledge. 
That said, practices considered “questionable” in one discipline may be 
permitted in another, for example, the omission of outliers. Disregarding ne-
gative results is also common practice in some fields and not always classified 
as fraud (Fanelli 2011). In my opinion, there may be good scientific reasons 
for not publishing negative test results for example because they may have 
been influenced by unknown variables. Classifying research data and/or sear-
ching for a statistical analysis that does achieve the desired level of significant 
correlation can, under certain circumstances, be regarded as an acceptable 
practice. However, deliberately omitting inconvenient research results in 
the final publication of one’s research results is more than questionable. 
The gray area between error and fraud, between unintentional mistakes and 
deliberate cheating, must be well monitored. Performance pressure does 
not have to lead to dishonest behavior, assuming that performance means 
carrying out sound, sustainable research and reporting on it in a clear and 
careful manner. This process takes time, which explains the call for “slow 
science” as a counteractive force: not against real achievements or ambitions, 
but against bad science.
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3.5 COMMISSIONED RESEARCH: UNDER PRESSURE TO ADJUST? 
In discussions about the perceived increase in scientific fraud, reference is 
often made to the publication pressure exerted by universities. There is, how-
ever, another possible cause worthy of attention: commissioned research. 
When scientific research is carried out on behalf of commercial companies 
and government organizations, this may increase the risk of dishonesty. In 
this case, the main concern is not necessarily the pressure to publish—most 
likely some results will not be published—but rather the pressure to produce 
a particular outcome. Commissioned researchers are often under pressure 
to produce results that the commissioning party can put to good use, for 
example, in industry. 
The relationship between scientific research, industrial exploitation and 
economic application is nothing new. During the scientific revolution in the 
seventeenth century, scientific knowledge and industrial production went 
hand in hand. At that time, it was often trade and industry practitioners who 
initiated scientific innovation (Shapin 1996; Zilsel 1985). That relationship 
continues to this day, and as long as the fundamental principles of science 
(i.e. the critical testing of ideas and the honest description of results, which 
in turn lead to new ideas) are respected throughout the process, there is 
nothing to worry about. But over the last thirty years, there has been a major 
increase in scientific research commissioned and funded by external clients 
(KNAW report, Wetenschap op bestelling [Commissioned Research] 2005). At 
the same time, patents allow scientists to put their new knowledge to work 
in industrial companies. The modern knowledge economy is, in fact, largely 
dependent on these kinds of mutual incentives.
In terms of scientific integrity, this can lead to two problems. First, there 
is the question of whether research driven by specific commercial interests is 
still as reliable as independent university research. Fellow researchers need 
to know which interests are driving the research, and any conflicts of interest 
must be reported. If the research is funded by or otherwise linked to a private 
company or special-interest organization, this must be stated in the final pu-
blication. Many journals have made it mandatory for researchers to mention 
any potential conflicts of interest regarding their clients (the biomedical field 
also requires a declaration of all conflicts of interest). Failure to disclose this 
information can lead to a violation of scientific integrity, as experienced by 
a group of medical researchers in the Netherlands in 2013. The group was 
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conducting research into the effectiveness of medical products sold by com-
panies that they founded themselves and in which they maintained a vested 
interest (University of Groningen, NRC, October 3, 2013). In another case, a 
medical researcher started his own company in the United States and then 
used this company to conduct a population study in the Netherlands under 
his supervision, while concealing the fact that he had a personal interest 
in the company’s success (VU Amsterdam, the Meijer case, NRC June 13-
14, 2015, NRC April 20 and May 22, 2016, NRC October 1, 2018). No matter 
how scientifically sound their research may be, researchers should always 
mention potential conflicts of interest in their scientific articles. At the very 
least, this will provide readers and consumers with some insight into the 
researchers’ background.
Secondly, the increase in commissioned research raises the question as 
to whether the influence of the client, consciously or unconsciously, could 
jeopardize the independence of researchers. If a client (or a commissioning 
governmental agency) tries to directly influence research results for its own 
benefit, this is clearly a violation of the standards of honest scientific practice. 
However, there are many less overt forms of influence, for example: requests 
to leave negative results out of the final publication, requests to change the 
wording of conclusions, or threats to terminate the research relationship if 
the researchers reveal certain research results. Köbben and Tromp provide 
several examples of cases in the Netherlands where governmental instituti-
ons commissioned scientific research as part of their policy and then attemp-
ted to influence the results. In one case, the Ministry of Education, Culture 
and Science commissioned a study into teacher absenteeism in secondary 
education, but when the study revealed that the teachers were suffering from 
an enormous workload the Minister preferred not to reveal the results (Köb-
ben and Tromp 1999). Such conflicts of interest between researchers and 
their clients can be avoided by establishing clear agreements about the pu-
blication of research results in advance: good fences make good neighbors, 
as the saying goes. Clear research contracts can prevent major disputes over 
the publication of research results.
We have seen a number of important and instructive cases in other coun-
tries where commissioned research has led to improbable results. In 1998, 
medical specialist Andrew Wakefield published an article in The Lancet that 
claimed that vaccinations against measles, mumps and rubella were not safe 
for children (Mersch, 2012: 165-173; Goldacre 2009: 290-323). This was due 
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to the fact that numerous cases of autism had been observed within a year of 
vaccination (mostly within a child’s first year of life, when the first symptoms 
of autism can occur). His findings had a major impact on public opinion, rai-
sing concern among parents that vaccinations cause autism. Wakefield even 
produced new evidence highlighting the link between the measles vaccinati-
on and intestinal infections. Eventually, official agencies got involved. Other 
researchers who investigated the same relationship found no connections 
between vaccinations and autism (Mersch 2012: 169). A large-scale study 
of 440,000 vaccinated and non-vaccinated children in Denmark from 1991 
to 1998 showed no difference in the prevalence of autism in vaccinated and 
non-vaccinated children. People began to question Wakefield’s theory. After 
conducting its own research, the Immunization Safety Review Committee 
in England concluded that there was no reason to assume that vaccinations 
cause autism. Soon after, it was discovered that, before Wakefield wrote his 
article in 1998, he had received $50,000 from a law firm trying to hold the 
vaccine producer liable for massive damages. Wakefield also planned to 
develop a test that would allow parents to determine whether their child had 
been harmed by the vaccine. In 2010, The Lancet withdrew the article. Wake-
field was found guilty of scientific misconduct and stripped of his position 
and doctoral degree (Mersch 2012: 179). 
Also notorious are the researchers who, funded by American tobacco com-
panies, produced results indicating that, contrary to study carried out by the 
Environmental Protection Agency, there was no link between second-hand 
smoke and lung cancer (Oreskes and Conway 2010). Later, it turned out 
that the tobacco companies had known about the dangers of smoking and 
second-hand smoke for years. Nevertheless, the tobacco industry accused 
researchers from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of pursuing 
their own political objectives and restricting individual freedom, and the EPA 
worked to combat the tobacco industry’s disinformation campaigns.
What is the difference between bad science and good science, and what 
is the difference between poor science and dishonest science? Is this case a 
matter of scientific controversy or a deliberate distortion of research results? 
Regardless, the tobacco industry is a prime example of a client that was able 
to exert great influence on both the research results and the dissemination 
of those results, making certain “unwelcome facts” seem suspicious. The 
politicization of science is the predictable consequence of this kind of inter-
ference and one that has been observed in other cases where controversial 
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scientific issues are at stake (e.g. climate change, reduction of the ozone 
layer, ecological protection of the natural environment). These examples 
highlight the importance of independent research and researchers. Any 
attempt to undermine this independence can thus be seen as a violation of 
scientific integrity.
There have been similar discussions concerning the relationship between 
drug research and the pharmaceutical industry. In general, research commis-
sioned by large pharmaceutical companies is regarded with suspicion (see 
Goldacre 2013). There is always the question of whether open and demon-
strable manipulations have occurred under the client’s influence or whether 
the initial research question has been formulated in such a way as to create the 
“right mindset” for obtaining favorable results. The pharmaceutical industry 
is also known for exerting more control over certain points of research than 
the free scientific community. This is generally due to the simple fact that 
official governmental approval is required to introduce new drugs on the 
market and the criteria for doing so are very strict. The industry cannot afford, 
or is uwilling, to invest large sums of money in research that later turns out to 
be wrong or that quickly falls by the wayside due to excessively one-sided or 
careless data collection. Here, too, honesty in science remains key.
3.6  TOWARDS AN EXPLANATION OF SCIENTIFIC FRAUD? 
In the absence of thorough research into the frequency, nature and forms 
of scientific fraud and its possible causes, I’d like to examine several cases 
of scientific fraud from history to serve a starting point for future research. 
From 1985 to 2005, there were approximately twenty major cases of scien-
tific fraud in the US, where the details of integrity violations are generally 
fully disclosed after the case in question has been closed (Resnik 1998; Free-
land Judson 2004; Marks 2009; Goodstein 2010). One of the most blatant 
examples of scientific fraud, the case of Helena Wachslicht-Rodbard, was 
described by both Freeland Judson and Marks. This case is a manifestation 
of nearly all forms of scientific integrity violation: plagiarism of ideas, pla-
giarism of texts, lack of supervision, unwarranted co-authorship and the 
nasty consequences that come with being caught. As Ben Goldacre so aptly 
put it: “With science as we have seen repeatedly, the devil is in the details” 
(Goldacre 2009: 238). It is precisely by studying cases of scientific fraud in 
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detail and observing the events and circumstances behind them that we can 
better understand behavior that may well strike us as unexpected. This is the 
first step towards formulating hypotheses and ultimately a scientific explan-
ation. Marks described Wachslicht-Rodbard case as follows:
“A researcher at the NIH named Helena Wachslicht-Rodbard 
submitted a research article on hormone levels in anorexic wo-
men to the New England Journal of Medicine in 1978. The journal 
sent it out for review to three anonymous referees, among them 
a high-ranking endocrinologist at Yale named Philip Felig. Felig 
agreed to review it but simply passed it on to his protégé, Dr. 
Vijay Soman. Soman, who was working on a similar project, 
promptly plagiarized the ideas and some of the sentences in 
the manuscript and told his boss to recommend rejecting it, 
which the boss did. Then Soman sent his own newly augmented 
manuscript (co-authored with his boss) to the American Journal 
of Medicine. The American Journal of Medicine sent it out to a dis-
tinguished researcher at NIH named Jesse Roth, who agreed to 
review it but instead also just passed it on to his own protégé, 
who was Helena Wachslicht-Rodbard. 
Imagine her surprise at finding parts of her own work submit-
ted to another journal under someone else’s names!” (Marks 
2009: 181; see also: Broad, 1980: 38-41; New York Times, Novem-
ber 1, 1981).
This case involves so many violations that it’s almost too ugly to be true, 
but it all really happened and has been described and analyzed several times 
since. We see many of the previously discussed forms of integrity violation at 
play: no time for careful peer review, the “just put my name on it” mentality 
from the boss, the plagiarizing researcher’s ambition, and the outrage of the 
plagiarized. What would have happened if the professor had not outsourced 
the review to his protégé, but rather done it himself ? Would he have noticed 
the plagiarism of ideas? Or was he not really that well informed about his 
protégé’s work? The outcome is not very encouraging: neither of the profes-
sors was reprimanded in the end, and both were allowed to continue their 
careers. Both of the junior researchers left the scientific field, one in shame 
and the other disgusted that the high-ranking professors were not held re-
Scientific Integrity
74
sponsible and that she was ultimately blamed for bringing the case to light 
(Marks 2009: 181; Freeland Judson 2004: 110-112).
By looking at famous cases of scientific fraud, which, in some cases, 
have included well-known scholars like Newton, Mendel, Freud, Pasteur, 
Millikan, Summerlin and others, we can start to identify some of the com-
mon types of “fraudsters”. Of course, such a typology says little about the 
frequency at which scientific fraud occurs, but it does offer some insight into 
certain types of behavior. 
As far as I can tell, there are six types of scientific fraudsters:
 – The Crafty Types: Great theorists, such as Darwin, Mendel, 
Pasteur and Millikan, who sometimes adjusted (or omitted) 
research data to reinforce their own ideas or intuitions. Their 
scientific theories live on today, though some historians have 
questioned the greatness of the theorists behind them (see 
also: Klotz 1992: 2271-2273).
 – The Panic-Stricken: Researchers who, due to a lack of time, re-
sort to using other people’s texts. Time constraints do not 
justify an integrity violation, but they can explain it.
 – The Sneaky Devils: Researchers who secretly alter measure-
ment results. Examples include Imanishi-Kari, central to the 
Baltimore affair and discussed below, and Summerlin, the 
skin-transplant specialist who marked his mice with felt-tip 
pens (Broad and Wade, 1983: 153-158).
 – The Self-Satisfied Pushers: Researchers who are completely con-
vinced of their own theories and ideologies and try to force 
them on the scientific community with all their might. They 
will do anything to get noticed, even if it means committing 
fraud. One example is the above-mentioned German physicist 
Schön, whose breakthroughs on semi-conductors turned out 
to be fake (Beasley et al 2002; Bell Laboratories 2002); other 
examples could include Burt and Bax.
 – The Naïve Ones: Researchers who will continue to insist that 
“nothing is wrong”; they have—admittedly—made some mi-
nor mistakes and been a bit sloppy, but never on purpose.
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 – The Budding Criminals: Offenders who notice over time that no 
one is watching and start to believe that there is no risk of get-
ting caught. After a while, they start thinking that crime pays 
off, and the self-reinforcing rewards of their negative behavior 
compel them to continue committing fraud—until they finally 
get caught. These fraudsters (be they accountants, financial 
managers, or scientific researchers) usually start out small but 
soon find themselves in a complex swamp of larger crimes. 
They continue to do wrong because they don’t know how to 
stop. I would place Stapel in this criminologically interesting 
category of scientific fraudsters. 
However interesting it may be, a typology is far from a hypothetical mo-
del. It still puts too much emphasis on personality traits. Good hypothetical 
reasoning calls for careful consideration of the interaction between the most 
important factors: in this case, the combination of one’s individual charac-
teristics and the characteristics of the social system in which one lives and 
works. A detailed study of one of the most notorious cases, the Baltimore 
affair, provides a good basis for further reflection. The case was described 
by Resnik, Frank, Goldstein and most extensively by the science historian 
Freeland Judson. For more than ten years (from 1986 to 1996), the affair was 
a major topic of debate among American scientists. There are detailed reports 
from four different committees that lay out everything that was gradually 
brought to light in this case.
David Baltimore’s employee, Thereza Imanishi-Kari, was highly ambi-
tious but tended to avoid contact with her colleagues and supervisors. This 
had already been observed by her professors in Sweden and Germany on a 
number of occasions, but she still managed to obtain a prestigious position 
at MIT. Her research was judged unpromising by a review committee, but 
she insisted that her project was highly innovative and in line with Nobel 
Prize-winner David Baltimore’s work. Imanishi-Kari commissioned her em-
ployee, Margot O’Toole, to conduct certain experiments and when O’Toole 
did not obtain the results that Imanishi-Kari had expected, a quarrel broke 
out between the two. Later, however, in an article published in the scien-
tific journal Cell with Baltimore as co-author and herself as the last author 
(Weaver et al., 1986: 247-259), Imanishi-Kari included the research results 
that O’Toole had been unable to confirm. O’Toole sounded the alarm and 
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demanded that the article be withdrawn because of the manipulated data. 
Nevertheless, Baltimore ignored these signals, presumably because he felt 
that an article with his name on it, published in a top magazine, could not 
be incorrect. 
Shortly afterward, O’Toole was fired. However, in the ten-year integrity 
violation trial that followed, it turned out that she had been right: the labo-
ratory data had indeed been falsified by Imanishi-Kari. A CIA investigation 
revealed that, during the course of the experiment, Imanishi-Kari had used 
special ink to falsify data and personally changed dates on the research re-
ports. Further investigation revealed that she had also lied about degrees 
obtained in Europe. She hadn’t really earned a PhD; she’d only followed 
special courses. Eventually, in an appeal to the US Department of Health and 
Human Services, she was acquitted of scientific fraud on legal grounds, but 
it was clear to experts in the field and those involved that fraud had indeed 
taken place (Freeland Judson 2004: 191-243; Goodstein 2010: 61-64).
Slowly but surely, the legal handling of this complex case became a subject 
of discussion. According to Resnik, the Baltimore affair boiled down to a 
question of ethics:
“Should Baltimore have paid closer attention to the research 
that was being done under his supervision? If he could not ade-
quately supervise the research, should he have been listed as 
an author? Should O’Toole have been given more protection 
for her whistle-blowing? Should the initial investigators have 
conducted a more thorough and careful inquiry? Should peo-
ple outside of science be allowed to investigate and adjudicate 
cases of scientific misconduct? Should fraud cases be decided 
on scientific or on legal standards of evidence? Did politicians, 
scientists and the media ‘rush to judgment’? Assuming that 
Imanishi-Kari did not fabricate or falsify data, could her poor 
record-keeping be viewed as irresponsible or unethical? How 
could one prove the allegations of fraud that were made in this 
case?” (Resnik 1998: 8) 
From this case study, Freeland Judson identified what I believe to be one 
of the most important and widespread causes of scientific fraud (and exten-
ding to fraud in other sectors of society): a lack of supervision and mentor-
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ship. Supervision and mentorship are founded on a relationship of trust and 
mutual respect between more experienced and less experienced scientists. 
Mentorship creates a bond that goes beyond work. It is based on the power 
of the role model; someone a junior researcher can look up to as an exam-
ple of the norms and values in the field. He or she sees the role model and 
thinks: “This is how I want to work; this is who I want to become.” In some 
cases, however, mentorship can be marked by a lack of supervision. Freeland 
Judson mentions possible causes for this: too much distance between the 
laboratories and other workplaces where the supervisor and trainee work, 
or the young researcher showing so much promise that he or she is allowed 
to continue without supervision.
When I add this analysis of one of the most notorious fraud cases of the 
last thirty years to the other national and international fraud cases that I’ve 
studied, I arrive at a hypothetical model, which could not only help prevent 
scientific fraud but, as previously suggested, may even be transferable to 
other sectors in which fraud occurs. Though still somewhat primitive, this 
model consists of four clusters of factors that, when combined, can lead to 
fraudulent behavior. 
1) Misplaced ambition or overambition, particularly among tho-
se who are still building their careers and in need of supervi-
sion and/or mentoring. “Misplaced ambition” refers to cases 
where one’s ambition is not in proportion to one’s proven 
capacities, as was the case with Imanishi-Kari. “Overambi-
tion” refers to the very talented, who think they can conquer 
the world at lightning speed, like Schön; medical researcher 
John Darsee, found guilty of the fabrication of data in the early 
1980s, is another example.
2) Too little supervision or mentoring, either due to organizati-
onal hierarchies, large and complex organizational structu-
res, bureaucracy between researchers and management, or 
through a folie à deux, in which the supervising researcher is 
so impressed by the young talent that supervision is no longer 
taking place, and the young researcher takes this to mean that 
he or she no longer needs supervision.
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3) Lack of oversight in the overall system (failures in the peer 
review system, disregard for statistical anomalies, insufficient 
measurement checks, no replication of experiments).
4) Ignoring early signs of deviant behavior: lying, stubbornness, 
a pattern of non-cooperation, keeping to oneself. Darsee, for 
example, already had a prior conviction for check fraud and 
was later found guilty of forging diplomas.
The combination of these four complex factors, all of which involve individ-
ual and systemic characteristics, can give rise to scientific misconduct and 
dishonest behavior: overly ambitious people who avoid supervision and a 
system that does not adequately provide it can be a recipe for dishonest be-
havior. And when this goes unnoticed, the risky practices continue.
Naturally, these hypotheses need to be tested by means of large-scale in-
ductive research. Scientific ethics can certainly play a role in the prevention 
of fraud, but without good mentorship within a well-designed social system, 




Addressing scientific integrity complaints
4.1   THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMITTEES FOR  
SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY 
In many countries, scientific integrity only became a matter of interest after 
a high-profile case of scientific fraud, such as the Baltimore affair in the 
United States. In Norway, for example, a scandal regarding the manipula-
tion of medical research by Jon Sudbø in 2005 led to a new law prohibiting 
scientific fraud and plagiarism (The Norwegian Law on Research Ethics/Integrity 
in Research, 2006). Since then, regional medical ethics committees have been 
established along with an umbrella organization called the National Com-
mission for the Investigation of Scientific Misconduct, whose members are 
appointed by the Minister of Education (Kalleberg 2013). In Denmark, a fraud 
case in 2009 involving neuroscientist Milena Penkopva led to the creation of 
a legally sanctioned national body (Calaway 2011). In the Netherlands, the 
Buck (1992-1996) and Diekstra (1996-1998) affairs inspired action among 
members of the scientific community. And the Belgians followed the Dutch 
example in imposing self-regulatory measures after the VUB Brussels and 
other universities (e.g. KU Leuven) were confronted with several serious 
cases of scientific fraud and plagiarism. Fraud in science became an issue, 
not only for universities and governmental bodies but for the media and the 
general public as well. 
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4.2   THE COMPLAINT PROCEDURE IN THE NETHERLANDS:  
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
In response to growing national and international concern about integrity in 
science, the KNAW, VSNU and NWO drew up their aforementioned memo-
randum on scientific integrity in 2001. In it, the LOWI is already mentioned 
as a forthcoming appellate body, and it was formally established in 2003. 
The motivation behind these initiatives was that, in light of recent scandals, 
a procedure was needed for addressing scientific integrity violations. Until 
the early 2000s, there was very little protocol for how to handle integrity 
cases. Academic disciplinary law, which had been regulated by the Academic 
Statute (Academisch statuut) from 1874 to 1960 and primarily served as a 
guideline for students’ public behavior, had been abolished. After that, cases 
of suspected plagiarism were dealt with quietly until well into the 1970s (Van 
Kolfschooten 1996: 41-46). Only labor laws offered a narrow basis on which 
university researchers could be held accountable for plagiarism or fraud, 
and only on the grounds that they had behaved in a manner “unbefitting of 
a good employee”. Rarely was anyone fired or sanctioned. Most cases were 
kept internal, and the details were not always well documented. After the 
scandals of the 1990s, this was no longer possible.
The 2001 memorandum is interesting for several reasons. First, it explicit-
ly opted for a complaint procedure, with a complainant and a defendant, and 
emphasized the importance of hearing both sides of the argument. Second, 
the investigation and evaluation of complaints were primarily carried out 
by Confidential Advisors. The role of the LOWI was somewhat unclear: Was 
it a quasi-judicial body that would be allowed to issue binding rulings or 
more of an administrative advisory council? The first cases brought before 
the LOWI resulted in “rulings”, which were later changed to “opinions” that 
are addressed to the Executive Board of the institution in question. Around 
the same time the 2004 Code was adopted and went into effect on January 
1, 2005. 
Of course, this is not to say that plagiarism committed before that time 
could not be sanctioned, as one defendant tried to argue at the LOWI in 
2008 (LOWI opinion 2008-1). A number of universities were slow to comply 
with the obligation to establish rules and regulatory committees, which, 
in the absence of regulations and a standing committee at the time, led to 
the inadequate handling of integrity complaints (LOWI opinion 2010-2). It 
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was not until the 2011 Stapel affair that universities realized how serious the 
matter of scientific integrity is; this was when the universities that did not yet 
have permanent committees for scientific integrity finally established such 
committees.
It is interesting to examine the systematic legal framework for addressing 
scientific integrity complaints. What kind of behavior constitutes a violation 
of the provisions of the relevant code of conduct and what kind of sanctions 
can be imposed?
As noted earlier, the 2001 memorandum serves as a sort of “constitution” 
on how to handle scientific integrity complaints. The text states that there is 
no legal basis, but that the parties involved can turn to the civil courts at any 
stage of the proceedings. Both the position and the competence of the LOWI 
are based on the regulations drawn up by the three founding organizations, 
the KNAW, NWO and VSNU. The regulations themselves have a legal basis 
pursuant to Article 5.1 of the Higher Education Act, in which the KNAW is 
instructed to actively ensure the advancement of scientific practice—in addi-
tion to its other tasks, such as advising the Minister of Education and Science. 
Article 3.1 of the LOWI regulations states that the LOWI is responsible for 
advising institutions on how to manage scientific integrity complaints. The 
LOWI offers its advice without the intervention of the KNAW Board; in other 
words, the LOWI operates independently of its three parent organizations. 
The LOWI’s independence was confirmed by a judgment of the District Court 
of Amsterdam (May 22, 2013) in a case in which a complainant demanded 
that the KNAW Board correct an opinion issued by the LOWI and exercise 
more supervision over the organization. 
In addition, the above-mentioned European Code of Conduct for Research Inte-
grity or ALLEA Code calls on the relevant institutions to carefully investigate 
alleged scientific integrity violations: “It should be fair and speedy, and lead 
to proper outcomes and sanctions. Confidentiality should be observed where 
possible and proportionate action is taken when necessary.” (ALLEA-Code 
2010). In addition, the new version of this ALLEA Code (2017) states the fol-
lowing: “Investigations are carried out with due process and in fairness to all 
parties” and “Anyone accused of research misconduct is presumed innocent 
until proven otherwise” (ALLEA Code, 2017: 9).
The ALLEA Code also states that the primary responsibility for addressing 
cases of scientific misconduct lies with the researchers’ employers. These 
institutions should have an ad hoc or standing committee to investigate al-
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legations of misconduct. Moreover, Academies of Science and other bodies 
should have a code of conduct that all members are expected to abide by, 
which also includes rules for handling cases of alleged misconduct.
In the end, only the employer can impose sanctions, but the LOWI is 
authorized, according to its regulations, to advise on possible sanctions. In 
addition to the LOWI regulations, universities and research institutes have 
their own regulations for handling scientific integrity complaints, which lay 
out the respective roles of the Confidential Advisor, the scientific integrity 
committee and the institution’s Executive Board. These regulations stipulate 
that if the complainant or the defendant does not agree with the Executive 
Board’s decision, he or she may, within six weeks after this decision, request 
the LOWI’s opinion on the matter. The LOWI will then evaluate both the 
complaint itself and how it was addressed by the institution in question. For 
administrative bodies recognized by law, this complaint procedure is gover-
ned by Book 9 of the General Administrative Law Act (AwB), which lays down 
rules for how administrative bodies should handle complaint. Pursuant to 
Article 9.3 of the AwB, a decision on these complaints is not subject to appeal 
in court; however, it may be taken to the National Ombudsman.
The legal framework outlined here can be described as a form of self-re-
gulation by the associated administrative bodies, in this case the universi-
ties and research institutes affiliated with NWO and KNAW. Self-regulation 
implies that the standards and rules of good conduct are set by the profes-
sionals themselves and not imposed by the state. This means that, in cases 
of suspected integrity violations, scientists judge scientists. Self-regulation is 
thus the opposite of government regulation, where the government sets the 
standards for good scientific conduct and determines how violations are ad-
dressed and by whom (as is the case in Norway and Denmark, for example). 
The self-regulation of scientific research also makes sense given that much 
of what already occurs in the scientific field involves evaluating the quality 
of other scientists’ work (e.g. peer review, appointments) and research pro-
posals (e.g. applying for funding).
This system of disciplinary self-regulation is similar to the one found in 
the legal profession, where lawyers assess each other’s conduct and investi-
gate alleged violations of the attorneys’ code of conduct. The only difference 
is that the code for lawyers is backed by a special Act: the Attorneys Act (Advo-
catenwet). The same goes for the medical profession, where the assessment 
of professional standards is entrusted to a board of mixed membership, 
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which operates outside of the hospitals’ own organizations and the medical 
field. The pros and cons of these different types of disciplinary systems, 
whether they be state-sanctioned or self-regulatory, composed of professi-
onals inside or outside the field in question, will be discussed in Chapter 7.
4.3  THE CURRENT COMPLAINT PROCEDURE 
If a person suspects that scientific misconduct has taken place, the current 
procedure is as follows: 
 – This person can report the case to the Confidential Advisor 
or take it directly to the Executive Board of the institution in 
question. It is the duty of Confidential Advisors to advise the 
complainant and the defendant, guide them through the pro-
per procedure, assess the seriousness of the complaint and 
discuss the matter with those involved. Confidential Advisors 
can also serve as mediators in a conflict. 
 – If necessary, the Board will order that the complaint be investi-
gated by the CWI. If there is no established CWI, the Board will 
set up a temporary one. The complainant and the defendant 
can both present their case, witnesses can be heard, and advice 
can be sought from experts in the field. 
 – Based on the CWI’s advice, the Board will make a provisional 
decision.
 – The complainant and the defendant then have six weeks to ap-
peal to the LOWI. The LOWI may initiate a re-examination of 
the complaint itself, after which it will provide an opinion on 
the provisional decision and the procedure followed to reach 
that decision. This advice is then submitted to the Executive 
Board.
 – The Board will then make a final decision on the complaint, 
any violations of scientific integrity and measures to be taken 
under employment law (e.g. warning, reprimand, suspension 
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or dismissal). Under special circumstances, the Board’s deci-
sion may deviate from the LOWI’s opinion.
 – An Executive Board’s final decision cannot be appealed in 
administrative court (Article 9.3 of the AwB), but complaints 
about the procedure can be submitted to the National Ombud-
sman. An appeal may be requested in civil court (particular-
ly in cases involving the VU Amsterdam, Tillburg University 
and Radboud University, which are not administrative bodies 
within the meaning of the AwB). In cases involving measures 
taken according to employment law, an appeal may be lodged 
with the Civil Service Tribunal, and eventually taken before the 
Central Appeals Tribunal.
These steps indicate the formal order in which an integrity procedure takes 
place. Both university regulations and the LOWI regulations state specific 
timeframes within which certain actions or decisions must be taken. Some 
time limits are mandatory, such as the time limit for appeals; others, such 
as the time limit within which a decision must be taken, may be extended if 
necessary. The two parties, the complainant and the defendant, are given the 
opportunity to present evidence and counterarguments during the proceed-
ings, which can then be responded to by the opposing party once. The CWI 
or the LOWI may also set time limits for this exchange of evidence, within 
which the parties must submit any documents or material that they wish to 
be taken into consideration.
4.4   PRINCIPLES OF FAIR TRIAL IN ADDRESSING FRAUD 
COMPLAINTS
Just as important as these formal steps are the principles on which the en-
tire procedure is based. In any case of suspected fraud or misconduct, one 
thing is paramount: there must be a fair trial, in which the defendant has the 
opportunity to defend his or her actions. Likewise, there should be no fear 
of retaliation for reporting suspected scientific fraud. The principle of fair 
trial is indisputable. 
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At the University of Oxford, there are special rules for addressing plagia-
rism in academic dissertations. In describing this procedure, lawyer Nicolas 
Bamforth, who has been involved in the handling and assessment of these ca-
ses for years, emphasizes the importance of protecting the defendant’s legal 
rights: “Within Oxford, considerations of academic integrity and fair play are 
balanced through the University’s procedures in plagiarism cases, with a deep 
concern to ensure procedural fairness” (Bamforth, 2013: 79, my emphasis). This 
goes without saying. If the accusation of plagiarism or other serious mis-
conduct turns out to be true, the person’s academic career will most likely be 
destroyed. But even an accusation of misconduct, whether it’s true or not, can 
damage a person’s scientific reputation, which is why all complaints need to 
be investigated with the utmost care. Only after a thorough investigation can 
a careful, well-founded judgment be made.
Thus, the principles of fair trial for integrity complaints run parallel to 
the general principles of due process. This means that, in all cases, both 
sides of the argument must be heard, the accuser must provide evidence of 
a breach of integrity, and it must be clear which behavior is being examined 
as a violation of which specific provision of the relevant code of conduct (a 
general accusation that “there has been a breach in scientific integrity” is too 
vague to be taken into account).
The fact that both sides of the argument must be heard means that legally, 
pursuant to Book 9, especially article 9.4 of the AwB, an anonymous com-
plaint cannot be taken into consideration (due to the increased possibilities 
to anonymously accuse someone of a violation of scientific integrity via digi-
tal means, this has become a serious point of consideration, and one which 
universities tend to take too lightly). If a complainant is not identified, there 
is no way for both sides of the story to be heard, thus disadvantaging the 
defendant, because a fair trial presupposes equal treatment of the accuser 
and the accused (the so-called ‘equality of arms’ principle). If there are good 
reasons not to disclose the name of a complainant, there is a whistle-blower 
procedure that can be applied. In that case, at least one person (usually a 
member of the Executive Board) knows the complainant’s identity so that he 
or she cannot evade legal liability for a false accusation.
Fair trial is also necessary when one considers the fact that if the defen-
dant is found guilty of a violation of scientific integrity, he or she may face 
administrative consequences, such as dismissal, suspension, reprimand 
and other far-reaching labor law measures. From a legal perspective, these 
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consequences can be considered “punitive sanctions”, to which the European 
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, in its current case law based on Article 
6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), has attached speci-
al minimum requirements. When imposing severe punitive sanctions, such 
as dismissal and suspension from office, the following applies:
(1)  Pre-established, clear and unambiguous standards should be 
formulated so that violations can be identified.
(2)  There must be a second, independent body that one can call 
upon to determine whether these standards have been viola-
ted.
(3)  The principle of equality of arms must be respected throug-
hout the procedure.
In a fair trial, an investigative committee, such as a CWI, should reach an 
impartial, independent and objective opinion. Thus, it is important for mem-
bers of this committee to maintain an objective distance from the disputing 
parties, which can be difficult in small scientific organizations or highly 
specialized fields. The investigative committee should not include anyone 
who knows the complainant or accused, works in their department or has 
collaborated with them in the past. For this reason, universities now require 
that Confidential Advisors, who are responsible for providing advice to all 
parties involved, not be part of the CWIs. 
In addition to fair trial, there are two other important principles for ad-
dressing integrity complaints: confidentiality and transparency. Although 
these two principles may seem at odds with each other, if the rationale behind 
them is understood the tension between them is not really an issue. As the 
employer, the university’s Executive Board is the authority that, in concrete 
cases, weighs the two principles against each other: the importance of con-
fidentiality for the complainant or the defendant versus the importance of 
openness and transparency in one’s own decision-making.
All university regulations on the handling of integrity complaints state 
that all parties involved are bound to confidentiality throughout the entire 
procedure. The reason for this is that a large number of accusations are 
dismissed as unfounded, and the defendant is free to go. Allegations of an 
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integrity violation that are made public before a verdict has been reached can 
cause grave damage to researchers’ careers; therefore, it is in the interest of 
both the complainant and the defendant to keep all matters related to the 
case confidential and not publicize their suspicions, allegations or evidence. 
This is particularly true for young researchers, for whom a false accusation, 
however unjustified, can ruin a budding career.
Journalists tend to think otherwise. Science journalists have been devo-
ting more attention to scientific integrity violations in recent years, and many 
are eager to find out who is involved, what accusations have been made and 
which way the research committee is leaning. Naturally, the press wants full 
disclosure. After the Stapel affair, universities realized that, when it comes 
to integrity violation cases, openness is key to building trust. The univer-
sities agreed that, from 2012 onwards, all integrity violation cases would 
be published on the VSNU website in anonymized form (in contrast to the 
integrity procedures in Denmark, where the names of both the complainant 
and the defendant are made public). The anonymization of advice and the 
final decision ensures both the protection of the wrongly accused and trans-
parency with the public. The LOWI also publishes all recommendations in 
anonymized form on its website. For journalists, it has become something 
of a sport to uncover the names of those involved using these websites and 
all the other electronic means available to them.
Out of concern for the interests of young researchers, who are often the 
victims of false accusations, I am in favor of keeping this information anony-
mous. At the end of the day, it is about how the rules of scientific integrity are 
applied in specific cases, not the identity of the defendant.
In terms of fairness, there is also the question of how long a conviction 
for a violation of scientific integrity should be carried out. Oftentimes, a 
serious violation results in lifelong exclusion from science, but—as in the 
case of life sentences for criminals—this also raises some pertinent questi-
ons. How long is lifelong? Is there not a right to rehabilitation or at least a 
second chance after the punishment has been served? In criminal law, there 
is still a sharp distinction between the act and the perpetrator. An act can be 
unforgivable, but the person who committed it can change. So, the questi-
on is: Is there life after fraud? (Gallagher 2009; McCook 2009: 28-36). The 
issue has already been raised in the United States, where the “punishment” 
usually involves a period of time during which one is barred from funding 
(from three to ten years) and because the names of the offenders are generally 
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published and remain on the institutions’ websites for a long time, the im-
pact of the punishment can last much longer than the punishment itself. A 
minor integrity violation can follow a researcher for years and prevent him or 
her from pursuing a scientific career. Gallagher wonders whether this regime 
has become excessively punitive and suggests that the names of offenders be 
removed from the Internet after a certain period of time. 
In the Netherlands, some offenders have been reasonably well rehabilita-
ted (e.g. Diekstra, and neuropsychologist Margriet Sitskoorn). Personally, I 
think it is right for them to be given a second chance, with one major caveat: 
if it is morally right to give guilty scientists a second chance, we also have to 
make sure that scientists who have been wrongly accused are able to main-
tain their place in the scientific world. For example, it would be very unfair if 
someone who had been found guilty of plagiarism could return to work as a 
professor, while someone who has not committed any plagiarism or fraud, 
but was only accused of it could no longer keep his or her position due to 
relentless university gossip. This is yet another reason why scientific integrity 
cases must be held to the highest standards of fair trial.
4.5   SETTING THE BOUNDARIES: PRACTICAL PROBLEMS  
AND EXAMPLES
The substantive legal framework therefore consists of the 2004/2012/2014 
Code and the 2018 Code, as discussed in Chapter 2. Both Codes are effective 
as of October 1, 2018: research that started before October 1, 2018, is still 
covered by the old 2004/2012/2014 Code, whereas research that started after 
October 1, 2018 is covered by the 2018 Code, which sets out newly formulated 
rules and regulations. The Codes describe the main forms of misconduct, 
but they are still not very well known among researchers and they do not 
provide much guidance on how researchers should behave, although the 
oldest standards of scientific practice, namely no plagiarism and no manipu-
lation of data, are still evident. Moreover, on the basis of the literal text, the 
2004/2012/2014 Code seems to apply to education as well, but the LOWI has 
indicated in a number of recommendations that there are separate proced-
ures for educational complaints (Committees for examination complaints, 
Cobex, and eventually the Higher Education Appeals Tribunal, the CBHO). 
Issues related to education are therefore not dealt with by CWIs or the LOWI.
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Although the three deadly sins of scientific misconduct (FFP) are some-
what recognizable in the 2004/2012/2014 Code, they are difficult to pinpoint. 
The Code mentions desirable behaviors, such as exercising due care when 
reporting research results, treating colleagues and co-researchers with res-
pect, and a willingness to correct errors. If a violation occurs (e.g. a rese-
archer fails to properly provide a reference or misapplies a statistical test), 
the circumstances under which this violation occurred must be considered: 
Was the violation intentional, accidental, unconscious, due to insufficient 
knowledge, etc.? This was already mentioned in the KNAW brochure titled 
Scientific Research: Dilemmas and Temptations, published in 2000:
“If a researcher has made a mistake but it has already been pu-
blished, then a rectification should be issued. This should pre-
ferably be in the same periodical as the original article. If this is 
done quickly and unambiguously, then the researcher will rarely 
come in for blame. Errors made in good faith – just like differen-
ces of opinion regarding the results produced – are something 
entirely different to misrepresentation and fraud, and do not 
constitute any kind of scientific misconduct.” (KNAW 2000: 19).
This quote more or less summarizes what the US Code of Conduct would 
refer to as an “honest mistake”. Mistakes are part of science, and I’m not just 
talking about inevitable measurement errors (i.e. the statistically acceptable 
margins for differences in repeated measurements), but also careless errors 
and genuine mistakes. There is, however, a wide range of transgressions 
between a simple mistake and serious fraud. In many cases, complainants 
will regard an error as blatant fraud and defendants will try to write off fraud 
as a careless mistake. Therefore, it is essential that all cases of alleged scien-
tific integrity violations be investigated with extreme care and assessed on a 
case-by-case basis.
In this chapter, I would like to review several other key questions that are 
particularly relevant when it comes to determining which behaviors could be 
considered integrity violations under the Netherlands Code of Conduct. Over 
the last ten years, the LOWI, which, as an appellate body, is also responsible 
for coordinating the interpretation of the Code, has had to test these boun-
daries and set limits. I will devote the rest of this section to discussing five 
types of borderline cases.
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Intellectual property and patents
There have been several cases where the LOWI was confronted with disputes 
over patent applications. Most of them followed a similar pattern: two re-
searchers who had once worked together on a project got into a fight because 
one of the researchers had not been included in the patent application. The 
latter then attempted to undermine the application by submitting an integ-
rity violation complaint, which prompted the other party to do the same. It 
is not unusual for a disgruntled researcher to file an integrity complaint as a 
means of achieving another goal, namely the defamation of the defendant. 
If the accuser can show that the patent application contained manipulated 
or erroneous research results, then the patent application would likely be 
denied. One such case involved the allegation of manipulated results in sta-
tistical tables. In this case, the LOWI ruled that patent cases must be taken to 
civil court, which is equipped to settle disputes over intellectual property. The 
fact that the research had taken place at a university and that the university 
had approved the patent application was not reason enough for the LOWI 
to judge the case. Nevertheless, LOWI did investigate whether the research 
results in question had been manipulated and found that they had not (LOWI 
opinions 2008-2; 2011-4).
In these cases, it was easy enough to set a boundary between a civil case 
concerning intellectual property rights and a scientific integrity violation. 
The LOWI regulations support this distinction: Article 3.2 states that a com-
plaint cannot be dealt with if civil or criminal proceedings have been institu-
ted against the same conduct.
Another case, which had nothing to do with patent applications, raised 
the question of whether an alleged case of plagiarism constituted a violati-
on of scientific integrity. An ad hoc committee investigating the claim ap-
plied copyright law in this case and disregarded the Code of Conduct and 
the university regulations on scientific integrity violations. Of course, a case 
of blatant plagiarism may—in addition to being a violation of the Code of 
Conduct—also constitute a copyright violation, but determining whether a 
subjective right has been infringed is a matter for the civil court. 
In general, university researchers are quick to refer to the plagiarism of 
texts and ideas as “intellectual property theft”, and some may wish to combat 
it by filing a scientific integrity complaint. However, only the court can decide 
if such a “theft” has actually taken place (see Chapter 5).
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The distinction between a scientific integrity violation and a civil law case 
is again at issue when it comes to the simultaneous submission of one article 
to two scientific journals. Publishers and journal editors often prohibit the 
simultaneous submission of articles, referring to the Committee on Publica-
tion Ethics (COPE) regulations issued by the publishers of scientific journals. 
There are some who argue that this practice is a violation of scientific inte-
grity; however, this is a question of the contractual relationship between the 
researcher and the publisher, not a question of scientific integrity. 
Labor disputes and other quarrels
Similarly, we can draw a line between labor law disputes and integrity vio-
lations. Sometimes allegations of scientific integrity are a cover for serious 
labor conflicts. Researchers who have worked together for years get into 
a fight, which leads to accusations of integrity violations (e.g. plagiarism, 
denial of co-authorship, manipulation of research data). Sometimes these 
accusations are justified, and the research committee (i.e. the CWI) will 
have to confirm that a violation has indeed occurred, but the committee also 
needs to determine when there are primary labor law issues are at stake. As 
the employer, the university and its Board are responsible for taking action 
in labor disputes, and if necessary, parties can seek the help of a mediator. 
Confidential Advisors, who are appointed to monitor scientific integrity, need 
to be aware of the types of conflicts that can be addressed through an integrity 
complaint procedure and the types of conflicts that cannot (e.g. allegations 
of sexual harassment). As a general rule, the scientific integrity complaint 
procedure is not designed to address labor disputes.
In the same vein, arguments and complaints about PhD procedures should 
be submitted to the Committee of Deans of the institution in question and not 
to the CWI (for example, there was a case where someone was rejected as a 
co-supervisor and this was seen as a violation of scientific integrity towards 
that person). Likewise, one cannot use the scientific integrity complaint 
procedure to challenge the quality of a dissertation. This is a matter for the 
doctoral examination committee and ultimately the Committee of Deans, on 
whose behalf the doctoral degree is awarded. Universities also have separate 
complaint procedures for sexual harassment. Although sexual harassment is, 
by nature, a violation of integrity, this and other forms of criminal violations 




A third category concerns scientific controversies, which can arise when one 
disagrees with certain research results or with the interpretation of those 
results presented in a publication. If this leads to a negative opinion about 
the article in question, even without claiming that the research data have 
been manipulated, sometimes the disgruntled party will try to claim that 
there has been a violation of scientific integrity under the general provision 
in the Code of Conduct that states that a scientific researcher must always 
exhibit due care and report everything truthfully. For example, major and 
minor inaccuracies (e.g. a false quote) and careless behavior can lead to 
accusations of “scientific fraud” on the grounds that one has not complied 
with all the provisions of the Code, particularly those that describe desirable 
behavior.
In such cases, it is important to understand the distinction between scien-
tific controversies and suspected violations of integrity. Controversies are 
part of science. Contradiction, alternative explanations, criticism of hypo-
theses or research that contradicts one’s hypotheses, disagreement about the 
right methodology—these differences in opinion are the lifeblood of science. 
It goes without saying that science (and scientific journals in particular) pro-
vides the appropriate forum for “battling out” these controversies. The battle 
metaphor seems appropriate here: we often refer to the world of science as 
an arena, where hypotheses are bastions to be defended (Lakoff and John-
son, 1980: 46-60; for metaphors in medical-scientific texts see Van Rijn-Van 
Tongeren, 1994). This spirit of debate must be sustained and protected; it is 
important to make sure that it does not become burdened by concerns about 
scientific integrity violations. What makes the scientific community so uni-
que is that everyone, from professor to student, can participate in it and that 
there is no “Supreme Court of Science” to decide what is and is not a good 
scientific theory or opinion. Scientists should be able to withstand criticism, 
for example in the form of a negative review or a critical article. Neither the 
Scientific Integrity Committees nor the LOWI are equipped to act as final 
arbitrators in scientific controversies. 
Here are a few examples of scientific controversies that have come to light 
in complaint procedures: 
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 – The right method of soil investigation: should samples be 
collected at four meters or two? 
 – How should archaeological findings best be interpreted?
 – How do certain drinks influence young people’s behavior?
 – The use of a certain method in medical operations: Is there 
one right way to do surgery? 
 – Testing causal relationships between two variables: Is it better 
to use one- or two-sided statistical tests? 
 – What is the most scientifically probable cause of death of cer-
tain animals?
 – Can canine scent tests be used to identify suspects in criminal 
proceedings?
These controversies, some of which have generated a significant amount of 
public attention, have certainly raised issues worthy of debate; however, we 
should not allow scholarly disagreements to spiral into accusations of dis-
honesty. When such cases are brought before scientific integrity committees 
(e.g. the CWI or LOWI), these committees first have to investigate exactly 
what is going on. Oftentimes, a complaint about the quality of a scientific 
article is submitted in the form of an integrity complaint, for example the 
accuser might claim that the research question is flawed, the conclusions 
cannot be supported by the facts presented, the figures are incorrect or the 
method used is “unscientific” and therefore “untrue”. However, these claims 
are subject to interpretation and based on differences of opinion about what 
constitutes good scientific research. 
Allowing these scientific controversies to be treated as integrity violations 
conjures the horror of a science police—and the 2018 Code, with its 61 “stan-
dards” for good scientific research, is bringing us closer to this nightmare. 
I consider such a “police force” undesirable for many reasons, but mainly 
because it would restrict the freedom of scientific research. Fortunately, the-
re is no supreme power in science. There are only facts, interpretations and 
arguments—all of which are up for debate within the scientific community. 
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Side activities, side positions and conflicts of interest
How far does the position of professor or scientific researcher extend? If the 
professor is involved in pseudoscientific activities in his or her own time, 
for example, serving as chair of an association in which his or her scientific 
knowledge is useful, can the professor be accused of a scientific integrity vio-
lation if that association makes a decision that is out of line? In other words, 
are you a scientist twenty-four hours a day? Do scientific codes of conduct 
require that scientists always behave “truthfully” and take the utmost care in 
all scientific activities, even those outside of their research position? 
In one case, which questioned the private activities of an emeritus profes-
sor, the LOWI advised the Executive Board to set clear boundaries between 
activities carried out in one’s role as researcher and activities carried out in 
one’s private time. The Board had been right to reject the complaint on the 
grounds that the university’s code of conduct only covers activities carried 
out in one’s role as a university researcher. There are, however, some ex-
ceptions to this rule, particularly if the non-university activity stems directly 
from one’s scientific expertise. For example, if a researcher is called to be an 
expert witness in a civil case and his or her scientific opinion is not properly 
established or contains manipulated data, the professor could be charged 
and convicted of misconduct (LOWI opinion 2012, no. 2).
Such a case can also be influenced by scientific controversy. When two 
experts in a particular field meet in the courtroom, their scientific testimo-
nies may differ. It can be tempting to regard the other party’s testimony as 
fraudulent (“that can’t be true!”); however, in most cases, the problem is a 
difference of opinion, a difference in the weighting and interpretation of ac-
tual data, or from other methodological assumptions. The fact that scientists 
disagree with each other is not so surprising (although judges and outsiders 
may think otherwise), but it is surprising that these disagreements can result 
in accusations of dishonest conduct or fraudulent behavior. 
Conflicts of interest can play a role here as well. Conducting research 
without mentioning that one has a vested interest in the results goes against 
the principle that scientific research should be carried out independently 
of economic or social interests. Failure to mention conflicts of interest is a 
breach of scientific integrity. In various scientific fields, one must include a 
statement of disclosure that mentions any potential conflicts of interest or 
states that there are no conflicts of interest to speak of. Such a statement 
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offers a solution for scientific research funded or subsidized by companies 
and contributes to overall transparency. The readers of the future publication 
will know to look out for potential bias.
Trickier still is drawing the line between scientific research carried out in 
the context of a part-time university position (e.g. one day a week as an exter-
nally endowed professor in a highly specialized field) and other commercial 
activities carried out in the same field. Does research that is conducted in 
one’s own private time and on a commercial basis fall under the Code of 
Conduct as well? If a lawyer who serves as an endowed professor in a speci-
alized field of law and also has a private legal practice uses material from a 
client’s case as data for a scientific article, she is obliged to mention this as 
a potential conflict of interest. For all activities carried out as a lawyer, she 
is subject to the attorney’s code of ethics; for all activities carried out as a 
scientific researcher, she is subject to the code of conduct of the university in 
question. In sum, when publishing scientific research, researchers should take 
care to mention any vested interests they may have in the results of their own 
research. Commercial research, on the other hand, falls outside the scope of 
the 2004/2012/2014 Code and its successor, the 2018 Code.
Scientific evaluations and advice
The last boundary issue to be addressed is a question of scope: Does assessing 
research applications fall within the scope of conducting scientific research 
or not? The answer to this question depends on how strictly the Code of Con-
duct is interpreted. Is the Code limited to research one undertakes oneself ? 
Assessing someone else’s research is not the same thing as conducting one’s 
own research. So, does this mean that evaluating applications for research 
grants falls outside the scope of the standards for scientific practice?
There was one case where a complainant accused the scientist charged 
with evaluating applications of referring to a non-existent scientific article, 
calling it a deliberate fabrication (rather than a typo in the publication date). 
The committee rejected the complaint, claiming that it had nothing to do 
with scientific research. On appeal, the LOWI took a different view. Scienti-
fic misconduct can also occur in the evaluation of applications, for example 
a senior researcher with a large number of applications to assess can pick 
out original ideas he wants to use and then reject the application. Conflicts 
of interest also need to be considered when forming an opinion in order to 
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avoid cases where applications submitted by the evaluating organization’s 
own employees are judged more favorably (LOWI opinion 2013-3). It is coun-
ter-intuitive not to consider the assessment of scientific research applications 
as scientific practice. Nowadays, the assessment of applications for research 
funding has become an integral part of scientific activities. It serves as a sort 
of precursor to the peer review process, in which scientific articles that have 
been submitted for publication are evaluated by fellow experts in the field 
after the research has been completed. Here, too, things can wrong, as de-
monstrated by one of the most spectacular and instructive cases of scientific 
misconduct in the United States, the Wachslicht-Rodbard case discussed 
in Chapter 3. This case confirms the view that scientific practice cannot be 





5.1  VIOLATION OF THE BASIC RULES OF SCIENCE 
Most researchers are well aware of the fact that plagiarism is strictly pro-
hibited in the scientific arena and constitutes a serious violation of the code of 
conduct. What exactly plagiarism is and when it occurs is less widely under-
stood. Plagiarism as a specific legal concept is not addressed in the Dutch 
Copyright Act of 1912 (Spoor, Verkade and Visser 2005: 171; Verkade and 
Spoor 1986: 113). This act only refers to the “total or partial adaptation or 
imitation in a modified form, which cannot be regarded as a new, original 
work” (Article 13 of the Dutch Copyright Act). Here, “imitation” refers to 
many forms of creativity, not just science. The ban on imitation includes liter-
ary texts, cartoons, photographs, images, advertising texts and much more. 
Scientific plagiarism and copyright protection of “creations” are two sep-
arate issues, as are intellectual property theft and plagiarism, though many 
researchers like to refer to plagiarism as “intellectual property theft.” Spoor, 
Verkade and Visser write: “In practice one also speaks of plagiarism in cases 
that do not constitute an infringement of copyright, e.g. when one presents 
someone else’s scientific theory (not susceptible to copyright protection) as 
one’s own work” (2005: 171). Foreign intellectual property experts such as 
LaFolette (1992), Nimmer (2008) in the US and Ohly (2013) in Germany share 
this view. Plagiarism is seen as a violation of the basic rules of science—a 
serious offense, of course, but far from a violation of property rights.
In his extensive article “The moral imperative against academic plagia-
rism,” David Nimmer provides an instructive example of a publisher who 
wanted to publish a new edition of a part of The Path of the Law (1897) by Oliver 
Wendell Holmes. This work is no longer subject to copyright. However, a law 
professor who wants to publish the same long passage under his own name 
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in a journal article is guilty of a serious violation of scientific integrity and 
risks losing his position (Nimmer 2008: 490). In the Netherlands, the LOWI 
had to judge a case where a professor used a part of the text by his deceased 
predecessor without properly referencing the source. In the end, the de-
ceased author’s family chose not to take the case to civil court, so it could not 
be established whether this was a case of copyright infringement or whether 
copying would be permitted on the basis of contractual provisions between 
publishers and authors. Nevertheless, the civil law issues surrounding co-
pyright infringement are separate from the question of scientific integrity 
(LOWI opinion 2013: 2).
Plagiarism in science is a matter for the academic community itself. Since 
there is no copyright on scientific laws or theories, it is important to give cre-
dit where credit is due. In science, there is a certain prestige that comes with 
being the first to discover, find or clearly formulate something. Moreover, a 
scientific law will most likely bear the name of its original designer: Boyle 
and Lavoisier in chemistry, Mendel and Darwin in biology, Gossen’s laws 
and Axelrod’s Tit for Tat in economics, Chomsky’s generative grammar, 
the Thomas theorem in sociology—the list goes on. The person’s name can 
even become a verb, take “to pasteurize” from Louis Pasteur, for example. Of 
course, the history of science has shown that new discoveries lead to patent 
battles. However, intellectual property law dictates that patent law must also 
remain separate from cases of scientific plagiarism. A company can obtain 
rights to a patent without any involvement from the original author of the 
scientific article that formed the basis for the patent. Patents can be licensed, 
making imitation completely legal, but “imitation” without adequate refe-
rence to the source in science remains taboo.
This hasn’t always been the case. In the Middle Ages, monks copied 
texts from predecessors, who then provided them with comments in the 
margins (Kristeller 1992: 95-114). In the early Renaissance, scholars like 
Erasmus, Montaigne and Galileo hid their new ideas in extensive quotati-
ons from classical writers from antiquity. This was customary at the time 
and considered a demonstration of scholarship. As Ari Wesseling clearly 
explains: “Plagiarism was not a problem in the Middle Ages. The humanists 
used the work of their predecessors and contemporaries without mentio-
ning the source as well. Erasmus’s works were already being used early on” 
(Wesseling 2000: 66). It thus seems unfair to accuse Erasmus or Montaig-
ne of plagiarism in retrospect, as Van Kolfschooten does (1996: 22; 2012: 
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30), though Erasmus did include other people’s work and discoveries in 
his Adages. 
The protection against academic plagiarism is, however, relatively recent. 
The plagiarism of Pierson’s work in 1872, as mentioned in Chapter 3, may 
have raised a few eyebrows, but perpetrator Von Schwarzkopf was not expel-
led from the academic community. In 1923, legal historian Bernard Hermes-
dorf (1923: 411-427) argued in an article on scientific property that scientific 
inventions should fall under the protection of the Patent Act. He believed 
that this would stimulate scientists’ creativity, but he still wrestled with the 
question of whether one could actually hold the right to an idea. Holding the 
right to a piece of land means that the owner has the exclusive right to use 
that land, but how can someone have the exclusive right to an idea? Once the 
idea has been made public, can you really stop other people from using it? To 
Hermesdorf, a patent on a new medicine was still unthinkable: 
“Once that publication has been released, it becomes part of the 
published public domain. Everyone benefits from it (...). One 
thinks of the physician who has discovered an important medi-
cine against a disease that, until that point, had been regarded 
as incurable. He’ll write about it in journals, talk about it in lec-
ture halls and meetings. Maybe he’ll become a celebrity. Yet, he 
will not enjoy the protection provided by the Patent Act for his 
discovery” (Hermesdorf 1923: 418; see also Van den Belt 2010).
Since Hermesdorf ’s time, the paths of patents and scientific plagiarism have 
gone in different directions. Scientists exhibit mutual respect and recognize 
each other for their ideas and contributions to science. Industrial companies 
find practical applications for scientific ideas and then protect those applica-
tions with patents. The ban on plagiarism in science is primarily intended to 
protect the reputation of the first to come up with the new ideas, theories and 
evidence. Anyone who uses these ideas or incorporates them into their own 
research should mention that person and/or the location where the discovery 
was made—in other words, give credit where credit is due. This is science’s 
informal reward system. Plagiarism undermines this reward system, while 
fabrication and falsification, the other deadly sins of science, undermine the 
reliability of scientific knowledge.
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5.2  TAKING CREDIT FOR OTHER PEOPLE’S WORK
Plagiarism extends beyond the scientific field. It occurs regularly in literature, 
where authors integrate fragments from other authors texts into their own 
novels, stories or poems. Sometimes this can lead to harsh accusations and 
disputes. It also occurs in music, the visual arts, journalism and elsewhere. In 
the Netherlands, there has even been talk of plagiarism on a postage stamp! 
The photographer who took the photo of the Dutch king was not properly 
credited for his work. 
It is difficult to provide a comprehensive description of authorship and 
plagiarism. One of the older studies on scientific plagiarism, Stealing into 
Print: Fraud, Plagiarism and Misconduct in Scientific Publishing (LaFolette 1992) 
argues: “it has been discovered that finding one definition of authorship 
acceptable to all institutions and all disciplines is not just ‘intellectually dif-
ficult’, but impossible” (1992: 91).
A broad definition of plagiarism is given in the Oxford English Dictionary:
“The action or practice of plagiarizing: the wrongful appropri-
ation or purloining, and publication as one’s own, of the ideas, 
or the expression of ideas (literary, artistic, musical, mechanical 
etc.) of another” (OED, cited by Hexham 2005). 
Purloining means “to take dishonestly; to steal, especially under circumstances 
which involve a breach of trust” (Hexham, idem). While in a metaphorical 
sense, it may seem logical to associate plagiarism with stealing someone’s 
property, the question remains: how does one actually “steal” a message or a 
well-formulated idea intended for a wide audience? Doing so would be an in-
fringement of someone else’s subjective right (if this has been established by 
copyright, including damage and causality) and cause damage to a fellow sci-
entist’s honor. Plagiarism is a failure to give credit where credit is due—and 
hence a transgression against one of the basic rules of academia. Article 25 
of the Dutch Copyright Act does include the right to be mentioned by name, 
but this subjective right is not part of the property laws covered under the 
Copyright Act.
The 2004/2012 Code sent out a clear message to scientific researchers: 
don’t take credit for other people’s work. This message makes it clear what 
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one should not do, but it doesn’t offer any insight into what plagiarism is and 
is not. The 2014 Code provides a bit more clarity:
“Accurate source references provide a clear indication of the 
intellectual provenance of cited and paraphrased text. This also 
applies to information gathered from the Internet and from 
anonymous sources. The texts and research results of others 
are never reproduced without a reference.”
A number of university regulations on scientific integrity, including those of 
Utrecht University and the University of Amsterdam, provide a more detailed 
description. Both mention the use of the Internet, which is understandable 
given the ease with which online texts can be copied. For students new to 
academic writing, the genre can sound particularly impressive. They may 
think they cannot surpass it or summarize it succinctly and simply “forget” to 
mention where they found it online. Learning is unlearning: novice students 
need to be taught why and when proper acknowledgment of the source is 
necessary and why plagiarism is forbidden in science. What plagiarism is and 
why it is prohibited is not so difficult to explain. Although there are countless 
formulations, they mostly come down to the following:
“the use of another person’s ideas or expressions in your wri-
ting without acknowledging the source; simply put plagiarism 
is using another person’s words or ideas without appropriate 
acknowledgment. 
In short, to plagiarize is to give the impression that you have 
written or thought something that you have in fact borrowed 
from someone else” (Nimmer 2008: 489; Ong 1988: 154).
In other words, plagiarism is presenting someone else’s texts or ideas as 
your own. However, this definition doesn’t solve all of our problems when 
we consider that almost every idea people have—in science or otherwise—is 
from someone else. Thus, the question is which ideas or parts of the text 
must be attributed to a source? Any word-for-word quotation, paraphrase, 
well-formulated argument or theory should come with a citation. But is this 
always the case? That depends.
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Plagiarism is not like pornography. A judge presiding over a pornography 
case can operate under the principle of “I know it when I see it.” Plagiarism 
is more difficult to establish, depending on the absoluteness with which the 
basic rules of academia are applied. Should the author of every idea, thought 
or written expression be mentioned, including the original source and all 
of the later sources throughout history? Many expressions and texts can be 
traced back to the Bible and other sacred books, to ancient literary texts (e.g. 
the Oedipus complex, from the eponymous play by Sophocles) or were first 
recorded by well-known philosophers (e.g. Descartes’ “I think, therefore I 
am”) and scholars (Newton, Einstein). How far back must one go in crediting 
the original author? Should every textbook that uses logical reasoning cite 
Aristotle’s Analytica Priora, the original source of syllogisms of deduction and 
induction? When using Venn diagrams, must one always refer to the origi-
nal source when the man behind them is mentioned in the name itself ? If 
every failure to mention all (original) contributors is considered plagiarism, 
the requirement of academic honesty and giving credit where credit is due 
becomes very time-consuming, if not impossible. Fortunately, established 
scientific practices provide reasonable solutions for this.
General knowledge within a discipline does not necessarily require a 
detailed reference; it is sufficient to indicate the name of the original author 
of a theory or the person who first obtained certain research results. For 
example, if I am writing an article on the rise in suicide among immigrants 
married at a young age and want to refer to Durkheim’s classic sociological 
theory of anomie, which is still applicable today, it would suffice to write: 
“As Durkheim observed…”, or if I’d like to be more precise, “As Durkheim 
demonstrated in his study Le suicide (1897)”, etc. However, if I were to copy a 
literal quote from Durkheim (be it in the original French or in translation), I 
must be even more precise and also mention the original source in a footnote 
or reference, as well as the name of the translator.
A quotation is a literal citation from an existing text and must be signaled 
with quotation marks (also known as “inverted commas”). There is nothing 
wrong with quoting other people’s texts, as long as one does so properly, in-
cluding their exact punctuation, etc. It is, however, important to keep an eye 
on the length of the quotes. Longer quotations, for example of more than one 
page, require separate justification. All of this seems obvious enough, but we 
know from practice that plagiarism isn’t always so simple. There are many 
forms of referencing and many forms of plagiarism. In a journal specifically 
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devoted to FFP, Brian Martin listed fifteen different forms of plagiarism, 
based on the broad definition that “plagiarism is presenting other people’s 
ideas as one’s own” (Martin 2008: 3). In doing so, he makes a distinction 
between conscious and unconscious, intentional and nonintentional, and 
permissible and non-permissible plagiarism. One nonintentional form is 
cryptomnesia, a form of memory bias where one thinks that one has come up 
with a certain idea or expression oneself, when, in fact, it was actually heard 
from someone else. It is particularly common among older scholars. For 
example, I might write about “fatalistic suicide” as if I had come up with the 
concept myself, while having completely forgotten that I had actually read 
Durkheim’s book on the subject fifty years ago during my studies (in other 
words, the source is forgotten but the concept has remained engraved in my 
memory).
Nonintentional plagiarism also occurs when the author has no intention 
whatsoever of deceiving the reader, but simply fails to mention the correct 
source out of ignorance or unfamiliarity with the conventions of referencing. 
This is often the case with novice authors or students writing their first paper. 
One student accused of plagiarism in England even filed a lawsuit, claiming 
that his teachers had never properly explained how, when and why to refer 
to sources and that no one had ever told him that plagiarism is punishable 
by law (Nimmer 2008: 491). Nonintentional plagiarism does not constitute 
a violation of integrity, but it can be difficult to prove that the person did not 
know that copying information from other texts was wrong (although cutting 
and pasting from the internet does suggest a certain level of carelessness).
Martin (2008: 3-6) describes several forms of plagiarism that are some-
times considered acceptable, namely: 
 – bureaucratic plagiarism: when a text has been adapted repeatedly, 
particularly in a bureaucratic context, no one knows exactly 
who the original author is.
 – ghostwriting: a ghostwriter is someone who is hired to write a 
text or is ordered to do so by a superior (e.g. an entrepreneur, di-
rector or politician); both parties benefit from the relationship, 
although strictly speaking this practice will fall under the defi-
nition of plagiarism if the client later publishes the text under 
his or her own name, without mentioning the ghostwriter.
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 – editorial ghostwriting: when the editor of a magazine or book 
completes an author’s texts with a few lines or with an addi-
tional explanation, or corrects erroneous source references 
the author has made without asking for or receiving credit. 
Editorial ghostwriting is related to supervisory ghostwriting, 
that is when an advisor substantially improves a PhD student’s 
text without being mentioned or acknowledged. 
 – honorary authorship (also known as gift authorship): when some-
one is named as an author or co-author without having made 
a substantial contribution. Sometimes this is done on the pri-
mary author’s initiative in order to increase the publication’s 
prestige. This practice is sometimes considered acceptable in 
science and sometimes not (see Chapter 6);
 – self-plagiarism: presenting one’s own prior work as if it is new 
work. 
Martin’s opinion on the republishing of one’s own work is unclear. He men-
tions self-plagiarism as one of the forms of plagiarism but does not go into 
detail about to what extent it may be acceptable. He merely notes that it has 
become easier to detect self-plagiarism thanks to online databases and pla-
giarism detection software (e.g. Turnitin). “An investigator into self-plagiar-
ism, having found matching text in two different articles, has to check to see 
whether the author has acknowledged the prior source” (Martin 2008: 14).
The unacceptable forms of plagiarism are those which involve literal or 
almost literal copying of a text without adequate reference to the original 
source, thereby making the text seem like it is one’s own work. This can be 
in the form of word-for-word plagiarism or paraphrase plagiarism (Martin, 
2008: 4). Word-for-word plagiarism is immediately recognizable when one 
compares the source text with the copied text. Paraphrase plagiarism invol-
ves copying certain word sequences and/or structures from an original text 
and only changing a few words or replacing certain words with synonyms, 
without mentioning the source. Paraphrasing other people’s texts, as in 
reproducing someone else’s text in your own words, is in itself perfectly per-
missible, as long as one refers to the original source at the beginning or at the 
end of the paraphrase, as I am currently doing with the text by Brian Martin 
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(Martin, 2008: 4). This is very common in scientific texts. Good examples of 
correct and incorrect paraphrasing can be found in Hexham’s article “The 
Plague of Plagiarism: Academic Plagiarism defined” (Hexham 2005).
Another form of plagiarism Martin mentions, which is quite common in 
scientific texts but not mentioned in codes of conduct, is the incorporation of 
references used in other source texts (e.g. articles or books) without having 
consulted the text to which reference is made or checked the reference itself. 
This is often done out of laziness or by authors who state that they don’t have 
the time to check all their references. This is what Martin calls plagiarism 
of secondary sources. In other words, the author of the text is relying on the 
work of someone else. If the copied references are incorrect or refer to the 
wrong pages and/or the reference is mentioned without being checked—not 
to mention being read—the error is repeated. This form of improper copying 
is generally uncovered when one directly copies a reference that contains a 
blatant error. The question is: How bad is this? In some cases, it is a sign 
of sloppiness and laziness, combined with a desire to show off how many 
sources one has supposedly consulted. Thus, it is always better to be trans-
parent about the fact that you are using a quote cited by another author. In 
this case, a footnote or reference would read: “see Hexham 2005, as quoted 
by Martin 2008”.
Oddly enough, one form of plagiarism that Martin does not mention is the 
plagiarism of ideas, in other words, trying to pass someone else’s ideas off 
as one’s own—for example, ideas presented in a research application or in 
unpublished work. Presenting other people’s ideas as if they are one’s own, 
without reference to the original source, is a form of plagiarism. According 
to Freeland Judson, among others, the plagiarism of ideas is even more dis-
turbing when it comes to the formation of theories, methodical innovations 
and original approaches. Such plagiarism goes beyond simply failing to give 
credit where credit is due; it violates the mutual trust between scientists. In 
contemporary scientific practice, there are two crucial moments that are 
extremely vulnerable to surreptitious copying of other people’s ideas: the 
assessment of research applications and the peer review process. Young re-
searchers, in particular, have reported submitting their work for assessment 
and having it rejected, only to see their plans, or parts of their plans, carried 
out by other researchers later on (Freeland Judson 2004: 267-293; 313). This 
is more or less what happened in the Baltimore affair. However, things beco-
me a bit murky when new ideas emerge during brainstorming sessions and 
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it is no longer possible to determine who first came up with them. The same 
goes for brilliant ideas that come as a result of fruitful conversations between 
supervisors and PhD students or among colleagues. Unlike “ordinary” pla-
giarism, the plagiarism of ideas is often difficult to establish or prove. Ack-
nowledgments are usually the best solution. One simply cannot be generous 
enough when it comes to acknowledging other people’s contribution to the 
formation of one’s own ideas.
5.3  SCOPE AND FREQUENCY OF PLAGIARISM
What is clear from all of this is that word-for-word plagiarism is a classic ex-
ample of inadmissible plagiarism. However, the question remains as to when 
this form of plagiarism is a violation of the code of conduct and whether 
those found guilty should be tarred and feathered. An accusation of plagiar-
ism is a very serious matter and false accusations can cause irreparable dam-
age to one’s reputation. As the saying goes, “where there’s smoke, there’s 
fire”, even if the matter hasn’t yet been fully investigated. Although it is clear 
by now that plagiarism is not permissible in academic research, there are still 
plenty of questions about the scope and frequency at which it occurs.
Once you’ve seen it, plagiarism is easy to recognize. Some examples of 
academic plagiarism need no further explanation or discussion—the violati-
on is clear. For example, an entire book that has been published in translation 
under a different author’s name is a clear example of plagiarism. Or the case 
of Hungarian President Pál Schmitt, a former Olympic fencer who resigned 
in 2012 after he was exposed in the media as having plagiarized large parts 
of his 1992 dissertation on the history of the modern Olympic games: that 
was obviously plagiarism (in addition to an apparent conflict of interest in 
the appointment of members of his examination committee). In another 
case, the German Minister of Defense, Karl-Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg, 
was forced to resign in 2011 when it was discovered that twenty consecutive 
pages in his 2007 PhD dissertation at the University of Bayreuth were bor-
rowed from texts by other authors without adequate reference to the source. 
A comparison with Recht, Demokratie, Politik (2003) by Dr. G. Heller revealed 
that Zu Guttenberg had subtly deceived his readers (Weber-Wulff 2013: 135; 
Weber-Wulf 2014: passim). Zu Guttenberg did indeed refer to Heller’s work, 
but the placement of the reference created the impression that the preceding 
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text was a paraphrase of Heller and that everything thereafter was his own 
reasoning—while in fact, what follows are several pages of text straight out 
of Heller’s work. In Germany, this new and ingenious form of plagiarism 
is called the Bauernopfer, or the pawn sacrifice: one sacrifices something in 
the beginning (i.e. by correctly mentioning the source) with the intention 
of winning more later—in this case, twenty “stolen” pages (Weber-Wulff, 
2013: 135-138).
The University of Bayreuth investigated the case and determined that 
plagiarism had indeed occurred and revoked the doctoral degree. In the end, 
the minister resigned. The commotion surrounding scientific plagiarism is 
often greater than in cases of “ordinary theft”, to which it is often compared, 
although ordinary theft can cause a lot more damage than a few copied pa-
ges. Voltaire (1694-1778) once remarked that “plagiarism, even in its worst 
form, is, of all petty theft, certainly the least dangerous for society” (quoted 
by Nimmer 2008: 487). While it is true that the content of the body of scien-
tific knowledge is not affected by plagiarism, it is still a violation of the great 
symbolic value attached to ownership in our current culture. (Incidentally, 
this may change with the development of the internet. The culture of abso-
lute ownership in the arts and sciences could become less absolute in the 
digital age, as Lewis Hyde proposes with his “cultural commons” concept, 
the shared use of cultural and scientific ideas (Hyde 2010). Although this 
concept does not exclude references to the original creator of ideas and texts, 
it does mean that they will probably become part of the realm of “general 
knowledge” more quickly.)
How absolutely should plagiarism be condemned? This question arises 
when the scope and frequency of plagiarized texts are relatively low. Publis-
hing twenty pages under one’s own name without mentioning the source 
is clearly plagiarism. Whether or not the person intended to plagiarize is 
irrelevant here, because no one who copies such long pieces of text can say 
that he or she did so unconsciously or “by accident” (LOWI opinion 2008: 1; 
Van Kolfschooten 2012: 101-102). The same goes for fifteen pages, or five, or 
one. But when it’s about the copying of a few lines or a few stray sentences, 
it becomes easier to wonder whether the plagiarism was committed cons-
ciously or not. Therefore, the basic rule of giving credit where credit is due 
must be considered and assessed on a case-by-case basis. Clarity is key: one 
must consider the form, scope and frequency of the plagiarism in question. 
Given that plagiarism is such a morally and emotionally charged issue, the 
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accusation and conviction must be as concrete as possible: are we talking 
about a few lines, twenty pages or an entire article? Is it only a one-off offense 
or a repeated and fixed pattern of inadequate acknowledgment of sources? 
The vague accusation that “plagiarism has been committed” without indica-
ting the scope and frequency of the offense can cause a lot of smoke, when, 
in reality, the fire is quite small. In plagiarism cases, it’s important that the 
punishment be proportionate to the crime.
There may be exonerating reasons or mitigating circumstances under 
which the plagiarism occurred. Students and novice researchers—or even 
advanced researchers—might take notes from articles and books they’ve stu-
died and forget to write down the source. Later, when they sit down to write 
their text, they may think that the copied text is actually their own words. This 
is careless, of course, but it is unlikely that they intended to deceive others or 
misrepresent someone else’s work. The fact that the student did not mean 
to commit plagiarism is definitely worthy of consideration, but the question 
remains as to whether he or she should still be sanctioned, by, for example, 
being excluded from the course or the program. When it is discovered that a 
paper contains a small amount of plagiarized material, it is better not to as-
sess it and to send it back to be rewritten than to immediately turn the student 
over to the bureaucratic powers that be. Rather than appointing some kind of 
university police squad to hunt down and sanction anything that resembles 
plagiarism, it is better to teach students how to take good notes and refer to 
sources from the start.
There are plenty of manuals on how to properly quote, format source 
references, and make use of common abbreviations and reading lists (which 
are generally drawn up for a specific field of study). One good example is the 
Leidraad voor juridische auteurs (Guide for Legal Authors) (2010; 2013), which, 
given its thoroughness, can also be used in other scientific fields. As a result 
of the Singapore Statement on Scientific Integrity (2010), an international guide for 
all scientific fields, titled Responsible Research Publication: International Standards 
for Authors, has been available since 2010 (Wager and Kleinert, 2011: 309-316).
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5.4  SELF-PLAGIARISM 
In early January 2014, Dutch scientists were confronted by two issues that, 
until then, had received very little attention: self-citation and self-plagiar-
ism. In the NRC Handelsblad of January 7, journalist Frank van Kolfschooten 
accused the renowned VU Amsterdam economist Peter Nijkamp of frequent 
self-citation and self-plagiarism, which the journalist characterized as a 
violation of scientific integrity. In his accusation, Van Kolfschooten referred 
to the opinion of an ad hoc Committee on Scientific Integrity at the VU Am-
sterdam, which was set up to investigate a case of alleged plagiarism by one 
of Nijkamp’s PhD students. In the opinion of this ad hoc CWI, certain “forms 
of self-citation” were equated with plagiarism (VSNU website, December 
20, 2013). The journalist then accused Nijkamp of “plagiarism” consisting 
of cases of such “self-citation”. In his opinion, “self-plagiarism” counted 
as full-blown plagiarism. A new academic scandal, known as the “Nijkamp 
affair”, was born.
This accusation led to a public debate about what self-plagiarism is and 
whether or not it is allowed in science. There were those who were in fa-
vor of banning self-plagiarism and those who were opposed. After all, one 
cannot “steal from oneself ” and plagiarism is, by definition, the stealing of 
other people’s ideas. Throughout the public debate, the concepts of “plagi-
arism”, “self-citation”, “self-plagiarism”, “co-authorship” and “intellectual 
property” were mixed up considerably, which did not make matters clearer 
for anyone.
Until the NRC article in early 2014, hardly anyone in the scientific com-
munity was talking about the issue of self-plagiarism. The 2004/2012 Code 
did not contain any reference to self-citation or self-plagiarism, nor did most 
other national or international codes of conduct. This raises the question as 
to whether a certain type of scientific behavior that is not mentioned in a code 
of conduct can really be considered a form of misconduct or as a violation of 
scientific integrity. And although we have numerous good and bad examples 
of re-using one’s own texts, they do not help us in answering this question.
The ALLEA-ESF Code does mention the issue of self-plagiarism in its 
“Guidelines for Good Practice Rules” for publication etiquette:
“Publication of the same (or substantial parts of the same) work 
in different journals is acceptable only with the consent of the 
Scientific Integrity
110
editors of the journals and where proper reference is made to 
the first publication. In the author’s CV such related articles 
must be mentioned as one item” (European Code of Conduct for Re-
search Integrity, ESF/All European Academies, ALLEA 2010: 12). 
This rule refers to the simultaneous presentation and/or publication of the 
same text in two different scientific journals, which is often cited as an ex-
ample of self-plagiarism. A better example comes from education, where 
it is strictly forbidden to submit the same bachelor’s or master’s thesis or 
a substantial part thereof unaltered to two different degree programs or 
to two programs at different universities. This is a sensible and perfectly 
understandable measure for education. However, different rules apply for 
research. Publishers and journal editors have a right to not want articles to 
be published by more than one journal at the same time, but it is up to the 
contracting parties to establish these terms in the contract. As mentioned 
in Chapter 4, journal publishers and editors have their own rules, such as 
“Guidelines on Good Publication Practice” in the ALLEA, and the COPE com-
mittee to monitor them. However, these private-law agreements between two 
parties have nothing to do with the codes of conduct that scientists establish 
amongst themselves.
It seems odd to speak of self-plagiarism in cases where nothing has been 
published yet. Some authors have to wait a very long time to find out whether 
or not their article will be accepted by the journal in question, so it makes 
sense that they try to increase their chances by submitting to more than one 
journal. Whether or not this is allowed is determined by the individual pu-
blisher and is a matter for private law. The issue of intellectual property rights 
(copyright, transfer of copyright, remuneration, reproduction rights, copy-
right protection, etc.) is often confused with the university’s own rules of 
conduct on plagiarism. 
This also raises the question of whether one is allowed to reuse one’s own 
previously published texts and whether or not this is a violation of scientific 
integrity. In most cases, this involves using parts of previously published arti-
cles and certain formulations that recur in one’s own work. According to the 
ALLEA Code, self-references are allowed “where proper reference is made”. 
In other words, as long as one places quotations marks around the quote and 
follows it with a proper reference, self-citation is perfectly acceptable. Thus, 
it is silly to regard self-citation with suspicion—citing other sources, even 
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those written by oneself, is a standard part of scientific practice. What is not 
acceptable, however, is reusing (i.e. recycling) one’s own scientific texts or 
texts one has written with others and attempting to use them for other pur-
poses without acknowledging their provenance. Given how easy it is to copy 
and paste nowadays, there seems to be a greater temptation to reuse one’s 
own work, and unfortunately, such laziness is often rewarded. 
In order to resolve some of the confusion, KNAW set up an advisory com-
mittee to decide whether the 2014 Code should include additional rules on 
self-citation and self-plagiarism. In KNAW’s advisory report, titled Correct 
Citeren [Citing Correctly], from April 2014, the word “reuse” is presented 
as an umbrella term, and plagiarism is distinguished from self-quotation 
and self-citation. Self-citation is defined as “a reference to one’s own pu-
blication, according to bibliographical conventions” (KNAW 2014: 4). The 
term self-plagiarism is avoided, because “one cannot steal or repossess his 
or her own intellectual property” (idem, my emphasis). Once again, even in 
this official report, the concepts of “intellectual property” and “plagiarism” 
are confused. The report is right to distinguish between the reuse of one’s 
own texts and/or results with proper acknowledgment of the source and the 
reuse of one’s own texts and/or results without such acknowledgment. Re-
using one’s texts with proper citation only becomes a problem when authors 
reuse their own texts in order to to increase the number of publications to 
their name. According to the report, there is nothing wrong with authors re-
using small excerpts from their own texts, but longer excerpts can be more 
problematic. Without mentioning the original source, re-using one’s own 
texts is, in essence, misleading “the public, editor and/or publisher about 
the originality of the text on offer, thereby potentially damaging trust in sci-
ence” (KNAW 2014: 6). However, also according to the report, these negative 
effects do not necessarily constitute a violation of integrity, especially when 
the unreferenced citations are limited to “short passages, texts and ideas in 
the introduction, theory and methods sections” (KNAW 2014: 7). All in all, 
KNAW’s conclusions are not exactly groundbreaking. They can be summed 
up as follows: the Code needs to address the issue of “re-using” one’s own 
texts, both with and without reference to the original source, and caution 
should be exercised when assessing past publications on the basis of rules 
on reuse that were non-existent at the time of publication (KNAW 2014: 9).
From a legal perspective, this second conclusion seems superfluous and 
questionable. The fact that one cannot be condemned for past conduct on 
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the basis of rules that did not exist at the time is a long-standing legal prin-
ciple. Simply stating that “caution should be exercised” is not enough—how 
can one judge whether or not someone has “exercised caution”? If there is 
no rule in the 2004/2012 Code prohibiting the reuse of one’s own texts, one 
cannot hold someone accountable for it retroactively simply because the 
KNAW committee has taken a new position on the matter. This would be an 
infringement on the legal certainty of the defendant and a violation of the 
ban on arbitrariness. Given that self-plagiarism is often equated with more 
serious forms of plagiarism, retroactive accusations would make it all too 
easy to damage the reputation of the defendant.
Nevertheless, these commonsense principles of legal certainty did not 
stop the VU Amsterdam from setting up an ad hoc Committee on Scientific 
Integrity in 2013 with the purpose of conducting an integrity investigation 
into Nijkamp’s work following the media’s accusations of self-plagiarism. 
All of the economist’s work dating back to 1995 (!) was investigated “retroac-
tively” for “plagiarism” and “self-plagiarism”, even though the VU Amster-
dam’s regulations on scientific integrity did not contain any provisions on 
the reuse of one’s own texts. The evaluation was simply based on the new 
prohibition clause that was going to be added to the 2014 Code, which the 
Rector Magnificus of the VU Amsterdam had already insisted on himself. The 
pertinent question in the Nijkamp case is thus whether this investigation, in 
which so many legal principles and requirements of fair trial were violated, 
could itself pass a test of administrative integrity?
Naturally, rules can change; however, when they do, they should only 
apply from the moment they go into effect and have been communicated to 
all parties involved. Thus, a rule of conduct for publications should only ap-
ply to work that has been published since the rule has been in force—not to 
work that was published before. In the end, the first recommendation stated 
in the KNAW opinion was accepted quickly without public debate. In the fall 
of 2014, the VSNU amended the Code and several new rules were added. The 
section on the reuse of one’s own texts reads as follows:
1.5 “Academic practitioners do not republish their own previ-
ously published work or parts thereof as though it constituted 
a new contribution to the academic literature. When republis-
hing previously published findings, they indicate this with a 
correct reference to the source or by another means accepted 
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within the discipline. In many disciplines it is permissible and 
even customary to reprint short texts from works published 
with or without coauthors without a source reference when it 
concerns brief passages of introductory, theoretical or metho-
dological explanation.” (Netherlands Code of Conduct for Scientific 
Practice 2004/2012/ 2014).
What this new rule actually says is that the reuse of one’s own words is tech-
nically not allowed, but it is tolerated as long as it is limited to “brief passages 
of introductory, theoretical or methodological explanations”. In this sense, 
this new rule is an international frontrunner in the further regulation of 
existing scientific practices, and any committee would be hard-pressed to 
find a scientist who has never reused any of his or her own work. A German 
study on plagiarism that appeared after the Zu Guttenberg affair is very clear 
about this:
“Likewise, one’s own work is quote-free: anyone who reuses 
passages from his or her own publications does not have to 
quote him- or herself, since the text is from the same author—it 
is just not new. There is no such thing as self-plagiarism. This 
also serves to protect readers who would otherwise be bothered 
with constant ‘as previously mentioned’ quotations’” (Rieble 
2013: 47).
What Rieble seems to suggest here is that if we demand that authors con-
stantly cite their own work, their texts will quickly become unreadable. Of 
course, one should not reuse one’s own texts too often, but sometimes it is 
inevitable (as in the case described below). And if one does do it, a one-time 
reference in a footnote or an announcement beforehand seems sufficient, 
for example, “The following three paragraphs have been borrowed from...”.
It is important to compare the advantages and disadvantages of reusing 
one’s own work. What is absolutely unacceptable is republishing an entire 
article again in another journal under a new title—this is comparable to the 
student who submits the same thesis twice. This would clearly be a case of 
“self-plagiarism”: one takes an old text, gives it a new title, and makes no 
mention whatsoever of the previously published version. Equally questiona-
ble is the practice of reusing one’s own work under a new title with the sole 
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aim of increasing the number of published articles and, if possible, obtaining 
a position, promotion or subsidy.
Fortunately, there are simple solutions to both of these problems. Not 
only is the author responsible for his or her dubious behavior, editors and 
reviewers carry a certain responsibility as well. If journal editors pay more 
attention to whether or not a submission has already been published else-
where, cases of self-plagiarism can be filtered out. For example, as an editor 
of a journal, I was given the opportunity to review an article that was identical 
to a chapter of a recently published book that I was already familiar with. 
Instead of filing a “self-plagiarism” complaint, the article was simply rejec-
ted, and the author was given a warning. Effective? Most certainly. As long as 
evaluation committees thoroughly read the submitted material (and perhaps 
run it through plagiarism-detection software), rather than merely looking at 
the number of publications by the applicant, they will be able to detect any 
overlap and filter out cases of self-plagiarism. Furthermore, the author can 
protect him- or herself from self-plagiarism accusations by simply inclu-
ding a short statement of disclosure, such as “As I have written before and 
published elsewhere…”. After all, it is not unusual for experts to be asked to 
reformulate their insights on a particular topic for various bodies and publi-
cations. In my opinion, this is to be expected of scientists. 
One interesting scientific argument in favor of reusing one’s own work 
is provided by Hexham. He compares “self-plagiarism” to selling a se-
cond-hand car as if it were brand new. He puts it this way:
“…self-plagiarism, however, must be carefully distinguished 
from the recycling of one’s work that to a greater or lesser ex-
tent everyone legitimately does (…) Academics are expected 
to republish revised versions of their Ph.D. thesis. They also 
often develop different aspects of an argument in several pa-
pers that require the repetition of certain key passages. This 
is not self-plagiarism if the work develops new insights. It is 
self-plagiarism if the argument, examples, evidence, and con-
clusions remain the same without the development of new ideas 
or presentation of additional evidence” (Hexham, 2005: 11; with 
thanks to M. Hofstede, who pointed this argument out to me).
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Sometimes the repetition of key passages is necessary, particularly if one is 
building on previous work or finds better or more extensive arguments and 
evidence for previously held positions. Especially in the socio-cultural fields 
of science, which are more prone to long, complex arguments than concise 
mathematical formulas, insights are likely to develop over time. Thus, for 
the sake of consistency, it is often necessary to use exactly the same wording. 
Finally, it is important to consider the context in which one’s work will be 
used: reuse as a spin-off from an original idea or reuse in a popular scientific 
article. Both are, in my opinion, perfectly permissible.
In the above passage, Hexham also points out that many dissertations are 
often published in revised form, just as many books published by top authors 
consist of articles that have been previously published and later revised. This 
is widely considered a sensible scientific practice. In the Netherlands, PhD 
candidates can use articles they’ve published in scientific journals as part 
of their PhD dissertation. This practice has been accepted here for years, 
and over the last twenty years, it has become customary in an increasing 
number of scientific fields. In a literal sense, this is the reuse of one’s own 
texts—often in combination with those written together with one’s supervi-
sor. Although this practice is quite commonplace, there are numerous CWIs 
that still view “self-citation”, “self-plagiarism” or “the reuse of one’s own 
text” as impermissible—a view that, in my opinion, is as ill-considered as it 
is debatable.
What strikes me in this discussion about self-plagiarism and the reuse of 
one’s own work is the preoccupation with originality and new knowledge—
as if scientists should be constantly coming up with original ideas. In reality, 
however, most articles in scientific journals are based on the work of prede-
cessors. Every once in a while, someone comes up with a purely original idea, 
and the major journals compete to be the first to publish it. In my opinion, 
however, journals and scientists are not only responsible for spreading new 
knowledge, they are also responsible for debating, discussing, criticizing 
and passing existing knowledge on to younger generations. This necessary 
recycling of existing knowledge takes place in manuals, reviews, standard 
works, readers and textbooks, and—if all goes well—in scientific journals, 
where people respond to each other’s contributions. In these discussions, 
which can lay the foundations for new research, the reuse of earlier works 
and quotes from well-formulated texts are often unavoidable and even en-
couraged (with proper referencing, of course). The discussion of existing 
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knowledge has always been part of education and continues to form the 
bedrock of scientific knowledge.
Moreover, specialists in a certain field are often asked to repeat or rephra-
se their ideas, particularly those that have been recognized as interesting, 
new or important, for a different publication or a wider readership. Most are 
more than happy to do so and don’t see anything wrong with reusing their 
own work in such cases. This is standard practice—everyone does it. Howe-
ver, scientists now suddenly have to worry about being accused of violating 
“integrity rules”. Nobody knows where they stand these days, because it is 
unclear whether non-compliance with the new provisions in the 2014 Code 
and the 2018 Code (standard 41) on the reuse of one’s own texts will be re-
garded as an integrity violation.
Why shouldn’t someone publish his or her own ideas two or three times, 
even without a reference? One wonders whether banning scientists from 
doing so is a violation of their scientific freedom or freedom of expression. 
This fear and the overblown discussion about “self-plagiarism” only emer-
ged after the article on Nijkamp in NRC Handelsblad made the topic big news 
(January 7, 2014). But who decides what is and is not allowed in science? 
Journalists or scientists themselves? 
The view that researchers should only produce “original” texts is, in my 
opinion, short-sighted. The dissemination, criticism, and discussion of 
existing knowledge is also part of good scientific practice, and oftentimes, 
the reuse of one’s own texts is unavoidable. An expert in the field of intel-
lectual property, Antoon Quaedvlieg, spoke out against what he called the 
“criminalization” of self-plagiarism in the Nederlands Juristen Blad. He wrote: 
“Let’s also consider the other side of the story. The near-hysterical frenzy 
about—often insignificant—partial ‘self-plagiarism’ is driving us towards 
an exaggerated administrative formalism in science. It results in a ludicrous 
parade of self-references that have no more than the tiniest bagatelle me-
aning. (...) The ‘self-plagiarism’ puritans are doing science a disservice” 
(Quaedvlieg 2014: 853). The lack of appreciation for the value of repeated 
knowledge and the crackdown on self-plagiarism (which is, as noted, often 
labeled as full-blown plagiarism) are unfortunate consequences of today’s 
overly competitive scientific world, in which ambition and ostentation are 
becoming more difficult to distinguish.
Plagiarism and self-plagiarism
117
5.5   PLAGIARISM COMPLAINTS: POWER RELATIONS  
AND REPORTING
Plagiarism is one of the easiest scientific misdemeanors to identify: one 
simply compares the source text with the copied text. Discovering cases of 
plagiarism, however, is not always so easy. The most notorious cases tend 
to involve people who select articles from obscure journals, add a new title 
and a few non-existent co-authors and then submit them to equally obscure 
journals for publication (e.g. the Alsabti case; Broad and Wade, 1983: 38-56; 
Freeland Judson, 2004: 109). Given the fact that the number of scientific 
journals has exploded (there are now more than 10,000 medical journals in 
the world and hundreds of thousands of other journals dedicated to various 
disciplines), it is quite possible to find an interesting text somewhere and 
republish it under one’s own name. Who gets caught and who doesn’t is gen-
erally a matter of chance. New digital search engines (e.g. Medline, Turnitin) 
are somewhat helpful in this regard (Freeland Judson, 2004: 315-317; Weber-
Wulff 2014: 71-112). Nevertheless, a vast number of scientific contributions 
go completely unnoticed, hidden in the annals of science until someone finds 
them and examines them for plagiarism.
When submitting a plagiarism complaint, it is also important to consi-
der the relations among those concerned. As Brian Martin pointed out, the 
outcome of plagiarism cases can vary depending on the respective status 
level of the plagiarizer and the plagiarized and also on the respective social 
position of the accuser and the accused (Martin 2008: 6-12). Imagine the PhD 
student who discovers that her supervisor has taken her text to conferences 
and presented it under his own name, which is a form of plagiarism of ideas 
(assuming her text has not been published yet). This puts the student in a 
difficult position, because such a serious accusation against a superior could 
permanently damage her future employment opportunities. Conversely, a su-
pervisor or research institute director may discover that his young employees 
have copied other people’s texts (the supervisor’s, for example) without cre-
diting the source. There is nothing stopping the supervisor from reporting 
the suspected plagiarism, which could potentially lead to the termination of 
the young researcher’s employment. 
Martin studied both types of cases, which he refers to respectively as the 
case of the weak perpetrator and the case of the powerful perpetrator. In the 
case of the weak perpetrator, a subordinate (student, assistant, doctoral can-
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didate, young researcher) commits plagiarism and the more powerful party 
(teacher, supervisor, director, renowned professor) discovers and reports it. 
In the case of the powerful perpetrator, the subordinate discovers plagiarism 
committed by a superior and reports it. The nature, course and outcome of 
both cases of plagiarism are quite different, Martin explains. But in most ca-
ses, the stronger party comes out ahead, even when there is strong evidence 
against him/her (Martin 2008: 8).
When someone in a weak position commits plagiarism, it is often out of 
ignorance. Due to a lack of experience or self-confidence, students may try to 
patch together a paper from various sources without proper attribution or ask 
fellow students to write their texts for them. Martin specifically mentions the 
weak position of foreign students and junior researchers, who may be faced 
with the challenge of writing in a foreign language in an unfamiliar culture. 
For them, the temptation to copy from well-written texts—especially at the 
beginning of their studies—is great. If their plagiarism is discovered, their 
defense usually consists of: “I didn’t mean to”, “I didn’t realize it wasn’t allo-
wed”, or “it’s just one little passage”. Such cases of unintentional plagiarism 
can be difficult to assess:
“It is one thing to demonstrate copying with inadequate  
acknowledgment and another to assess its significance”  
(Martin 2008: 7).
Forgetting quotation marks but still providing a reference is not the same 
thing as copying texts from an obscure source and not providing a reference 
at all, which is often a sign of deliberate deception (Martin 2008: 8). Literally 
quoting without using quotation marks is unacceptable and certainly fool-
ish, but if a reference to the original author is included, it is still possible 
to verify the source. However, plagiarism in the purest sense of the word 
escapes all forms of verification—if no reference whatsoever is provided, 
the text appears to be the author’s original work. If the intention to cheat 
cannot be established, an educative response is more useful than immediate 
punishment. When a student demonstrates dishonest scientific behavior, it 
is the supervisor’s job to teach the student about ethical scientific practices. 
It’s as simple as that.
The classic example of plagiarism committed by someone in a powerful 
position is the professor who appropriates an original idea from a student’s 
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work and uses it in her own presentations or scientific articles, without 
properly mentioning the source (“How can a student have such original ide-
as? I’m more qualified to assess the meaning of these results, aren’t I?”). The 
defense against this kind of plagiarism is often the same: “I didn’t mean to”, 
“it was an accident”, “I forgot that I had read it in that student’s paper”, etc. 
These types of excuses are typical of plagiarism cases. While it is not unusual 
for the perpetrator in a position of power to claim that the plagiarism was 
unintentional, if the evidence of plagiarism is undeniable, the situation tends 
to unfold very differently than in cases where the perpetrator is in a weaker 
position. First, the one in power tries to keep the whole thing quiet, and if 
that is not possible, he will blame the assistants—it wasn’t his fault that his 
assistants failed to provide proper references (Martin, 2008: 10). In the past, 
that is until about 1970, it was customary for professors to use their assis-
tants’ work without mentioning them as co-authors at all, but nowadays this 
is not so easily done. Even still, when things go wrong, the error can always 
be blamed on a subordinate.
In addition, the superior has more direct access to the administrative po-
wers that be, which can ensure that the seriousness of the case is downplayed 
and that no official measures are taken against him or her. However, there 
are plenty of measures that can be taken against a subordinate who has filed 
a complaint. Threats of dismissal or the refusal to renew the subordinate’s 
contract are often an effective means of putting the matter on hold. The su-
bordinate’s level of dependence is often a good indication of how the case 
will end. In the majority of cases Martin studied, the party in power usually 
got away with plagiarism one way or another (Martin 2008: 8).
In light of these power relations, the question arises as to whether those 
in a weaker position, who have a lot to lose from filing a plagiarism com-
plaint against a superior, should not be able to remain anonymous. There 
are plenty of arguments in favor of anonymous reporting: a PhD student 
sees something that he suspects is unacceptable but does not want to face 
the negative consequences that come with reporting it; a researcher suspects 
that a close colleague is behaving unethically but does not dare to approach 
her directly about it (after all, these suspicions may not be correct and their 
working relationship would be damaged for good). As a third argument, 
one could mention the fact that it’s easy to demonstrate that the Code of 
Conduct has been breached in plagiarism cases, thus it doesn’t really matter 
whether the complainant is known or not. It is also possible to determine 
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whether plagiarism has been committed without revealing the complainant’s 
identity.
There are, however, plenty of arguments against anonymous complaints 
as well. First, there is the fact that the complaint procedure adopted by the 
VSNU in 2001 explicitly prohibits anonymous complaints. The memorandum 
which formed the basis for its complaints system states: “The institution 
must provide for a procedure in which the complainant and accused are heard 
and rebutted. Anonymous complaints cannot be dealt with; ‘whistle-blowers’ 
must be properly protected” (KNAW, VSNU, NWO, 2001: 6). Most likely, the 
underlying reason for this is the belief that an open procedure will prevent 
gossip and backstabbing at universities and prevent a toxic atmosphere of 
suspicion and secrecy in the workplace. Accusations of plagiarism can cause 
tremendous damage to reputations and careers; thus it is important to consi-
der whether there might be improper motives for filing a complaint (jealousy, 
personal grudges, revenge, harassment). And if the accusations prove to be 
false, there is no way of holding an anonymous complainant accountable.
However, a better, more transparent solution is available that would 
allow those in a weaker position to submit a complaint against someone in 
a superior position without fear of reprisal: a whistle-blower’s procedure, 
as mentioned in Chapter 4, where the whistle-blower’s identity is revealed 
to at least one member of the institution’s Executive Board, who can then 
decide whether the whistle-blower’s identity should continue to be protected. 
The Board can weigh the complainant’s motives for remaining anonymous, 
and if the accusations turn out to be false, it can still hold the complainant 
accountable. The VSNU implemented this whistle-blower procedure in its 
standard complaint procedure, and it has since been adopted by other uni-




Frequently asked questions about scientific integrity 
6.1   WHO CAN COMPLAIN ABOUT WHOM?  
TO WHICH AUTHORITY?
In principle, anyone can submit a complaint about a suspected violation of 
scientific integrity. Neither the national Code(s) nor university regulations 
on scientific integrity pose any limit on who can file a complaint. This has to 
do with preserving trust in science, both among scientists and in society as a 
whole. People expect scientific research results to be reliable and responsibly 
generated, and fraud in science undermines that trust.
Scientists build on each other’s knowledge and results; therefore, they 
need to be able to trust each other. If they have reason to believe that someone 
else’s research results have been obtained via incorrect or unethical means, 
they have a right to complain. Corrupt and fabricated data pollutes the entire 
body of knowledge.
Private citizens also have an interest in trustworthy, non-fraudulent sci-
ence. For starters, a great deal of research is paid for with public funds, so 
the public has a right to keep an eye on how those funds are used. As noted 
in Chapter 1, this was why members of the US Congress became interested 
in scientific fraud in the first place. Citizens are also often the consumers 
of scientific knowledge, and they should be able to assume that they are not 
being deceived. Scientific research results are being reported more frequent-
ly, often in news articles and clips published in print and online. However, 
that research results are reaching a wider audience does not mean that they 
are more comprehensive or accurate. Concerned citizens are thus entitled to 
question the scientific practices behind the research.
In theory, citizens do not have to demonstrate that they have a vested inte-
rest in a specific article or study to submit an integrity complaint about it. In 
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practice, however, demonstrating that one has a vested interest in the matter 
at stake is a general requirement in many other complaint and objection 
procedures. After the Stapel affair, the number of complaints from citizens 
outside academia rose dramatically, thereby increasing the demand for more 
restriction on what constitutes an “interested party”. After all, non-specia-
lists are generally less familiar with the way in which scientific results have 
been obtained and if citizens (or politicians) do not agree with certain results, 
this does not mean that they have been obtained in an improper manner. The 
distinction between a difference of opinion on scientific issues, the quality 
of research, and demonstrable violations of scientific integrity is not readily 
apparent to every citizen. Thus, it makes sense to first consult with Confi-
dential Advisors about suspected fraud or other integrity violations before 
submitting an official complaint. Some university regulations require that an 
initial notification be submitted to a Confidential Advisor, but it is still up to 
the complainant to decide whether or not to pursue the complaint.
Anyone can submit a complaint, but not everyone can be the subject of 
one. In one case, a PhD student submitted a complaint about a news article 
written by a science journalist. The student believed that the news article had 
stolen passages from his recently defended dissertation and filed a plagia-
rism complaint with the Dean of his faculty. The Dean, who was particularly 
sensitive to integrity violations due to all of the hype surrounding the issue 
at the time, decided to hold the journalist accountable. The journalist was 
not only extremely surprised by the accusation but also indignant. He be-
lieved, and rightly so, that the Netherlands Code of Conduct for Scientific Practice 
only applied to university staff and not to independent journalists. He also 
claimed that this was not a case of plagiarism but of alleged plagiarism (which 
was later confirmed by the Dean’s investigation). Moreover, he argued that 
universities chasing down science journalists and threatening them with 
all kinds of false accusations posed a serious through to the freedom of the 
press, and that the Dean should have gone through the Netherlands Press 
Council. And things didn’t stop there. The journalist felt that he had been so 
unfairly treated by the Dean and the PhD student that he submitted a com-
plaint of his own… about a violation of scientific integrity! After all, the Code 
holds scientists to a standard of “honest and respectful behavior.”
In another case, the LOWI received a complaint from abroad that a doctor 
in the Netherlands had published an article in a scientific journal which, in 
the complainant’s opinion, was based on dubious data. The LOWI rejected 
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the case because the doctor was not affiliated with any scientific institution 
in the Netherlands. The same applies for medical research carried out by 
specialists in non-university hospitals. As a result, one well-known case of 
research fraud regarding patient registrations at a provincial hospital could 
not be investigated by the LOWI. The only body that could take action in 
these cases was the Dutch Health Care Inspectorate, but it did not consider 
the detection of scientific fraud one of its primary tasks.
These kinds of gaps in the Dutch research world can be filled if more 
scientific research organizations adopt the Dutch university system of self-re-
gulation. This has been a growing trend in recent years. Various research 
institutes have joined the LOWI, using it as an appellate body for scientific 
fraud cases investigated internally. The number of researchers potentially 
subject to integrity complaints is larger than ever before, but this has not led 
to more reports from these institutes.
To which authority? 
In principle, a scientific integrity complaint starts and ends with the insti-
tution’s Executive Board. The Board may commission an investigation and, 
once the results are in, judge the case and determine the consequences. The 
rationale behind this approach is that these Executive Boards are employers, 
and, as employers, they can impose sanctions on employees who have com-
mitted a violation of integrity.
However, this can sometimes be problematic in practice, for example, if 
the (allegedly) fraudulent research was conducted at a certain university or 
medical center, but by the time it was discovered and a complaint was filed, 
the defendant was working elsewhere. This was the case with a scientific 
study carried out at University A as part of one researcher’s PhD research. The 
researcher later wrote a few articles about it while working as a post-doc at 
University B, before moving on to become a senior lecturer at University C. In 
the meantime, complaints about the original study emerged. But the question 
was, where to file the complaints? Should they be submitted to the university 
where the research was carried out, to the university where the defendant was 
working when he wrote the articles, or to his current employer? University C 
was reluctant to deal with this case (let’s not forget that integrity violations 
bring negative publicity to the institution!), claiming that it had nothing to 
do with its employee’s past research. While University C’s position is cer-
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tainly understandable, the LOWI ruled that it was the current employer’s res-
ponsibility to handle the case because it was the only body that could impose 
sanctions if the defendant were found guilty. If for some reason University C 
was unable to accept the case, the institution where the study was carried out 
was second in line to address it. Researchers are followed by their reputation. 
If a researcher has committed a violation in the past, this can not only have 
consequences for the reputation of the institution where the research took 
place, but also for the institution where the researcher is currently employed 
(LOWI opinion 2011-4).
But what if the researcher is no longer employed? This is the case for 
emeritus professors who are no longer affiliated with the university where 
they previously worked. If the complaint concerns prior research carried out 
while they were still employed by their university, the procedure is clear (see 
above). If they continue to conduct scientific research or to assess research 
applications after their retirement, their former connection to the institution 
is decisive, because the institution’s prestige benefits its emeriti and vice ver-
sa; in other words, when it comes to the treatment of integrity complaints, 
there is still a strong symbolic relationship between the emeriti and their 
former university. An emeritus professor could still be found guilty of plagi-
arism or cryptomnesia. In both cases, integrity complaints can be submitted 
to the former employer, but, according to Dutch labor laws, formal sanctions 
may not be imposed on former employees. However, in the event that mis-
conduct has indeed taken place, disclosure of the judgment would serve as a 
symbolic punishment, and that in itself should be sufficient. The Bax affair 
at the VU Amsterdam is a good example of this: although formal sanctions 
were no longer possible, the scientific articles in question were withdrawn 
by the journal editors.
There have also been cases where research carried out in the Netherlands 
has come under fire, but the author is no longer employed by a Dutch univer-
sity. This is not all that unusual given the internationalization of the scientific 
labor market. If the researcher in question has already left the country, the 
university has no way of imposing sanctions under Dutch employment law. If 
the violation is proven, the only “sanction” that the university could impose 
would be to request that the article in question be withdrawn from the jour-
nal it was published in. It is then up to the journal’s editorial staff to decide 
whether or not to withdraw the article and why.
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Oddly enough, the universities where researchers carry out their research 
generally have no say in how or where that research is published. Meanwhile, 
most of the journal editors are also employed by universities. It is time to 
review the relationship between universities, the publication of research, and 
the position of scientific journals. It would also be worth exploring whether 
open access journals with well-functioning editorial staffs, in collaboration 
with university libraries, could offer more transparency, better access to re-
search data and improved peer review systems in the future.
6.2   MATTERS WORTHY OF COMPLAINT (I): FABRICATION AND 
FALSIFICATION 
In principle, anyone can submit a complaint about a suspected violation 
of the provisions of the 2004/2012/2014 Code and the 2018 Code. These 
complaints concern the most serious offences: fabrication, falsification 
and plagiarism. Plagiarism was addressed in Chapter 5; below I will discuss 
fabrication and falsification.
Fabrication
Fabricated science is often uncovered quite quickly. Take, for example, Kon-
rad Kujau’s 1983 publication of 62 fictitious diary entries by Adolf Hitler, 
which was exposed as a hoax within two weeks (Stern, April 25, 1983; Mac-
Arthur 2008). Jan Hendrik Schön’s fabricated research data was exposed 
within two years (Bell Laboratories 2002), and although it took two decades 
to reveal that anthropologist Mart Bax had based much of his research from 
1984 to 1998 on fabricated stories, there were already plenty of signals from 
expert ethnologists and church historians who doubted the authenticity and 
historical probability of the religious violence Bax had described. Unfortu-
nately, these signals were largely ignored by the scientific community (Van 
Kolfschooten 2012: 191-197).
Other fabrications in scientific history managed to survive much longer. 
For example, it took more than forty years to “unmask” the Piltdown Man 
(1912-1952, Walsh 1996) and more than a hundred years to reveal the fake 
historiography behind the purported origins of the Scottish kilt (Hobsbawn 
1983; Trevor-Roper 1983; 2013). Even the Stapel affair took more than ten 
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years to uncover, which is a long time especially given the exceptional scope 
of Stapel’s fabrications.
The hype surrounding the Stapel affair opened the door for complaints 
against universities for disclosing information about (alleged) integrity vi-
olations; as a result, the number of integrity complaints increased. Those 
submitted after 2011 often referred to the Stapel affair and some claimed to 
concern fraud that was “much worse” than Stapel’s. However, the chance 
that scientific data is being fabricated on a large scale is highly unlikely, and 
the increase in integrity violation complaints is more indicative of a desire to 
tarnish reputations than a real increase in data fabrication.
Still, when we consider two reports on recent fabrication cases, there are 
a few things that stand out. First, both the Levelt report (2012), on Stapel, 
and the Baud report (2013), on Bax, emphasize that the researcher’s fabrica-
tions were embedded in a larger pattern of carelessness. This carelessness 
was observed in their research practices, the documentation of research 
activities, and the presentation of their results. The Levelt report refers to 
this carelessness as “sloppy science”. Furthermore, both reports indicated 
that the environment in which the research was conducted was unsatisfac-
tory and indicative of a general tendency in the researcher’s scientific fields 
(social psychology and anthropology, respectively) to reinforce these kinds 
of careless scientific practices. 
After the investigation of the Stapel affair, measures were taken against 
three social psychologists from Tilburg who forgot to include a dataset in a 
publication and changed the name of a test subject without mentioning it in 
the publication. They were found guilty of “gross carelessness and sloppi-
ness”. Although they had not knowingly manipulated data, they had failed 
to comply with the rules of scientific research, namely that “methodological 
principles be followed as vigilantly and transparently as possible, that all 
information be properly verified and that any deviations from the standard 
rules be justified” (NRC January 17, 2013). 
The scale on which all this took place is not mentioned in the news article. 
The actions were judged as reprehensible violations of integrity, but disclosu-
re of the names of those involved was found to be “disproportionate” to the 
severity of the crime (NRC, idem). In my opinion, this says a lot about the true 
seriousness of the violation. In this case, non-compliance with the highest 
standards of methodological diligence and transparency was considered a 
violation of integrity, which naturally raises the question as to how the less 
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diligent methodological research practices (and there are probably a great 
number of these) ought to be judged. Should forgetfulness really be regarded 
as a violation of integrity? The strict boundaries between an integrity violation 
and “sloppy science” were blurred in both the Levelt and Baud reports.
The suggestion that there is a relationship between sloppy science and 
dishonest science is, in my opinion, fundamentally flawed. Sloppiness and 
dishonesty are often seen as one and the same or causally linked, but we do 
not yet have conclusive evidence that this is actually the case. Sloppy science 
and fabricated science are not the same. Both are regrettable, but for very dif-
ferent reasons. Allow me to use a sports metaphor to explain. A soccer team 
can play sloppily, making one careless pass after another and constantly mis-
sing the goal, or it can play rough, making serious fouls and earning yellow 
or red cards. In the team’s eyes, the goal—winning—justifies all means. This 
distinction is similar to the one made in Chapter 2 between game rules and 
goal rules. Poor, sloppy play does not win a match, nor do gross violations 
of the rules. The team’s coach has two options: he can give his players a fiery 
locker room speech and tell them they have to win by any means necessary 
or he can have the players practice hard to improve their skills and become 
better players so they can truly win. In other words, better skills render rule 
violations unnecessary.
The conclusion is that sloppy scientific practices need to be improved 
through training, the development of better research skills and a stronger 
commitment to diligence. Meanwhile, integrity violations and gross vio-
lations of scientific rules and standards must also be prevented. While the 
improvement of research skills may be necessary, it is not sufficient for the 
total prevention of integrity violations. In scientific institutions, the former 
falls under the institution’s “science policy”, whereas the latter falls under 
its “integrity policy”. 
Falsification and manipulation of research data 
Falsification is more common than fabrication and comes in a greater variety 
of forms. It can consist of adjusting measurement results, changing average 
values, digitally re-coloring photos, perfecting images, blots, gels and pic-
tures from laboratory tests (also known as “image tampering”; Comstock 
2013: 79-87), deliberately coding interview data to theoretically desirable 
patterns, and tweaking research data via statistical tests until they exhibit 
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the hypothetically desired results. And let us not forget the notoriously dis-
puted research practices of trimming and cooking identified by Babbage in 
1830, and other contemporary questionable research practices, such as the 
improper rounding of p-values, the extra processing of data, and the selective 
omission of test subjects (a form of cooking).
All these forms of data manipulation are a violation of scientific integrity. 
Here, too, the emphasis is still on whether the falsification was carried out 
deliberately, but both the manipulations and the intention behind them can 
be difficult to determine. Researchers accused of falsification are often quick 
to hide behind denials of intent and may reject accusations against them on 
the grounds of carelessness, unfortunate errors and hastiness, or they may 
try to shift the blame onto a fellow researcher who allegedly provided them 
with erroneous or manipulated data without their knowledge. The only way 
to resolve these disputes is for the CWI in charge to conduct a thorough 
investigation, but unfortunately most CWIs in the Netherlands do not have 
the resources to do so. Rarely are they able to question everyone involved, ask 
witnesses to testify under oath or confiscate personal computers to be exa-
mined for incriminating evidence. In the US, however, this is more standard 
procedure: in the Baltimore affair, for example, the CIA was even called in 
to determine exactly when the accused researcher made lab journal entries 
and with what ink.
When cases of suspected falsification arise, the ability to re-examine and 
verify the original research data is of great importance. The best defense 
against accusations of falsification is a well-maintained data file containing 
a thorough record of all research decisions made and codifications used—
in short, all verifiable data. When the disputed data are no longer available 
(“I got rid of those files years ago”) or can no longer be retrieved (“My 
computer crashed”), this is a violation of the principles of “reliability” and 
“verifiability”. Naturally, these offences are less serious than deliberate fal-
sification, but in combination with other offences and in the presence of 
statistical anomalies there can be talk of “culpable carelessness”, which goes 
beyond pure carelessness or unintentional errors. 
One interesting question is whether manipulations or falsifications of 
research data can be identified purely on the basis of statistical anomalies. 
Often a statistical improbability is the first sign that the data have been falsi-
fied. This was what happened in the Burt case, where results from different 
research populations with exactly the same correlation coefficient were dis-
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covered, as well as in the Stapel case, where values were too low and unlikely 
for Cronbach’s alpha. Results that are too good to be true give rise to suspi-
cions, but if no other sign of manipulation can be found, a judgment cannot 
be reached with absolute certainty.
In science, falsifications and manipulations must also be distinguished 
from “blunders”. Mistakes are part of science. Scientists are free to speculate 
and theorize at any time, they can even make mistakes, but they must respect 
the facts. This fundamental distinction between the status of theories and 
the status of facts was expressed by the physicist Freeman Dyson as follows:
“Science consists of facts and theories. Facts and theories are 
born in different ways and are judged by different standards. 
Facts are supposed to be true or false. They are discovered by 
observers or experimenters. A scientist who claims to have dis-
covered a fact that turns out to be wrong is judged harshly. One 
wrong fact is enough to ruin a career. Theories have an entirely 
different status. They are free creations of the human mind, 
intended to describe our understanding of nature. Since our 
understanding is incomplete, theories are provisional. Theo-
ries are tools of understanding, and a tool does not need to be 
precisely true in order to be useful. Theories are supposed to 
be more-or-less true, with plenty of room for disagreement. 
A scientist who invents a theory that turns out to be wrong is 
judged leniently. Mistakes are tolerated so long as the culprit 
is willing to correct them when nature proves them wrong” 
(Dyson, 2014: 4). 
This precise formulation also underlines why, in discussions and disputes 
about scientific integrity, actual fraud and manipulation must continue to 
be clearly distinguished from errors, theoretical differences of opinion, sci-
entific controversies and qualitative interpretations of “facts”. In all these 
cases, a high degree of tolerance is necessary, and it is striking that in today’s 
scientific climate, with its tough competition, such skeptical leniency is be-
coming harder and harder to find. If one wishes to criticize the quality of a 
fellow researcher’s scientific work or vision, this ought to be done in an open 
discussion within the scientific community, not in the form of a scientific 
integrity complaint in the hope that this will eliminate competitors.
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6.3  MATTERS WORTHY OF COMPLAINT (II): CO-AUTHORSHIP
There are a variety of problems that can arise in a co-authorship. When scien-
tific research is carried out as a team and more than one author has worked 
on an article, it is possible that certain researchers may receive too little or 
too much credit for their contributions. The first case is known as denial of 
authorship: the co-author does not receive due credit for his or her contri-
bution. The second case is called gift authorship: a co-author receives credit 
that he or she does not deserve. Another form of gift authorship is honorary 
authorship, which refers specifically to cases where an author is only men-
tioned because his or her name offers a certain sense of prestige. Gift and 
honorary authorship are both forms of “empty” co-authorship. There are 
two other interesting types of co-authorship worth mentioning here as well: 
guest co-authorship and ghost co-authorship, as well as the clever combin-
ation of the two—the ghost guest.
Too little recognition
Before we discuss the problems that can arise from having too many auth-
ors, we should—in light of issues related to scientific integrity—devote our 
attention to the problem of non-recognition of authorship. Article 1.4 of 
the 2004/2012/2014 Code clearly states “Authorship is acknowledged. Rules 
common to the scientific discipline are observed.” The 2018 Code contains 
a similar point. Standard 30 states: “Ensure a fair allocation and ordering of 
authorship, in line with the standards applicable within the discipline(s) con-
cerned.” While it is true that the standards of co-authorship can vary great-
ly per field, there is one requirement that holds true in all disciplines: one 
cannot ignore someone who has made a substantial contribution to a study 
or to a joint article by omitting his or her name from the list of co-authors.
In 2008, the LOWI was asked to assess a complaint from a research in-
stitute employee who had independently developed a pedagogical test for 
children. Following a disagreement with his professor, the employee’s tem-
porary appointment was not extended. After finding work elsewhere, he was 
surprised to discover that his test had been published without his name on it. 
He filed an integrity violation complaint and won (LOWI opinion, 2008-3). 
Another case involved a young, employee who had carried out the majority 
of work on a commissioned study in the social sciences. Upon completion 
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of the research report—most of which he had written—his appointment was 
not renewed. Afterwards, he struggled to find work in the Netherlands and 
decided to go abroad. The original report was later converted into a book 
and published under the names of his former colleague and professor. The 
young researcher’s name was not mentioned. From abroad, he asked why 
his name had been omitted. As a young researcher, he could have certainly 
benefited from being the co-author on this groundbreaking study. At first, 
the authors tried to claim that the book was completely different from his ori-
ginal report, but that could easily be refuted by comparing the two texts: his 
contribution was still easily recognizable. Initially, it was suggested that the 
book be taken off the market, but it was later decided that the employee had 
to be mentioned as co-author in the first edition (via an inserted page) and in 
subsequent editions on the cover. Although this case resembles plagiarism, it 
had more to do with the collaborative nature of the publication. Issues related 
to co-authorship must remain distinct from those of plagiarism, where the 
social relationships between those involved are quite different and generally 
non-existent.
The similarity between these two cases, both of which are fairly recogni-
zable, is that no clear agreements were made at the beginning of the research 
project or during the writing of the report, and co-authorship was “forgot-
ten” or ignored after the employment relationship was terminated. And if 
there has been a disagreement on the work floor, it becomes all the more dif-
ficult to produce articles together. But this is precisely why clear agreements 
are needed in the first place. Based on the principle of due care mandated 
by the Code of Conduct, the LOWI considers it a duty of research leaders to 
make sound agreements in advance about who may be considered co-au-
thor of what (LOWI opinion 2013-6). Article 1.5 of the 2004/2012/2014 Code 
states that the principle of due care also applies to the mutual relationships 
between scientists. One good example of this would be a timely agreement 
on co-authorship. There is no reason for every quarrel over co-authorship to 
develop into a scientific integrity complaint. These kinds of problems can 
and should be solved in the workplace. Only in cases where co-authorship 
agreements are, for whatever reason, not complied with would an integrity 
violation complaint be appropriate.
That said, there is no general consensus on when a person is entitled to 
co-authorship. This varies greatly from one scientific discipline to another. 
In my own sociological research group, our rule was that only researchers 
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and professors who had actually written parts of the text could be mentioned 
as co-authors. If the professor had not actually written anything, he or she 
would not be mentioned as a co-author. Thesis supervisors were not auto-
matically mentioned as co-authors of articles written by their PhD students. 
Any employees and students who had helped in other ways, for example 
by recording interviews, encoding data or conducting computer analyses, 
were mentioned in the acknowledgments. The writing work was distributed 
according to mutual agreements, and feedback was provided to each writer 
on his or her share. This approach to co-authorship may be stricter than in 
many other fields, but it does provide a clear criterion.
Too much recognition?
Compared to the non-recognition of co-authorship, the ever-expanding 
circle of co-authors seems like a luxury problem. At first glance, the prob-
lem of having too many co-authors seems to cause less harm to individuals 
because everyone seems to benefit. Complaints about honorary co-author-
ship are therefore much less common than those concerning the denial of 
co-authorship. Co-authors are not so quick to call each other out (at most 
they argue about the order in which their names will appear) and most of 
the time, readers have no idea who did what during the research and writ-
ing process. Nevertheless, the fact that an increasing number of scientific 
articles are being published with a long list of co-authors is a problem. It 
is becoming difficult to assess the contribution of individual researchers 
and judge its quality. During the job application and promotion process, 
it is increasingly common for candidates to submit publication lists that 
contain no single-author articles. In cases where the candidate is frequently 
listed as a middle author, it can be difficult to assess the true quality of his 
or her publication history. When does this luxury problem become a matter 
of scientific integrity?
The fact that more and more articles are being written with a series of 
co-authors is understandable. Modern science takes teamwork. Only in the 
oldest scientific fields of theology and law, the humanities and some fields 
of social science is the tradition of writing an article or an entire book by 
oneself still honored and cherished. But even in these disciplines, working 
and publishing together is becoming more common. In the natural sciences 
and biomedical research, it is quite normal for many people to work together 
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on the final result. One researcher may carry out tests or devise the metho-
dology, while another synthesizes substances or digitally processes the ex-
periments and creates computer simulations. The level of each co-author’s 
contribution can mostly be seen in the order in which their names appear on 
the publication: the first author is the one who carried out the main expe-
rimental research, the last author was responsible for overseeing the entire 
project and communication with journals, and the co-authors in the middle 
are generally those who have provided indispensable services and support. 
Young researchers prefer to be named first author, while more advanced 
researchers prefer to be the last, and the established professor or research 
director appreciate seeing their responsibility and involvement acknowled-
ged in the form of co-authorship. The system works to the advantage of all 
parties: young authors benefit from having an established name mentioned 
as co-author on their study and older authors can continue building an im-
pressive list of publications.
So far, so good, but this becomes an integrity problem when the motives 
for frequent and extensive co-authorship become disingenuous and disho-
nest. “Just put my name on it” can have a double meaning: on the one hand 
an established name can help young researchers in terms of guidance and 
management, but on the other, it can also be a sign of laziness and a desire 
to rack up as many publications as possible, especially if guidance and ma-
nagement have been virtually non-existent, which is all too often the case.
There seem to be three motives for the increased number of co-authors 
in modern-day scientific research: the desire for recognition from finan-
ciers and organizers, the increased specialization of science and the drive to 
publish more articles more often to increase one’s chances of being cited. 
Citations work both ways: if I quote certain colleagues often, there is a gre-
ater chance of them quoting me. In some cases, authors even agree to refer 
to each other’s work, which results in calculating behavior and artificial 
elements that may undermine a careful assessment of scientific quality. Two 
of the most well-known examples of long lists of co-authors are the CERN 
study (some articles have more than 180 co-authors) and the Human Genome 
study, in which two research collectives tried, in 2001, to outdo each other 




Another problem with having too many co-authors is that oftentimes the-
re is no one overseeing the entire project. If a few researchers are careless in 
the documentation of their observations and their mistakes are not detected 
during the review process, their contribution can damage the entire project 
and lead to accusations of fraud, as was the case in a large-scale cancer re-
search project in the United States (Freeland Judson, 2004: 296-298). The 
lack of social control in large research projects can thus become a major 
disadvantage; it does not necessarily cause scientific fraud, but it does make 
it easier to commit. 
In terms of scientific integrity, there is also the question of how honest 
everyone has been about their contribution. In cases of co-authorship, the 
problem is generally not failing to give credit where credit is due, because 
most of the time the authors are all mentioned, but rather that certain authors 
may profit from the merits of others. However, this problem is not particu-
larly difficult to solve. Freeland Judson suggests that specific contributions 
to scientific articles be mentioned by name, like in the closing credits at the 
end of a film (2004: 310). This would give a clear indication of who actually 
contributed to the article’s content and which authors’ contributions were 
more symbolic (“X was the director of the institute where the research took 
place”). Some scientific journals already do this. They require a detailed ex-
planation of each co-author’s contribution so that each person can be held 
personally accountable for his or her own work. The underlying issue at stake 
here is that authors are under too much pressure to accumulate as many pu-
blications and citations as possible; this pressure can be reduced by empha-
sizing quality over quantity. Providing “closing credits” for scientific articles 
can certainly help to provide more clarity about each author’s contribution, 
but we still need to reduce the obsessive preoccupation with the number of 
articles published and focus instead on scientific excellence.
Another remedy for scientific fraud would be to make all co-authors res-
ponsible for the integrity of any publication bearing their name. This, howe-
ver, seems unfair. In some major fraud cases, such as that of the physicist 
Schön, investigations revealed that the co-authors were completely unaware 
that fraud was taking place. No one—neither the co-authors nor the peer re-
viewers—noticed that some calculations were incorrect or that measurement 
results from other articles had been reused. Even still, in regard to the Schön 
case, Donald Kennedy remarked:
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“If the benefits are enjoyed jointly and severally by all authors, 
then shouldn’t the liability be joint and several too? The answer 
has to come in the form of a decision by the scientific commu-
nity” (Kennedy 2002: 495). 
The question of liability comes up again and again in the assessment of fraud 
cases involving multiple authors. Which of the three authors is to blame? 
Which of the seven? Which of the seventeen? Were the other co-authors aware 
of each other’s actions? Researchers working in a team need to be able to trust 
and rely on each other—yet this trust can be betrayed. A fraudster with truly 
malicious intent is difficult to stop. In the Levelt (2012) report on the Stapel 
affair, the co-authors were not held responsible for the fraud because they 
did not know it was going on and it was outside their control. There are other 
cases, however, that—at least in my opinion—should have been judged more 
strictly owing to the fact that some co-authors could have requested access 
to raw data prior to publication. I find it strange that co-authors who fail to 
notice highly improbable statistical results or choose to overlook them are 
not held responsible for them as well. Sometimes it can be all too easy to heap 
the blame on one person and to absolve the co-authors of any responsibility.
In my opinion, the idea of making all co-authors responsible for potential 
fraud could have a preventive effect. It could motivate all members of the 
team to be more meticulous and check each other’s work more carefully. The 
burden of proof for complicity would thus be reversed: only if ignorance can 
be clearly demonstrated is one assumed innocent. As a result, co-authors will 
be less likely to request that their name be put on an article that they haven’t 
worked on or examined closely themselves. 
Another clear form of integrity violation related to co-authorship has to 
do with the strange combination of guest and ghost authorship. It tends to 
occur in research carried out by industrial companies: the company will have 
an employee conduct scientific research and then pay a well-known scientist 
to put his or her name on it. In this way, the scientist becomes a guest-re-
searcher without having to take part in the research at all. The company 
then hires a ghostwriter to write an article about the study and mentions the 
high-profile scientist as co-author, after which the article is submitted to 
well-known scientific journals (Freeland Judson 2004: 308-309). The peer 
reviewers may not notice this or the fact that the research just so happens to 
show results that are favorable for the company’s products. The toxic com-
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bination of three G’s (gift, guest and ghost) can result in a scientific integrity 
nightmare and such practices should be vigorously combatted. One way (and 
perhaps the best way) to fight this type of scientific dishonesty would be the 
“closing credits” strategy mentioned before, in which each contributor’s role 
is clearly defined. 
6.4   IS THERE A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR SCIENTIFIC 
MISCONDUCT?
Yes, the possibility of assessing, condemning and punishing violations of 
scientific integrity are subject to a statute of limitations. Limitation periods 
are quite common in law. Their purpose is to prevent conflicts, such as those 
over property rights or punishable offenses, from lasting forever. Exceptions 
to this rule are crimes against humanity, war crimes and other violations of 
basic human rights; the statutes of limitations for such crimes have been 
abolished in the last decade. In criminal law cases, the limitation period 
usually lasts for thirty years for serious crimes (with some exceptions, such 
as murder) and five to ten years for smaller crimes, such as tax evasion. Terms 
of limitation are not about “forgiving and forgetting”, and they do not change 
the nature of the crime. A term of limitation simply means that after a certain 
period of time the right to prosecution lapses. 
There are also terms of limitation in science. Misdemeanors involving 
the manipulation of data can become less significant over time. This is par-
ticularly the case in the sciences and biomedical research, where it is said 
that articles lose relevance within five years of publication due to the rapid 
expansion of scientific knowledge. This seems a bit exaggerated to me since 
it is likely to take ten to twenty years to determine whether the knowledge 
accumulated during the research process can stand the test of time. Nowa-
days most university regulations for scientific integrity cases have a limitation 
period of ten years—the amount of time it apparently takes for scientific 
knowledge to become outdated (although this certainly does not apply to 
the humanities and social sciences). The period was increased to ten years 
in 2012, arguing that many research results are only published in journals 
after one to two years. And then it can take a while for errors in the study to 
come to light—for example, five years—which only leaves a small window 
for submitting a complaint. 
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According to the 2004/2012/2014 Code, ten years is the standard period 
for submitting a scientific integrity complaint. In serious cases of fraud and 
plagiarism, this period may be extended. The 2018 Code does not specify a 
limitation period. Thus, for all research carried out before October 1, 2018, 
ten years is the general limitation period, which raises the question: if the 
fraud is so serious, as in the Stapel affair, and it is only discovered after twel-
ve years, is there really no way to file a complaint? Are we going to let major 
fraudsters off the hook that easily? The answer is no, because, as previously 
mentioned, there are exceptions for serious cases. Take, for example, the pla-
giarism case of the Hungarian ex-president Pál Schmitt, mentioned above. It 
took twenty years to discover that his dissertation was largely borrowed from 
other sources without proper referencing. His political adversaries were all 
too happy to dig up some dirt on his past. The same happened to the German 
Minister of Education Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg (Dreier und Ohly, 2013), 
also discussed in Chapter 5. In both cases, their fraud went unnoticed by 
the scientific community and was later revealed by non-scientists. This says 
something about both the scientific community and the motives for accusing 
someone of violating scientific integrity: the scientific community and the 
peer review system are not foolproof and the motivations for submitting an 
integrity complaint are not always pure. 
After the Stapel affair in September 2011, there were numerous accus-
ations of scientific integrity violations that had occurred a long time ago: 
tampering with laboratory samples in 1991, plagiarism in a dissertation 
from 1976, an unreliable methodology in a medical study published in 2002 
and 2003, and questionable results in a student thesis from 2003. When 
such complaints arise, the reviewing bodies, CWIs, Executive Boards and 
the LOWI all need to ask themselves whether the term of limitations applies 
or whether the allegations are so serious that a deviation from it, may, in 
principle, be an option. Then, of course, there is the question of why the 
complainant waited so long to file a complaint. What motives did he or she 
have, other than concern for the sanctity of science?
The rationale behind having a term of limitations is to protect defendants, 
who need to know where they stand before the law. Arbitrariness in the filing 
of complaints should be avoided as much as possible: why this person, why 
now? Accusations of misconduct many years after the fact can be very unfair 




Given the standard ten-year limitation period, researchers are required to 
retain all research materials for ten years as well. The proper archiving of re-
search remains a weak point in many research projects. Too little attention is 
paid to proper documentation, and we do not yet have a long tradition of sys-
tematically recording research projects and storing data. When complaints 
arise, it is not unusual for the original research data to be missing: either the 
raw data has been discarded, sometimes within five years of conducting the 
research, or the dataset has been lost in a computer crash—both excuses are 
common but unconvincing. According to the 2018 Code, retention require-
ments should be observed as follows: “Manage the collected data carefully 
and store both the raw and processed versions for a period appropriate for 
the discipline and methodology at issue” (2018: 17, Standard 24). Both com-
plainants and defendants are required to exercise due care so that claims and 
evidence—the very heart of scientific practice—can be substantiated.
6.5   MINOR ERRORS, MAJOR NEGLIGENCE AND QUESTIONABLE 
RESEARCH PRACTICES
Chapter 5, on plagiarism, and this chapter address issues that can lead to 
complaints about suspected integrity violations. There are also scenarios 
that, although they frequently give rise to integrity complaints, are rarely re-
garded as true violations of scientific integrity. In many cases, the complain-
ant is not fully aware of what does and does not constitute a matter worthy 
of complaint. One can be indignant about the content of a certain scientific 
article or not believe claims in a journal, but that does not mean that the 
research itself is flawed or that the data has been tampered with. However, 
indignation can easily lead to a quality judgment: this article or that study is 
not reliable. But what does “reliable” really mean? Is there something in the 
study that is ineffective or unsatisfactory or has the author violated the rules 
of scientific integrity? 
There are plenty of examples of unsatisfactory research. In quantitative 
studies, measurement errors are quite common and even inevitable, because 
no measurement is a perfect reflection of reality. Thus, standard deviations 
and acceptable error margins must be taken into account. Scientific resear-
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chers make mistakes all the time. Mistakes are part of being human, and they 
provide excellent learning opportunities, as Karl Popper argued extensively 
in Conjectures and Refutations (Popper 1989). In short, if a complainant deems 
a certain scientific study unreliable, it will have to be determined what went 
wrong, whether the Code of Conduct has been explicitly violated and whether 
the violation was on purpose or by accident. This is the difference between 
error and fraud. An error is where a researcher violates, usually unintentio-
nally, the functional reliability of good scientific research (i.e. the goal rules). 
Fraud, on the other hand, involves intent: a researcher violates the rules of 
honest conduct in the presentation of research results (i.e. the game rules).
Distinguishing between error and fraud is therefore one of the key issues 
in the complaint procedure for violations of scientific integrity. There is also 
an intermediate space between errors, which are clearly and immediately 
recognizable as such, and fraudulent actions, which can only be proven 
through thorough investigation. This intermediate space is often described 
as a “gray area”; this is not necessarily due to the nature of the actions them-
selves, but rather because the rules of conduct are so vaguely formulated. 
The 2004/2012/2014 Code and the 2018 Code make it both easy and dif-
ficult to file an integrity violation complaint. Because the Codes mention a 
large number of desirable behaviors, such as being meticulous and truthful, 
responding to criticism, correcting errors, remaining fully transparent about 
the research process, and ensuring that all steps are verifiable, it is easy to 
accuse someone of non-compliance with one or more of these requirements 
of exemplary scientific behavior. At the same time, however, the Codes make 
it clear that such regulations and desirable behavior are examples of best 
practices, from which one may deviate under certain circumstances (which 
are not specified) and that failure to adhere to its best practices does not 
automatically constitute a violation of scientific integrity.
Thirty-eight of the 61 standards in the 2018 Code are actually best prac-
tices (2018: 23); however, all 38 should still be complied with. This means 
that one can complain about conduct that is not in full compliance with the 
Code, but the complaint is not likely to be judged as an integrity violation. It 
can thus happen that small, negligible errors and careless mistakes get blown 
way out of proportion because they demonstrate a failure to comply with the 
best practices laid out in the Code. Take, for example, standard 43: “Avoid un-
necessary references and do not make the bibliography unnecessarily long” 
(2018: 18). What is unnecessarily long and who decides how many references 
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are needed in the bibliography? The lack of clarity in both of the two current 
Codes (2004/2012/2014 and 2018) leads to dissatisfaction on all sides: the 
defendants feel as if they have been wrongly accused and complainants feel 
as if they are not being heard.
The space between error and fraud is thus not a gray area of indetermina-
te behavior. The behavior itself is easy enough to define; the problem is that 
the Code does not make it clear which behavior is classified as “unreliable” 
and which as “unacceptable”. No distinction is made between serious and 
minor violations, nor between conduct that is prohibited and conduct that 
is not; some behavior can be condemnable without being a violation of any 
law. In criminal law, there is a clear distinction between two different types 
of offences: actions that are inherently bad (mala in se) and thus worthy of 
maximum punishment and actions that are not bad in and of themselves 
but are regarded as such because they are forbidden (mala prohibita), such as 
submitting one’s tax return after the deadline. The same distinction is needed 
when it comes to interpreting violations of the Code—which actions consti-
tute serious offenses, and which are the result of “culpable carelessness”? 
To this end there are four categories of behavior to be discussed: Errors 
(both major and minor), carelessness (both major and minor), questionable 
research practices and violations of integrity.
Examples of errors 
 – incorrect use of statistical tests, such as one-sided testing in 
cases where two-sided testing would be more appropriate; 
calculating a standard deviation with an n-value that is too 
low; incorrect display of data in tables
 – arithmetic errors or typos that distort numbers, such as the 
incorrect placement of a decimal point
 – incomplete or incorrect source references (e.g. wrong page 
numbers, dates, journal titles)
 – failure to mention that the wording of a survey question was 
changed during the research process
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 – unclear problem definitions
 – unnecessary repetitions in the text
Examples of carelessness
 – failure to indicate the calculation methods used 
 – neglecting to include p-values in the verification of hypotheses
 – failure to explain and justify choices made at the beginning 
and end of the research process
 – neglecting to account for population and sample size
 – omitting crucial literature on the subject under discussion 
 – drawing conclusions that do not correspond to the research 
data or arguments shown 
 – neglecting to put quotation marks around quoted material
 – neglecting to mention certain sources in the bibliography 
 – accidentally copying a few sentences from another text without 
mentioning the source
 – neglecting to mention all co-authors in the case of a source 
mention (to be distinguished from omission in the publicati-
on; see below);
 – failure to respond to serious criticisms and questions about 
one’s own publications
 – unclear writing and reasoning 
 – an accumulation of various recurring errors
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There is no place for such errors and carelessness in sound scientific research, 
but that is not to say that the researcher did not have good intentions. Errors 
and carelessness may damage the quality of the research, but they do not con-
stitute a violation of scientific integrity by themselves. However, the question 
remains: When have there been so many careless errors that the integrity of 
the research becomes questionable? In other words, where is the boundary 
between sloppy science and a scientific integrity violation? Equating sloppy 
science with dishonest science is dangerous because it would mean that a 
broad range of unreliable research could fall into the category of scientific 
misconduct when there was no intention to deceive. The amount of unsound 
research out there is not yet known. There are estimates that 20% to 30% of 
scientific studies are unreliable (Martinson, Andersen and de Vries 2006), 
and certainly not all of them contain violations of integrity. However, it is 
clear that the reliability of research needs to be improved. In evidence-based 
medicine and evidence-based policy, for example, it is very important that 
these sloppy scientific practices, as well as responsible research practices, be 
thoroughly investigated (Bouter 2014), and that institutions take measures 
to counter questionable research practices. 
Examples of questionable research practices 
Traditionally, questionable research practices (QRPs) are those that can be 
considered deceptive, such as trimming and cooking, but other dubious 
practices have emerged that are often regarded as not entirely correct but are 
still tolerated. For example:
 – omitting outliers from the analysis and reporting 
 – deciding at the end of a project to eliminate subjects who do 
not meet certain criteria without explanation or justification
 – selecting additional subjects who do meet the right criteria 
after a trial or experiment has been completed
 – not repeating a test or experiment (once or multiple times) to 
verify results
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 – editing and modifying images without describing the steps 
taken in doing so 
 – using the same image twice but presenting it as two different 
images
 – rounding down p-values in statistical tests to generate a more 
favorable significance level
 – omitting historical data that do not support the theory or hy-
potheses in archival research
 – presenting correlations without explanation of the causal re-
lationship
 – generalizing results from small samples as indicative of the 
entire population
 – prematurely disposing of raw data and other research material 
that could be used to justify the research
 – failing to document the most significant research data, ma-
king it impossible to be held accountable at a later date.
There is something dubious about all these practices. Rarely do these things 
happen by accident. They could be an indication of a sly researcher trying to 
make his or her research look more perfect than it actually is in the hopes 
that it will be more easily accepted. Some of these practices clearly violate 
the game rules (especially those involving the omission of data) while others 
are examples of bad science that does not adhere to the goal rules (e.g. hasty 
generalizations).
A recurrent justification for some of these questionable practices, such as 
the omission of outliers, is that journal editors sometimes require it. In most 
cases, outliers are not relevant, and the editor may want to avoid superfluous 
information in the text. Sometimes SPSS programs are already programmed 
in such a way that outliers are automatically removed from the analysis. In 
other words, the omission of outliers is not always regarded as a questiona-
ble research practice; thus, it is important to consider the standards in the 
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field on a case-by-case basis. So when can the above-mentioned practices be 
regarded as violations of scientific integrity?
Examples of scientific integrity violations
The answer to this question is not covered by the three deadly sins of scien-
tific research: fabrication, falsification and plagiarism. In addition to these 
three, there are several other forms of integrity violations, such as:
 – not recognizing co-authors
 – incorporating non-scientific interests (e.g. commercial, poli-
tical, religious) into research outcomes and reporting 
 – not mentioning commercial interests or other conflicts of 
interest in the research
 – not obtaining the patients’ consent to participate in medical 
research 
 – not informing participants of the nature of the study they are 
participating in and that their responses may be used as scien-
tific data.
Conclusion
Based on the four categories of undesirable behavior discussed above, I pro-
pose a reformulation of the question of whether sloppy science is a form of 
integrity violation:
When can questionable research practices (e.g. statistical 
manipulations, the withholding of crucial information, poor 
documentation), combined with a pattern of carelessness, be 
considered fraudulent behavior and thus regarded as a violation 
of integrity?
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Or vice versa: When does a pattern of carelessness combined 
with one or more questionable or fraudulent acts and behaviors 
constitute a violation of integrity? 
One-time errors and careless acts that occur independently of each other 
are rarely judged as integrity violations. In such cases, the offender is likely 
to get off with a warning. But once the errors start occurring repeatedly and 
in combination with other errors, it is quite possible that an integrity viola-
tion is taking place. Repeated errors and sloppiness, particularly after the 
offender has already received a warning, may very well constitute a violation 
of integrity. However, this needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. All 
of these errors and bad practices form a stark contrast to the good practices 





Integrity: regulation, prevention, instruction
7.1   TRUST IN SCIENCE: SELF-CORRECTION AND  
SELF-REGULATION
Fraud damages trust in science, just as it damages trust in the banking world, 
the legal profession and the church. It is a clear indication that the represent-
atives of these social institutions are not living up to the standards they have 
set for themselves and for others. Nothing is more conducive to the loss of 
trust than hypocrisy, that is saying one thing and doing the opposite. 
However, we do not yet know the extent of fraud in science (see Chapter 
3). Thus, the question of whether the scientific system as a whole can no 
longer be trusted cannot be answered. Of course, each case of fraud is one 
too many, but it is important to distinguish between the normative question 
about the seriousness of scientific fraud, the empirical question about the 
frequency and extent to which fraud occurs, and the causal question about 
the damage that fraud causes to society and science. The three main forms of 
fraud, FFP, should not occur—let the normative judgment be clear—but their 
significance for science and society can vary tremendously from case to case.
The self-correcting power of science
Honesty and enthusiasm for science are two factors that contribute to the 
quality of scientific research. A true lover of science seeks real answers, so 
there is no reason for him or her to distort reality. A true lover of science is 
interested in reliability, quality and integrity. Science is based on trust in the 
scientific method. Although this method is not always followed perfectly in 
daily practice (Grinell, 2009: 21-58), it offers some assurance in the founda-
tion of knowledge, especially compared to other ways of answering questions 
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and responding to doubt (Peirce 1877; 1935, Volume V: 358-387). Competi-
tors to the scientific method include:
 – prejudice: if we don’t know something for sure, we can stub-
bornly cling to what we do know and base our beliefs on old, 
outdated theories and “truths”; in other words, falling back 
on assumptions like “this simply cannot be true” or “people 
with characteristics X, Y and Z can’t be trusted.” 
 – an ideological or metaphysical belief system: if we are not sure of 
something, we can appeal to our traditional or learned world-
view, which offers unverifiable answers to all questions; these 
answers may provide certainty, but of a rigid kind that is not 
grounded in reality.
 – trust in authorities: “If so-and-so says it, it must be true” or 
“That famous professor said so on television”. The authority 
argument still plays a role in modern society and can creep 
into science unexpectedly.
By comparison, the scientific method delivers far more successful results. It 
teaches us that science is constantly correcting our assumptions and itself. 
Its competitors are not self-correcting, but self-perpetuating. We are thus 
much better off relying on the scientific method, as long as we keep the fol-
lowing two realities in mind (Peirce, ibidem). 
First, we can never know anything for sure and science does not offer 
absolute certainty (Peirce, 1935, Volume I: 10-13; Pollack 2003). Knowledge 
is fleeting—something that is often forgotten in discussions about trust in 
science. But the transience of knowledge is not necessarily a disadvantage: 
in practice, old knowledge can be highly applicable and useful. However, 
one must bear in mind that knowledge acquired through inductive reaso-
ning may still be reliable. Following the example of American philosopher 
Charles Sanders Peirce, Karl Popper referred to this as “fallibilism” (Popper 
1972: 41; 64; 134). Although the problem of induction may be impossible to 
solve in theory, as Popper believed, it is still possible to live and work with it 
in practice. The fact that scientists often disagree with each other is not the 
exception, but rather the rule. 
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Secondly, scientific progress is almost always subject to specific conditi-
ons under which a given situation is or is not the case, or a given mechanism 
does or does not work. This means that science is becoming increasingly 
nuanced and specialized. Research is being carried out under ever more 
specific conditions; therefore, one must be cautious when it comes to for-
mulating generalizations. The urge for differentiation and specification in-
herent to science is also often forgotten or suppressed in public and political 
debate.
Science provides accuracy and clarity for opinions already present in so-
ciety and scientific circles, which have often already been expressed with 
great certainty. Undermining this certainty and replacing it with carefully 
tested perspectives is one of the most important functions of science. A good 
example of this is the case of Lucia de Berk, a Dutch nurse who was found 
guilty of seven murders and two attempted murders and sentenced to life in 
prison in 2003. Her sentence prompted philosopher of science Ton Derksen 
to reexamine the evidence presented in her trial, which included statements 
from scientific witnesses and experts. Derksen was able to show, in a scien-
tifically convincing way, that the evidence against her was flawed. The judges 
were not fully versed in probability arguments and the statistical pitfalls of 
the small numbers; they had also ignored certain indisputable facts that in-
validated the accusations and systematically omitted the counterarguments 
and evidence from the defense (Derksen 2006). Fortunately, Derksen recei-
ved support from other scientists and years later, his efforts led to De Berk’s 
complete acquittal. A miscarriage of justice was rectified through scientific 
reasoning and analysis. Without Derksen’s scientific attitude and enthusiasm 
for research, Lucia de Berk would have spent her entire life in prison.
In short, science is vital for the correction and improvement of social 
judgment. In a sea of irrationality, the scientific method offers a rational 
approach to scientific and societal questions.
From self-correction to self-regulation
Scientists judge the work of other scientists. This self-correcting practice 
emerged in the seventeenth century with the establishment of the Royal 
Society in London in 1660. New ideas and new discoveries were presented, 
commented on and discussed by an elite group of natural philosophers, in-
cluding Newton, before being published in one of the first scientific journals, 
Scientific Integrity
150
Philosophical Transactions. The first secretary of the Royal Society, Henry Olden-
burg, maintained contacts with a large number of correspondents, including 
Dutch scholars Huygens and Spinoza. The Society was a distant forerunner of 
the current peer review system, which emerged after the Second World War 
(Freeland Judson 2004: 272-274; 276). The scientific community has thus 
created a system of continuous criticism, one which does not end in a final 
ruling by a supreme authority or some other powerful institution proclaim-
ing which theory is correct. The self-correcting function of science is thus 
carried out by the scientific community itself, which is constantly making 
new discoveries, adjusting existing knowledge and offering new insights. 
However, in light of the recent cases of scientific fraud, it has been noted 
that the self-correcting capacity of science has failed us in the past (Stroeber, 
Postmes and Spears 2012; NRC September 21, 2012). Stroeber, Postmes and 
Spears investigated forty known cases of scientific fraud in support of their 
thesis on the not-so-self-correcting nature of science and found that several 
major cases of scientific fraud have gone unnoticed by the scientific commu-
nity, in this case by peer reviewers. The Levelt report already pointed this out 
in the Stapel affair (Levelt, 2012). During the peer review process, one’s work 
is assessed by fellow scientists before publication, not after. “Peer review is 
the process of subjecting an author’s scholarly manuscript to the scrutiny of 
others who are experts in the field, prior to publication” (Ware 2008: 6). But 
is the primary purpose of the peer review process to uncover potential fraud, 
thereby preventing the spread of false information? If so, then peer review 
is not so much about self-correction over the long term as about short-term 
self-cleansing, which is another matter entirely. 
In order to answer the question of whether the peer review process is even 
capable of detecting fraud, let us first examine what the process entails. Peer 
review is a remarkable institution: experts in a particular field are asked to 
judge the work of colleagues, who are also, in some cases, their competitors. 
To ensure fairness, assessments are carried out anonymously (double-blind 
or single-blind), but in reality, reviewers may be able to tell by the referen-
ces and/or method whose manuscript they are assessing (Ware 2008: 18). 
Moreover, that the anonymous reviewer cannot be publicly held to account 
may lead to unfair or distorted assessments. Research indicates that bias in 
peer review particularly disadvantages novice authors, female researchers 
and researchers who take an unorthodox approach (Freeland Judson 2004: 
266;271). Freeland Judson also points out that the peer review system has be-
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come overly bureaucratic and time-consuming and the actual improvements 
to the material under review are often marginal. 
There is also the fact that the reviewers are not looking for fraud (they 
do not necessarily check all calculations or have access to all the research 
data required to do so). They are mainly looking for new theoretical insights 
and discoveries. The anonymity provided by the peer review system can also 
increase the temptation to plagiarize ideas, as demonstrated in the Wachs-
licht-Rodbard case (see Chapter 3) (Freeland Judson 2004: 283-284). 
What we need is a more open system, where both the name of the rese-
archer and the name of the reviewer are known (double open), or at the very 
least, the name of the reviewer is known (single open). Another solution 
would be to make the peer review process available through open access, in 
other words, to publish the entire review process online so that anyone can 
access the original research data, the evaluators’ comments, the reviewers’ 
critique and the author’s response. This would make the discussion much 
more transparent, as discussions among scientists should be. 
Stroeber, Postmes and Spears (2012) concluded that “corrective mecha-
nisms such as peer review are not effective for detecting fraud” and that the 
system of “self-regulation” fails. This sounds plausible, but there seems 
to have been a subtle shift in their reasoning, namely from self-correction 
to self-cleansing and from self-cleansing to self-regulation. However, the 
self-correction and self-cleansing of scientific work presuppose a scientific 
opinion. Scientists are good at formulating opinions—it’s one of the main 
tasks of their profession. However, one’s opinion on whether something is 
fraudulent and unacceptable is a normative legal judgment and one that is 
based on existing rules and standards. When judging their colleague’s work, 
scientists may not be aware of the normative nature of their judgments. They 
tend to focus on the theoretical and/or practical insights that the article under 
review has to offer. This is well illustrated in the articles that Bax published 
between 1984 and 1998 in the Amsterdams Sociologisch Tijdschrift and the Sociolo-
gische Gids. The editors and reviewers were so interested in his theories about 
the relationship between religious regimes and political violence that no 
one bothered to examine the reports from his anthropological observations. 
They simply trusted that the reports existed and were in alignment with the 
findings published in Bax’s articles. As noted above, twenty years later, eleven 
articles had to be withdrawn (Sociologie 2014, 10.1: 3-4). 
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Questions about the self-correcting capacity of science should thus not 
be confused with questions about scientists’ capacity to establish whether 
the standards of scientific practice have been violated. By self-regulating, in 
other words by adhering to rules and principles for scientific practice that 
have been devised by scientists for scientists, we are entering a new, norma-
tive terrain.
7.2  A CLOSER LOOK AT THE SYSTEM OF SELF-REGULATION
In a system of self-regulation, scientists judge the work of other scientists. 
This is the same wording I have used in the preceding section to describe the 
self-correcting function of science and the peer review system, but self-regu-
lation presents us with a different perspective. In a self-correcting system, 
the scientific community and peer reviewers assess scientific quality (i.e. 
the effective implementation of goal rules); in a self-regulating system, they 
assess the propriety of the researcher’s conduct and determine what is and 
is not permitted when conducting and publishing scientific research (i.e. 
compliance with the game rules). The freedom of science means that a lot is 
permitted—especially in cases of advanced, cutting-edge research (Vanden-
broucke 2013)—but not everything. In a system of self-regulation, scientists 
must…
 – establish their own rules; 
 – put them into practice;
 – determine when these rules have been violated;
 – decide how violations should be dealt with.
There are several alternatives to self-regulation that are effective both in 
theory and in practice. It is thus useful to consider how such matters are 
addressed in other intellectual professions that, like science, are character-
ized by independence and a high degree of professional autonomy, such as 
medicine, law, architecture, accounting, and journalism. For example, doc-
tors and lawyers in the Netherlands are bound by statutory regulations for 
their profession. These legally binding codes of practice regulate admission 
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into the profession, set standards for properly exercising the profession, and 
require that there be an independent body in place to assess whether those 
standards have been complied with. The reason that these professions are 
governed by law is, of course, the importance of protecting patients and cli-
ents in their interactions with professionals who enjoy a high level of auton-
omy. As for these professionals, not only can they insure themselves against 
malpractice, they can also have a say on disciplinary boards. Together with 
objective, legally experienced industry outsiders, they can help determine 
the boundaries of what constitutes proper behavior within their profession.
Unlike in the medical and the legal profession, the self-regulation of 
scientists and academics is not (yet) governed by law. In the Netherlands, as 
in other places, the scientific community has drawn up its own rules, and it 
evaluates the behavior of its own members. Self-regulation in science most 
closely resembles the system of self-regulation in journalism. In the Nether-
lands, journalists have established their own code of conduct, known as the 
Leidraad [Guideline]. The boundaries of professional journalistic practice are 
assessed by an internal committee, the Netherlands Press Council, to which 
those who feel they have been improperly treated by journalists can address 
their complaints. Originally, the members of this Council were all industry 
outsiders, but nowadays it is composed entirely of journalists. Scientists and 
journalists do not have individual clients like doctors and lawyers do, and 
they serve a wider audience with interests that extend beyond those of the 
individual. Both attach great importance to independent reporting and hold 
themselves to high standards of truthfulness. 
Nevertheless, this system of self-regulation in science raises questions, 
especially when it is compared to the disciplinary codes for doctors and 
lawyers. Is the Code of Conduct a list of recommended best practices or a 
summary of scientifically inappropriate conduct? Apparently, it’s both, but 
the two functions are not clearly distinguished. Consider, for example, the 
preamble to the 2004/2012/2014 Code (previously cited in Chapter 2):
“The principles defined in this Code are detailed further in ‘best 
practices’. These best practices, which provide a certain set of 
norms for the conduct of teachers and researchers, reflect the 
national and international understanding of good scientific te-
aching and research. Under particular circumstances, deviation 
may be justified. The applicability of the provisions depends on 
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the concrete circumstances under which the scientific practitio-
ner operates. Moreover, the circumstances under which the uni-
versity operates are also regularly subject to change. Nonethe-
less, every practitioner must, if required, be able to explain and 
motivate if – and if so, to what extent and why – he is at variance 
with the best practices of the university Code of Conduct (the 
rule ‘apply or explain’)” (The Netherlands Code of Conduct for 
Scientific Practice 2004/2012/2014: 7, preamble; my emphasis).
The 2018 Code is based on the same ideas and most of its 61 standards are 
“best practices”: for example, how to formulate a good research question, 
how to choose the right research method, how to be transparent about po-
tential conflicts of interest, etc. Only fabrication, falsification and plagiarism 
are mentioned as clear “violations of scientific integrity”, whereas violations 
of other standards need to be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine 
the level of seriousness. 
Thus, the Code offers certain standards from which one can deviate. After 
all, the term “best practices” assumes that, in addition to the “best”, there 
are good and not-so-good research practices that could also be considered 
acceptable. Best practices are mainly used as a benchmark for institutions 
or organizations (or in this case scientific disciplines), and the term itself 
suggests that there is also a wide variety of legitimate, but less advisable, 
practices. The purpose of a code of conduct is clear: to define what constitu-
tes desirable behavior and to encourage practitioners to achieve this “best” 
behavior. But such a code does not answer the question of what should be 
done if this ideal behavior is not achieved. What if the principles of good 
research are not upheld?
In practice, best practices for scientific research can pose new problems: 
 – They can lead to differences of opinion about the quality of 
scientific research: “This research meets / does not meet the 
standards of scientific excellence defined in the Code”.
 – Not only are errors and careless mistakes considered scientifi-
cally unsatisfactory, they are also labeled as morally inappro-
priate behavior, a violation of integrity, or, in the case of the 
2018 Code, as “questionable behavior” (2018: 24).
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 – Non-compliance with the best practices mentioned in the 
Code can be mistaken for an integrity violation, leading to an 
increased number of scientific integrity complaints.
This third problem is mostly a practical one (too many vague complaints 
about violations of vaguely formulated standards), but the first two are more 
fundamental: When does low-quality research—which should in principle 
be corrected by the scientific community or during the peer review process—
warrant a scientific integrity violation complaint? Clearly, such a complaint 
can damage a researcher’s reputation, even when there was no intention of 
cheating. A slow shift is taking place in the evaluation of scientific research. 
Where we once focused on the scientific quality of the work, now we are 
increasingly judging the morality of the researcher. This is where the com-
parison with the legally binding codes of practice in the medical and legal 
professions becomes relevant. Do we need a similar code of practice in the 
academic profession?
The two Codes of Conduct currently in effect, 2004/2012/2014 and 2018, 
attempt to fulfill two different functions. But by not distinguishing these two 
functions, they produce more conflict, in complainants who feel that their 
(broadly formulated) complaints are not being taken seriously and resear-
chers who feel wrongly accused of violating (broadly formulated) standards. 
At the same time, there is a tendency within the system to confuse judgments 
of scientific quality with judgments of morality. Instead of focusing on the 
scientific content of the study, one focuses on whether the arguments are 
“reliable”. This moralization of research often replaces scientific criticism 
and monitoring within the scientific community.
In my opinion, this may be a hindrance to scientific freedom. The primary 
function of a scientific code of conduct is to clearly indicate which behaviors 
are a violation of the fundamental standards—the game rules—of professi-
onal scientific practice. There should be no misunderstanding about these 
behaviors. As long as scientists are in compliance with these fundamental 
standards, they should be free to choose how they work.
In the Stapel affair, it was not difficult to pinpoint which behaviors con-
stituted a violation of scientific integrity, especially after Stapel confessed. 
The hard part was cleaning up the damage. Separating the 55 contaminated 
articles from 82 non-contaminated articles was no easy task; it required 
a tremendous amount of research and expertise. All 55 articles had to be 
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withdrawn, but this retraction process alone was not enough to repair the 
damage that had been done, especially to Stapel’s junior co-authors. The 
withdrawal of scientific articles has become much more common in recent 
years, and we are not yet sure how this will affect the body of knowledge as 
a whole (Grienesen and Zhang 2012). 
The double function of the Code of Conduct can be traced back to its 
origins. Almost all scientific codes of conduct were formulated immediately 
after a serious case of plagiarism, fraud or fabrication occurred. These cases 
always bring about a demand for rules and measures, and a principled choi-
ce between a self-regulatory system and a legally binding academic code of 
practice has been preempted by the speed at which these decisions have to 
be made. This choice retains its importance today, but for now the practical 
question is: How does the chosen system of self-regulation work when it 
comes to addressing suspected violations of integrity?
7.3  THREE CONDITIONS FOR SELF-REGULATION 
In cases of suspected integrity violations, scientists must evaluate both the 
work and the behavior of the scientist in question. However, as indicated 
above, scientific researchers are more accustomed to making scientific qual-
ity judgments than to assessing their colleagues’ compliance with rules, even 
though they may have played a role in making those rules themselves. In 
addition, all cases of suspected integrity violations must meet the standards 
of fair trial, which places new demands on the scientists’ ability to adequately 
judge the case. Thus, the question can be formulated as follows: What con-
ditions must be fulfilled by the system for handling suspected integrity viola-
tions in order to justify and perpetuate the self-regulatory function of science?
First, allow me to describe the scientific integrity complaint procedu-
re followed in most Dutch universities. It is fairly hybrid in nature and not 
unlike a civil procedure. The complainant and the defendant each have the 
chance to present their case before the CWI. They exchange written eviden-
ce back and forth with comments from both sides, while the CWI acts as a 
pseudo-judicial body. However, in state-subsidized research organizations, 
like most universities, the complaint procedure is governed by Book 9 of the 
AwB, which falls under the general regulations of the AwB (although this 
does not extend to special agencies such as the non-state-subsidized reli-
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gious universities, the VU Amsterdam, the Radboud University and Tilburg 
University). The administrative law procedure allows for severe punitive 
sanctions, such as dismissal, suspension, warning, exclusion from a rese-
arch grant, discontinuation of doctoral studies or the revocation of a doctoral 
degree. Given the seriousness of these punishments, a precise formulation 
of exactly which behavior constitutes a violation is essential. The question 
is whether the current provisions of the two Codes of Conduct offer such a 
formulation. The regulations for scientific integrity at most universities are 
often more concrete and clearly formulated than the national Codes, and 
CWIs and Executive Boards are bound by their own regulations as well.
In view of this lack of clarity, wouldn’t it be better if there were a discipli-
nary procedure established by law, with permanent judicial boards instead of 
ad hoc committees of scientists that are constantly changing? Is the current 
complaint procedure still effective given that anyone can submit an integrity 
complaint nowadays? Would a system like the one used in Norway, where 
scientific integrity and plagiarism complaints are taken to the Public Pro-
secutor, and thus handled outside the institution concerned, be fairer and 
more sensible?
Professional performance
The system of self-regulation is highly dependent on professional perform-
ance, which may be lacking in practice. Ad hoc committees are often com-
posed of emeriti, who are well versed in matters related to their specific scien-
tific field, but have no idea how to carry out a thorough fair legal procedure. 
They assess what they themselves consider self-plagiarism instead of first 
asking whether there are any applicable rules on the subject. Other examples 
of unfair procedures include applying rules and insights retroactively (as dis-
cussed in Chapter 5) and treating small errors as serious forms of misconduct 
without asking whether the complainant might be exaggerating. 
Of course, these difficulties could be overcome with the help of good legal 
support, but universities must be willing to invest in this. Some universities 
have already taken this step and incorporated legal knowledge and experi-
ence into permanent CWIs. Other institutions are not yet ready to make this 
step. All too often, the defendants are literally “put on the stand”, where they 




Knowledge of the rules
Knowledge of rules and regulations is often lacking among those involved 
in the case and authorities, such as Deans, Confidential Advisors, Executive 
Board members and professional advisors. Deans often like to get involved 
in all the details of complaints cases, but they may also have to make other 
decisions later in the procedure, for example on labor law matters. In one 
case regarding plagiarism in a PhD dissertation, the CWI was composed of 
the Rector, the Dean and a third professor; thus, the Rector and Dean who 
had first been formally involved in the evaluation of the PhD dissertation were 
later also involved in the decision about the complaint. There was a lot to 
learn from this case, both theoretically and practically. It is important to keep 
separate the roles of Confidential Advisor (responsible for giving advice and 
information to the complainant and the defendant and mediation between 
parties if possible), the CWI (responsible for investigating, establishing 
the facts and forming an opinion), and the Executive Board (responsible 
for making the final decision on the case). Any overlap between them runs 
counter to the principle of fair trial. Since 2014, all Dutch universities have 
acknowledged this fact and separated the role of Confidential Advisor from 
the other roles.
Coordination among universities
The LOWI was established to coordinate the application of regulations in 
scientific integrity cases. This has proved necessary. At one point, four pla-
giarism cases from four different universities were brought before the LOWI. 
What would happen if these four universities were to adhere to their own—
very different—views on plagiarism, fraud or misconduct and ignore the rec-
ommendations of the LOWI? Theoretically, the system could collapse into as 
many jurisdictions as there are universities, each with its own interpretation 
of the rules. This risk is further exacerbated by the fact that the coordinat-
ing body is dependent on whether or not the complainant or the defendant 
chooses to make an appeal to the LOWI. If minor offences lead to heavy 
sentences at one university and serious offences lead to minor sentences at 
another, this constitutes a disturbing disparity. If one university allows an-
onymous complaints and another does not, you could end up with a situation 
where a complaint is submitted anonymously against a co-author employed 
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by the one university and publicly against a co-author employed by the other. 
This would certainly raise questions about equal treatment.
In other words, is a coordinating body with a purely advisory role enough 
to ensure consistency among the universities themselves? This consistency 
is crucial, and I do not understand why universities cannot work together to 
coordinate their decisions on integrity violations. Ultimately, these decisions 
are based on the same Code of Conduct. Following the example set in the 
medical field, one option would be to limit the number of CWIs to three or 
four and have them handle integrity complaints at multiple universities and 
advise the Executive Boards in question. This would provide continuity, long-
term experience and expertise, and improved coordination, and it would help 
to reduce the mistrust of internal committees, which may be too close to 
those involved in the case and their interests. In Finland, this coordination 
problem has been solved by requiring universities to submit all decisions on 
integrity cases to the National Office of Research Integrity, which can then, 
if necessary, advise the university to reconsider the decision at the request of 
the coordinating body (Finnish Code of Conduct for Scientific Research).
One thing is clear: the system of self-regulation needs good legal sup-
port in its implementation and good lawyers to implement it. But not only 
lawyers, because there is something to be said for scientists evaluating other 
scientists. Surely it is better to be judged by colleagues who have been in 
the lab and conducted research themselves than by outsiders who are not 
familiar with scientific research at all? This demand for fellow professionals 
in the disciplinary process has been heard in various industries, from jour-
nalism to sports, law to medicine. The example of a legally binding medi-
cal code of practice, overseen by experienced judges in five mixed regional 
tribunals (three outsiders, two insiders) and one Central Medical Discipli-
nary Court to make binding decisions, is, in my opinion, both attractive and 
efficient.
7.4   PREVENTION OF FRAUD AND MISCONDUCT:  
INTEGRITY POLICY
The KNAW advisory report titled Responsible Research Data Management and 
the Prevention of Scientific Misconduct (2012) emphasized the general need for 
improvement in all phases of the research cycle. Researchers need to be more 
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vigilant, and their work needs to be checked more frequently. After all, good 
research practices are a prerequisite for trust in the results. Sloppy research, 
though not in the same category as dishonest research, must be vigorously 
combated. The answer to sloppy science is to insist on improvement; the 
answer to fraud is prevention. Sloppy science requires good research policy, 
whereas fraud requires good integrity policy. A healthy research climate must 
be created and supported by practitioners at all levels, by the management 
and members of research institutes and by Faculty Boards, Executive Boards, 
journal editors and the management and membership of professional associ-
ations. They are all responsible for maintaining trust in science, both within 
the scientific community and among the general public. 
Nevertheless, policy on scientific integrity has been slow to develop. Per-
haps this is due to the moral weight attached to concepts such as integrity and 
fraud. No one wants to be accused of fraud or dishonest behavior. Organiza-
tions don’t want such behavior taking place under their roof, and if it does 
take place, they would rather keep it as quiet as possible. In the Stapel affair, 
Tilburg University was wise to opt for a more transparent strategy, which 
ended up being a major turning point for all Dutch universities. 
At the Third World Congress on Scientific Integrity (2013), Yarborough 
gave a lecture in which he compared the integrity policies of universities 
around the world with the safety policies of airlines, which, like universities, 
are highly dependent on the trust of the general public. He compared the 
five phases of safety control in the aircraft industry to the integrity policy 
of universities. The first phase involves a pathological apathy for risk, or a 
“that doesn’t happen here” attitude. Airlines can have this attitude towards 
safety risks and universities towards integrity risks. If accidents or cases of 
scientific misconduct do occur, the second phase is marked by a defensive 
reaction. The company or institution tries to keep things quiet. The third 
phase begins with the recognition that the problem can no longer be denied. 
This phase generally involves a risk analysis: What will cause more reputati-
onal damage—keeping things quiet and denying that anything happened or 
acknowledging the issue and trying to control the fallout? The organization 
is likely to opt for the most advantageous option based on the risk manage-
ment strategies learned over time. The fourth phase is more constructive: 
policy development. Rather than merely reacting to a crisis, the organiza-
tion develops a proactive policy aimed at ongoing improvement. The fifth 
and final phase involves achieving an open atmosphere of risk awareness, 
Integrity: regulation, prevention, instruction
161
regular audits and ongoing learning, resulting in “work the public can trust” 
(Yarborough 2013).
In my opinion, integrity scandals at Dutch universities tend to occur be-
tween the second and third phases. The same goes for international organi-
zations, which rarely get much farther than recommendations for principles 
of good research (e.g. honesty, fairness, objectivity, reliability, skepticism, 
accountability, openness) and leave it up to the scientific organizations they 
hire to make sure that these principles are adhered to (Responsible Conduct in 
the Global Research Enterprise, a Policy Report, IAP, 2012). Erasmus University 
Rotterdam was one of the first universities to adopt a systematic and proac-
tive integrity policy in all faculties (Wynstra, Van Donzel and Dijkstra 2013). 
After receiving a stern message from the Executive Board that integrity had 
become a serious policy issue, the university faculties were given one year to 
make adjustments within their departments. Each faculty had to appoint an 
integrity officer, set clear guidelines for researchers on what is and is not per-
missible in research, create a relevant course in all academic programs, and 
establish a standing committee to investigate suspected violations. What’s 
more, all new PhD students were required to take an oath at the start of their 
position, following completion of the integrity course. This helped to create 
a culture of conscious risk management, the fourth and fifth phases of Yar-
borough’s policy.
Another example of a meaningful integrity policy was found at Eindhoven 
University of Technology. Here the Board spent an entire year meeting with 
scientists in the university’s research institutes to discuss the desired content 
for new, university-wide regulations on scientific integrity. One year later, the 
university had a widely supported policy that described which behaviors were 
and were not permissible. 
The experiences of the integrity officers who investigate misconduct ca-
ses are also valuable when it comes to setting up an integrity policy. David 
Hudson, a physician from Virginia State University, summed up his fifteen 
years of experience by saying: “Assessing scientific misconduct is like eating 
soup with a knife, messy and slow.” His recommendations include: do not 
allow any misconduct that is not related to the scientific research in question 
to interfere with your case; do not allow quarrels about authorship to get out 
of hand—take quick action early on; show equal respect to everyone involved; 
avoid drawing conclusions until you’ve heard both sides of the story, don’t 
jump to conclusions; first set out a suitable procedure and clearly explain that 
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procedure to all those involved; be well prepared for interviews and hearings; 
keep a thorough record of all interviews; listen, don’t give your opinion too 
quickly; be mindful of your own behavior; use plagiarism detection software 
but don’t rely on it completely. Finally, he reminds us to “hope for the best 
but prepare for the worst”. His last piece of advice should come as an encou-
ragement to any scientist: “your investigation is research, behave like a rese-
archer” (Hudson 2014). In this sense, the impartiality and independence of 
an integrity officer runs completely parallel to that of a scientific researcher.
One of the pitfalls of an integrity policy is its integral approach. Scien-
tific integrity cases should investigate inappropriate conduct in scientific 
research, not assess the quality of the research in question or other forms of 
misconduct on the part of teachers and students. In other words, issues of 
scientific integrity should not be confused with other issues related to overall 
integrity. There are other preventive measures and procedures in place for 
other forms of integrity violations, such as criminal conduct (e.g. abuse, 
embezzlement), sexual harassment, discrimination, blackmail, financial 
fraud (unless directly linked to research fraud) and professional misconduct 
under employment law (being late to work or absent without leave, using an 
employer’s stationery for private purposes, etc.). This all goes without saying 
but given that “integrity” can be such a loaded term and violations can have 
major consequences, a sharply delineated scientific integrity policy remains 
necessary.
7.5   CAN INTEGRITY BE LEARNED? EDUCATION IN SCIENCE 
ETHICS AND OTHER SKILLS
One of the recurring discussions on integrity policy is the question of how 
and when the subject of scientific integrity should be addressed in educa-
tion. We know that the matter needs to be discussed, but at what stage of 
education? Until recently, scientific integrity was not an integral part of uni-
versity curricula, but that is not to say that it wasn’t taught. It has long been 
part of the “hidden” curriculum, that is all the things that one learns from 
instructors that are not explicitly included in the curriculum. For example, 
in my first year at university (1961-1962), I learned about scientific citation 
and other forms of referencing. Later as a young research assistant, I learn-
ed that plagiarism constituted a major transgression and one should never 
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withhold data. Personal guidance and learning by example have always been, 
in my experience, the best way to transmit norms and values in science. But is 
this still realistic given the high number of young, inexperienced researchers 
and PhD candidates? Nowadays, some professors are supervising so many 
PhD students (I have seen cases of 25 or more!) that it is difficult for them to 
provide intensive guidance.
In light of recent scandals, students are often required to take a structured 
course on “integrity” in the hope that they will exhibit proper scientific beha-
vior in the future. However, the link between scientific integrity courses and 
honest behavior has not been thoroughly researched. Just because one knows 
what is right does not mean that one will do the right thing. Ironically, some 
of the most high-profile fraud cases have involved middle-aged researchers 
with well-established scientific careers, and here we are trying to prevent this 
behavior by teaching the youngest generation about integrity.
Attempting to use education to prevent scientific misconduct is based on 
the presumption that we know exactly what to prevent and what the causes of 
misconduct are. If one of the causes of misconduct is a pressure to publish, 
then we need to try to reduce that pressure; if another cause is too little gui-
dance, then we need to provide better guidance. If the problem is merely a 
lack of knowledge of academic standards, then perhaps we should require 
students to take an exam on the subject. But let’s not forget that there are 
other, more stimulating reasons to promote scientific integrity in education, 
namely, to show students how much fun science is and to teach them what 
science is all about. In their life-long discovery of the joys of science, they will 
come to understand and appreciate that honesty is a natural part of scientific 
research.
Some are in favor of introducing the topic of plagiarism in primary school, 
where children are already learning to conduct basic research online (e.g. 
teaching them to properly cite and not to copy-paste information without a 
reference). Others believe that the issue of plagiarism should be addressed 
at the secondary-school level when students encounter more research assig-
nments and have more opportunities to copy-paste texts. How much can we 
really expect from incoming university students? 
During the first years of their university studies, these students will quic-
kly learn that researchers are held to a certain standard of integrity and that 
there is no room for lies and deception in science. They will also learn about 
the importance of properly citing sources and giving credit where credit is 
Scientific Integrity
164
due. A writing course combined with a visit to the library and explanation of 
the bibliographic reference system should be sufficient at the bachelor level. 
Students learn by doing, so it is important that teachers regularly correct their 
students’ mistakes (learning to read and write well is the secret to success, 
just like in primary school). Students in academic programs with a heavy 
writing requirement will most likely master basic writing and referencing 
skills within one to two years. 
Ideally, these basic skills should be complemented by a course in the phi-
losophy of science, in which bachelor students learn about the specific values 
of science (preferably with numerous examples from their field) and come to 
understand that there are many conflicting views in science and thus every 
argument needs to be attributed to a source. In other words, the importance 
of referencing sources is reinforced in the context of another course. Such a 
course would also devote a bit of extra attention to the ethics of science (per-
haps one or two sessions), thereby completing the students’ introduction to 
scientific integrity during the first phase of their higher education.
7.6  TEN RULES OF SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY
At the end of their university or professional studies, all graduates should be 
aware of the game rules of scientific research and scientific integrity. There 
are only ten of them, so they should be easy enough to remember: 
1.  Do not fabricate data
2.  Do not falsify or manipulate data
3.  Do not plagiarize
4.   Do not let scientific interests get tangled up with other inte-
rests
5.   Disclose any potential conflicts of interest in the final publi-
cation of results
6.   Recognize as co-authors all those who have made a substan-
tial contribution
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7.   Do not grant or accept unwarranted co-authorship
8.   Do not falsely accuse anyone of an integrity violation
9.   Do not try to cover up integrity violations
10.  Treat both the complainant and the defendant with fairness 
For those students who choose to continue in scientific research, the ques-
tion remains as to how and when they should be informed about more specif-
ic issues related to scientific integrity. Most authors on the subject agree that 
in this second phase of education (i.e. from the master’s level onwards) extra 
instruction on scientific integrity should be provided for novice researchers. 
At this point, it is not enough to simply remind them of the FFP standards. 
They need to gain a more precise understanding of what FFP is, which prac-
tices it entails and under what circumstances it occurs; it is also important 
to talk about special cases and possible exceptions. 
For this reason, a Penal Code would be more precise in its descriptions of 
disapproved and punishable conduct than, for example, biblical command-
ments such as “Thou shalt not lie.” (Katz 1987: 4-7; 210-252). For example, 
the fact that one can “lie” with statistics is well known, but learning how to 
carry out advanced statistical processing, the rationale behind it and its po-
tential risks is another thing entirely. Rather than devoting an entire course to 
ethics and morality, I think we would be wiser to address ethical questions in 
a skills course (if these questions were not already covered in the first phase 
of education). The style of teaching can vary depending on the subject: ethical 
issues are best addressed in a discussion-based format, whereas technical 
and advanced scientific skills are best obtained through practice and men-
torship. Finally, the principles of scientific integrity should be published and 
publicized online, and read and discussed.
By the time students reach the PhD level, instruction on the standards of 
scientific integrity could involve a combination of the following: 
 – reflection on the importance of ethics and values of science, 
preferably within the framework of the philosophy of science 
(examples include Van Schravendijk 2012; Cornelis 2013)
 – advanced skills training and statistical consultation
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 – personal guidance and mentoring
 – required reading of On Being a Scientist (2012) or similar litera-
ture
 – taking a scientific oath (Wynstra et al. 2013)
 – practice modules: specially programmed instruction per 
scientific field and online games (e.g. Dilemma Game, The Lab)
The latter two forms of instruction are still up for debate. Some feel that 
taking a scientific oath is superfluous: Why promise something that ought to 
be self-evident? But proponents see it as equivalent to the oath of office taken 
by civil servants, bankers, lawyers and doctors. When young researchers find 
themselves in situations that challenge their integrity, they can recall their 
promise to adhere to the highest standards of honesty. They can also remind 
their colleagues of this promise and use it to explain why they have chosen 
to do or not to do something.
An oath can also reinforce the internalization of integrity standards, 
though we do not have any confirmation from scientific research that this 
is indeed true. The same goes for online training modules. We do not yet 
know for sure whether digital instruction and online games are as effective 
for the internalization of scientific integrity standards as mentoring and the 
sharing of personal stories and ideals. What we do know, however, is that just 
because a university has published scientific integrity material online, this 
does not mean that it has a sufficient integrity policy (personal conversation 
with Simon Godecharle, KU Leuven).
Researchers and departments are free to choose any combination of me-
thods to transfer standards, knowledge and skills related to scientific inte-
grity. The chosen method may vary according to place, time and scientific 
discipline. The most important thing is that these methods are initiated and 
executed. One idea is to incorporate them into annual researcher gatherings, 
where PhD students meet with other junior and senior researchers to discuss 
their research. This can be an excellent opportunity for an open discussion 
on various practical issues and integrity questions. What matters is that the 
most important message rings loud and clear: 
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“The classic obligation and desire of the scientist is to be his 
own first and most watchful critic” (Freeland Judson 2004: 208).
7.7  WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM INTEGRITY? 
What have I learned from writing this study? First, that too much emphasis 
on integrity and morality can be counterproductive. Second, integrity should 
not be seen as an absolute virtue, just as no virtue should be pursued in abso-
luteness. A virtue is a balance between two extremes: for Aristotle, courage 
was the balance between overconfidence and cowardice. Integrity is some-
where between an obsessive fear of contamination and the desire to deceive 
others. If scientific integrity is regarded in overly absolute terms and every 
aspect of scientific research—down to the minute details—is held to the 
highest standards of integrity, we will end with a witch-hunt on our hands. 
Modern science is by nature an imperfect art, and there is no room for fanati-
cism and intolerance (cf. Atlan 2013). If scientists are frantically looking for 
fault in each other’s research so that they can point fingers and say “see, this 
person has committed a scientific integrity violation,” something is wrong. 
Naturally, this does not mean that we should not take violations of scien-
tific standards seriously. In essence, it is all about learning to distinguish 
between error and fraud. Minor errors, one-time mistakes and accidental 
shortcomings are not nearly as damaging to society and science as delibe-
rate deception and long-term fraud. As previously mentioned, criminal law 
makes a clear distinction between crimes and misdemeanors, and for good 
reason. Such a distinction would not be out of place in codes of conduct for 
scientific practice.
The third thing I learned from this study is that in the pursuit of integrity 
(in general and also in science), there is an interesting tension between the 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations for one’s behavior. In the first chapter, 
integrity was described as a standard for one’s own behavior, as a promise 
to oneself: “This is how I am going to behave and continue to behave, even 
if the people around me hold different views”. It’s about staying strong in 
difficult situations and sticking to your principles. These principles are the 
internalized standards that researchers live by when no one is watching, 
whether they be alone in the lab, deep in the library archives, or out in the 
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field. It is their own intrinsic motivation that compels them to adhere to the 
standards of scientific integrity.
The fact that, nowadays, many institutions are facing integrity problems 
and scandals has contributed to an excess of protocols, audits, supervisors 
and, in many cases, economically driven incentives. All of these factors can 
serve as excellent extrinsic motivation. In this respect, scientists are no lon-
ger driven by the pure joy of “figuring things out” or the desire to discover the 
secrets of nature. Science is chosen as a career path, as a way to achieve fame 
and make money. In one of the integrity courses that I teach, a young resear-
cher once said to me: “My goal is to publish a couple of articles in one of the 
top scientific journals because after that I’ll have it made.” This comment is 
a good illustration of the tension between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.
Scientific integrity presupposes a high degree of autonomy and personally 
internalized norms and values; at the same time, however, scientific norms 
and values are now primarily being taught and enforced through more con-
trol, peer pressure, supervision, compulsory courses, bonuses, and punish-
ments—in other words, through extrinsic motivation. Now the challenge is 
to promote scientific integrity as an intrinsic value and to pass that value on 
to younger researchers, and to cherish our own intrinsic motivation in the 
process. It is that intrinsic motivation that allows us to continue to uphold 
our norms and values without having to deny that science is a constantly 
evolving social force. Thus, we can believe in the value of scientific research 
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